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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis presents an investigation into the changing institutional fonn and 
policy content of the World Bank over the last two decades. It does this by 
relating the fonner to the contradictory trajectory of capitalist development at a 
global level. It is suggested that the noted transitions in the World Bank at the 
close of the millennium represent a series of reactive mediations to the 
unanticipated results of neoliberal-style reform. The latter are manifest in 
uneven development on a global scale, recurrent crises across the global South, 
and the expansion of local and global struggles that target the limits of 
development in its capitalist fonn. To build this argument the thesis examines 
the contradictory essence of capitalist development; the position of the World 
Bank as an international organisation within the context of global capitalist 
social relations; and the nature of Bank policy prescription in the 1980s and 
1990s. Additionally, the thesis concretises this analysis through a case study of 
the Chilean experience of neoliberal-style reforms that closely mirror the World 
Bank's prescription of "best practice". 
\'\ 
INTRODUCTION: THE WORLD BANK AND NEOLIBERAL RESTRUCTURING-
PAST. PRESENT AND FUTURE 
"Poor people are not liabilities, but assets. We have to invest in 
them, and empower them. Development must not be done to them, 
but by them" 
- James Wolfensohn, World Bank President, 2001. I 
At the tum of millennium the world's leading international organisation of capitalist 
development - the World Bank - was undergoing a period of upheaval and transition. 
Whilst its sister organisation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , remained 
resolute in its defence of the structural reforms that it had propagated globally since the 
debt crisis of the early 1980s, the World Bank embraced relatively substantial changes 
to its policy prescriptions and modes of interaction with client countries. In a series of 
speeches and publications the Bank began to outline a new development philosophy 
that, in contrast to the previously monolithic focus on freeing markets to achieve rapid 
and sustained economic growth, posits a "holistic approach" that balances 
macroeconomIc with structural and human needs.2 These changes in the Bank's 
discourse of development are considered to be part of what Joe Stiglitz has christened a 
'post-Washington consensus', or what World Bank President James Wolfensohn labels 
'Comprehensive Development'.3 Contrary to what Stiglitz criticised as the 'simplistic' 
nature of the original Washington Consensus, the World Bank's new framework 
constitutes a dual sided approach that combines sound economic policy with social and 
institutional reform and, in so doing, professes that there is more to fostering 
1 Wolfensohn 2001: .+. 
2 Wolfensohn 1999: 3. 
3 Stiglitz 2000; Wolfensohn 1999 contains the initial proposal for the Comprehensive Development 
Framework. The World Development Reports of 1999/2000, 2000/2001 and 2002 (World Bank 2000a, 
2001 a. 2002) elaborate in greater detail the substantive content of development practises that are to occur 
within this framework. 
sustainable development and reducing poverty than asserting the unbridled play of 
market forces. 
Importantly, however, the ongoing changes have not been limited to the content of 
World Bank development prescription alone. More fundamentally, the Bank now 
stipulates that profound changes to the way development is practiced are essential for 
success. In this respect, the World Bank now professes a mandate to empower poor 
people in order that they are able to achieve development and lift themselves out of 
poverty.4 In the words of James Wolfensohn cited above, development is no longer to 
be done to poor people but by them. This constitutes a furthering of the Bank's 
medium-term engagement with the concept of 'participatory development' which 
stipulated that the design and implementation of World Bank sponsored development 
programmes needed to involve the active participation of those involved.s 
Empowerment is now presented as a central axis in the World Bank's development 
practices and has been integrated into the prescription for a range of institutional 
reforms. 
In response to these changes, this thesis asks why the World Bank has shifted from the 
relatively narrow confines of the "Washington Consensus" prescription in the early 
1980s to a position of advocating the empowerment of the poor as an integral aspect of 
development strategy at the start of the new millennium? To be able to develop a 
response to this question, the thesis suggests that it is necessary to examine the World 
Bank's trajectory through the lens of an analytical enquiry into the contradictory nature 
of capitalist development. As elaborated in section one, development in capitalist form 
4 World Bank 2001a. 
5 cf. Cooke and Kothari 2001. 
constitutes the extension of the productive forces through the incessant yet haphazard 
movement of value. This entails the subordination of social reproduction to the self-
expansion of capital, a process that necessarily produces contradictory tendencies that 
repeatedly threaten to undermine the social basis of capitalist development. In this 
manner, whilst capitalism indeed develops the productive forces at unprecedented rates 
(the material basis of capitalist development), the social form of capitalist relations 
assures that the growth of social wealth is accompanied by uneven development, 
unremitting social struggle, recurrent crises, inequality and poverty. This conflictual 
duality of capitalist development is the antinomy to which the title of the thesis refers. 
As part two elaborates, the World Bank is constituted as part of these global social 
relations. On the one hand, it is driven continuously to consolidate the conditions for 
the accumulation of capital at a global level as this drives the process of material 
development in capitalist form. On the other, it has become increasingly involved in 
mediating the unseemly dynamics of this process in the global South, including 
escalating inequality, trenchant poverty, recurrent crisis and new forms of social 
struggle. 
Building from this analytical basis, the thesis builds an argument that relates the 
trajectory of reform in the Bank to the struggle-driven and crisis-laden trajectory of 
global capitalist development in the 1980s and 1990s. It is suggested that the 
transitions in the World Bank at the close of the millennium represent a series of 
reactive mediations to the unanticipated results of capitalist development within the 
context of neoliberal-style structural adjustment. Such contradictions are manifested in 
the increasingly uneven character of capitalist development on a global scale, recurrent 
crises across the global South, and the expansion of local and global struggles that 
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target the social limits of development in its capitalist form, i.e. the subordination of 
social reproduction to the expanded reproduction of capital. 
The tendency of capitalist development to continuously drive social struggle is central 
to the understanding of neoliberal-style reform presented in the thesis. It is argued that 
the essence of structural adjustment was an attempt to impose more fully the abstract 
social domination inherent to capitalist social relations as a form of social discipline 
that could impose limits upon the historical trajectory of social struggles in the South. 
Furthermore, the latest development discourse of 'comprehensive development and 
'empowerment', the thesis argues, represents a contradictory attempt to further this 
project of social discipline by actively harnessing the agency of subordinate groups to 
remove all non-market constraints upon their actions, and therefore embed themselves 
more fully in the abstract disciplines of capitalist development. In this respect 
empowerment represents a change in the means, rather than the ends, of contemporary 
World Bank development prescription. 
To construct this argument the thesis is broken into three sections that present three 
levels of analysis - analytical, national and global - through which a critical 
understanding of the nature and trajectory of capitalist development in the period of 
neoliberal reforms can be attained. These three sections examine respectively: a) the 
social foundations of capitalist development, b) the constitution and historical 
functioning of the World Bank as an institution of global capitalist development, and c) 
the course of capitalist development and neoliberal restructuring in Chile, 1973-2000. 
In the first of these sections, chapters one and two present a critical enquiry into the 
social constitution of capitalist development. By critiquing liberal notions of 
development the thesis begins to interrogate the specificity of development in its 
capitalist form. 6 The chapter argues that the social substance of development within 
capitalist social relations is the radical subjectivity of labour. A focus on these 
concerns leads to a close engagement with the social theory of Karl Marx and, 
specifically, the elaboration of his critical method in the Grundrisse and the subsequent 
analysis of the social relations of capitalist production in Capital. Marx's work is 
particularly apposite for the purposes of analysing capitalist development as it provides 
a basis on which to conceptualise the determinate social relations that give rise to the 
social forms constitutive of capitalist society. 
By analysing the specific dual character of labour in capitalist social relations, it is 
possible to chart the contradictory basis of capitalist development. Within capitalist 
social relations labour assumes the form of a contradictory unity between the concrete 
labour necessary to produce material goods for social reproduction, and abstract labour 
aimed at the production of value. Chapters one and two develop this theory and 
demonstrate how the subordination of the former to the latter gives rise to specific 
modes of abstract social domination that impose themselves objectively onto the 
socially-constituted subjects of capitalist society. These chapters indicate that this 
abstract form of social domination lies behind both the productive drive of capitalist 
social relations, but also the inherent tendencies towards antagonistic class relations, 
uneven development and crisis on a global level. It is on this basis, moreover, that the 
institutional form and the activities of the World Bank must be understood. 
6 The critique of liberalism is ongoing throughout this thesis, specifically of the liberal conceptualisation 
of the market as a realm of freedom (chapter two), its conceptualisation of international organisations 
(chapter three), neoliberal structural adjustment (chapter four), labour flexibility and social policy reform 
(chapter five) and the idea of empowerment through markets (chapter nine). Chapters six through eight 
likewise offer an historical critique of Chile's experience as "the success story" for neoliberal 
development practice. 
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In this respect, chapter three begins to formulate a materialist perspective on the World 
Bank. It is suggested that the Bank must be understood as an organisation suffused 
within the contradictory dynamics of capitalist development on a global scale, which 
impact upon it through various mediated forms including its position within the 
interstate system, its relationship with client countries, and its prominence as an object 
of global social movements. In this manner it is possible to comprehend the tensions 
within the World Bank institution and within its policy prescription, as well as to 
highlight the opportunities for local and global struggles to impact upon the character 
of the Bank. 
On this basis, chapter four attempts to historicize this approach to the World Bank by 
situating the Bank as an international financial institution within the major tendencies 
of post-War global capitalist expansion and the subsequent crises of the 1970s and 
1980s. The chapter broaches the character of the restructuring that swept across the 
global South in response to profound social crisis, and the World Bank's role within 
this conflict-driven process. It is suggested that the essential core of neoliberal 
restructuring was an attempt to impose more fully the abstract social dominations 
intrinsic to capitalist social relations upon states and societies in the South. This was to 
occur through a struggle-driven process of reconstituting the institutional forms by 
which the state and other social institutions mediated the relations of capitalist 
development. Withdrawing the state from historically developed roles and reinserting 
the primacy of the market not only seemed to offer a possible solution to the economic 
manifestation of crisis - i.e. the reassertion of the conditions for the expanded 
reproduction of capital - but concurrently presented a mechanism for societal 
depoliticisation by obliterating the circumstances in which politics had become a means 
for attaining social and economic ends. 
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Structural adjustment, therefore, is conceptualised as a series of institutional reforms 
aimed to assert the discipline of the capitalist social forms upon state and society 
through the disciplinary logic of money and other forms of abstract social domination. 
Guided by its neoclassical conceptualisation of money as a tool to facilitate mutually 
beneficial market exchanges, however, the World Bank does not recognise the 
exploitative essence of market relations sanctified by the impersonal power of money. 
It therefore did not fully anticipate, on the one hand, the pervasiveness of human 
resistance to processes of commodification, exploitation and the subordination of social 
need to profit and, on the other, the continual crisis tendencies of social relations that 
stubbornly refuse to conform to general equilibrium models. As such, the World Bank 
has been repeatedly faced with the contradictory essence of its project, and it is on the 
basis of these dynamics that the thesis proposes to understand the ongoing attempts to 
reinvent the socio-economic restructuring of the South. 
The third section of the thesis moves to a national-level examination of the 
contradictory trajectory of capitalist development in the era of neoliberal reform. Chile 
provides a valuable case study through which to address many of the above themes 
owing to three principal factors. First, Chile has often been viewed as a trendsetter in 
introducing fundamental and far-reaching neoliberal reforms. This reputation has been 
earned through the comparatively early initiation of neoliberal restructuring in Chile 
and the relatively greater depth and scope of the reforms vis-a-vis other Latin American 
countries. Second, in many respects, Chilean reforms, ranging from macroeconomic to 
social and labour policies, have gained a paradigmatic influence and have been 
embraced repeatedly by the World Bank in its "best-practise" prescriptions and 
propagated globally. Third, with Chile posting the highest GDP growth rates in Latin 
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America between the late-1980s and mid-1990s, the Chilean example has been 
heralded as proof of the success to be gained from commitment to a neoliberal policy 
prescription as prescribed by the Bank. 
Chile has received all the more accolades because its success, as stated in a recent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper, can be accredited to "good 
policies" and "improved political situation".7 As such, the IMP attributes the post-1990 
Chilean success precisely to the ability of the post-authoritarian governments to give 
full reign to the freedom of the market yet to combine this with forms of "neoliberalism 
with a human face" ("Growth With Equity"). In short, Chile is suggested to 
demonstrate the success of a particular form of neoliberalism in promoting capitalist 
development. However, by providing a critical analysis, this section highlights how the 
contradictions within the "Growth With Equity" paradigm reveal manifold limits to 
capitalist development within the modified paradigm now embraced by the Bank. 
Finally, the thesis ends by returning to the World Bank at the end of the crisis-stricken 
decade of the 1990s and examining how it has responded to the contradictions of 
uneven development on a global scale. In this respect, chapter nine concludes the 
thesis through an examination of the World Bank's new strategy of 'Comprehensive 
Development', including the notion of 'empowerment'. To close, it is suggested that 
this new World Bank strategy should not be understood merely as an instrumentally-
designed realignment to co-opt struggle, but rather a reflection of the crisis-stricken 
trajectory of capitalist development in the global South and the constant pressure upon 
the Bank to restructure its own forms of intervention within the context of local and 
global struggles. In this respect, the form and content of the World Bank's 
7 Jadresic and Zahler 2000: 12. 
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'empowerment' is not necessarily constrained within the limits prescribed by the 
institution. In contrast, the realisation of 'empowerment' will be established by the 
contours of struggles. To this end, the category of empowerment presents a new object 
for struggle in the global South. 
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CHAPTER 1: CAPITALISM, DEVELOP:Y1ENT 
AND THE RADICAL SUBJECTIVITY OF LABOUR 
This chapter attempts to penetrate analytically the notion of "development" by 
demonstrating how the social substance of capitalist development is related to the 
specific dual character of labour within capitalist social relations. On this basis, the 
chapter is able to identify how this contradictory basis of capitalist development 
manifests itself in the form of abstract social disciplines that appear as natural forces 
without social subjects. Subsequently, chapter two demonstrates how this abstract 
domination underscores both the unparalleled productive drive of capitalism but also 
the inherent tendencies towards uneven development, crisis, and the dispossession and 
impoverishment of a growing worldwide working class. To start, however, the chapter 
opens by examining the concept of development held by the World Bank as this 
provides a useful foundation for the ensuing discussion. 
1. The World Bank and the Metaphysics of Development 
A noticeable and ostensibly surprising feature of the World Bank's profuse research 
output is the pervasive vagueness that shrouds the Bank's analytical approach to the 
concept of development. Given that the Bank presents itself as a multilateral 
organisation whose internationally anointed function is the global propagation of 
'development', the manner in which it comprehends and represents this key concept is 
of paramount functional and ideological importance. Nonetheless, an examination of 
over two decades of the Bank's flagship annual publication. the World Development 
Rep0l1, rapidly establishes that, whilst Bank literature constantly alludes to an ongoing 
'process of development', there is no systematic elucidation of what this process is or, 
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more precisely, how it is socially constituted. At vanous moments the reader is 
informed of diverse facets of development including, for example, that development is 
a "process guided by the development of markets", that there are "many elements 
necessary for successful development", that it pursues a "range of outcomes", and that 
"social and environmental strains may derail it".) Similarly, the Bank states that: 
Understanding the process of development requires 
acknowledging both its complexity and the context zn which it 
operates. 2 
However, whilst this statement could presage the undertaking of a rigorous analytical 
deconstruction of 'the process of development' in order to reveal its determinate social 
substance, instead the Bank 'understands' development simply by acknowledging, on 
the one hand, the complexity of the social phenomena it gives rise to and, on the other, 
the importance of the social and political context in which it exists. By virtue of 
analytical occlusion, what the Bank terms the 'process of development' remains as an 
invisible and ethereal force that the Bank does not analytically penetrate in order to 
reveal its earthly core. In short, as employed by the World Bank, 'development' is to 
be conceived of in a neutral, self-evident manner as a common sense notion.3 
This disinclination towards a rigorous analysis of the social constitution of 
development is not for lack of a normative schematic of development (i.e. what the 
'development process' achieves), nor for want of advice on how to get there. On the 
I World Bank 1995: 16; World Bank 2000a: 17,23; World Bank 2003a: 4. 
2 World Bank 2000a: 31. 
-' The notion of development as an irresistible force that, in the right conditions, imposes itself on 
humankind mirrors the Bank's presentation of 'globalization', cf. World Bank 2000c (also IMF 2000a). 
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one hand, the Bank contends that the ends of the development process are both 
recognisable and measurable. These are conceived within a strictly modernist 
paradigm, with the end of development being in essence the replication of the socio-
economic conditions of the 'developed' liberal capitalist West; or, more specifically, a 
mass consumption economy with high levels of productivity, negligible levels of 
absolute poverty and, ultimately, the establishment of a liberal democratic political 
system.4 More recently, the Bank has integrated a 'human development' approach that 
complements the macro-focus with a micro-level focus on the ability of people to 
realise their innate capabilities and the substantive freedoms as judged against the 
model of a liberal-capitalist society.s 
The explicit normative drive of the Bank's conceptualisation of the 'development 
process' is substantively imbued with a social-evolutionism that became predominant at 
the end of the nineteenth century and was recast in the form of modernisation theory in 
the 1950s and 1960s.6 It is predicated upon a conceptualisation of development as a 
process through which the dichotomy between developed and developing countries is 
bridged. The latter are understood to be presently in a state of underdevelopment yet, 
subsumed under the development process, are on a trajectory towards the developed 
pole. On this basis, therefore, the relative achievement of development in the Bank's 
schematic can be measured in several manners, primarily by reducing complex social 
phenomena to quantitative indicators. The latter include statistical measurement of 
gross domestic product, basic economic and social indicators such as per capita income 
-I cf. Roxborough 1979. These characterisations of development reflect the taxonomy of development 
created by modernisation theory, which remains at the heart of the Bank's philosophy of development, 
and systematically elaborated by Walt Rostow (1960) in his 'The Stages of Economic Growth". The 
paradigm is broached again in chapter four. 
5 The latter conceptualisation of development is a recent addition to the Bank lexicon and is drawn from 
the work of Amartya Sen, although this new orientation has not proceeded beyond the level of rhetoric; 
cf. Sen 2000; World Bank 2001a: 35. 
6 On late nineteenth century social evolutionism, cf. Rist 1997: 40-5. 
1.2 
and life-expectancy, or changing trends in the number of people living on fewer than 
one or two dollars a day. Since the 1970s the Bank has regularly employed all three.7 
Similarly, the Bank also suggests that, to the extent that development as a process can 
be consciously influenced, this mediation resides primarily in the policy choices of 
national governments. The process of development, it argues, can be greatly facilitated 
by the implementation of correct policies and equally stunted by the failure to adopt 
these appropriate measures. Consistent with its conceptualisation of development as an 
ethereal process, the Bank suggests that such policies do not in themselves create 
development but, rather, affect the speed and volume at which it manifests itself. 
Substantial confusion arises, however, over what the "correct" policies are. As the 
Bank itself has recently acknowledged: 
Development thinking has followed a circuitous path over the last 
50 years. At various times it has emphasized market failures and 
market successes, governments as active interventionists or 
passlve enablers, openness to trade, saving and investment, 
education, financial stability, the spread of knowledge, 
macroeconomic stability, and more.8 
In spite of these major transformations in the Bank's prescription of sound development 
policy, the purpose of the latter is precisely to spur on a process that is conceived as 
already immanent. From this perspective, even in the era in which development theory 
promoted sustained and active state intervention, the state was seen as merely a 
7 cf. World Bank 2001a for their elaboration of the various manners of measuring poverty, the 
eradication of which they present as the foremost aim of contemporary development practise. 
S World Bank 2000a: 30. 
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substantial influence upon, not an author of, a wider and more abstract process of social 
change. 
Fundamentally, therefore, development appears in World Bank literature as a 
metaphysical concept: a process without a subject and with undetermined social 
substance. It is definable only by the ends it brings or by the particular style of policies 
that seek to influence its trajectory. Notwithstanding the identification of external 
influences and ends of development, the actual social basis of this process is rendered 
invisible and it therefore appears as a natural and objective phenomenon that is only 
facilitated or hampered, but not created, by human agency. Development is constituted 
as a universal process of social change that, aided by the prompting of humankind, 
naturally tends towards a normative vision of modernity as exemplified by the capitalist 
countries of the core. As will be developed below, this 'common sense' notion of 
development draws a superficial plausibility owing to the fact that capitalist social 
processes often do appear as objective phenomena without a subject. Even so, the 
seeming paradox of a social process without social subject raises the necessity of 
deconstructing the category of development through analysis that can reveal the social 
relations and historical processes that underlie the surface forms of societal phenomena. 
In this respect, beneath its metaphysics and persistent ambiguities, there nonetheless 
resides a more tangible understanding of development within Bank literature owing to 
an implicit correlation made between development and capitalism. This is most visible 
in the ends of development that are specified by the Bank for all the bank's criteria for 
development - such as industrialisation, high productivity, mass consumption, and 
higher ratios of foreign trade - closely relate to specific conditions associated with the 
historical emergence and subsequent trajectory of capitalist social relations. Based on 
14 
this nonnative concept of development, capitalism is posited implicitly as the cause of 
development, even though the Bank does not explicitly draw this connection. As 
Geoffrey Kay argues, in the literature of development economics: 
Capitalism is indeed the source of development according to every 
accepted definition of that term.9 
The World Bank and orthodox development theorists were, of course, perfectly aware 
that during the twentieth century there existed alternative models of development that 
professed these same modernist aims yet were based upon fundamentally different 
social relations, as exemplified in the fonn of the socialist economies of the Soviet 
Union, China, Cuba and others. lO The influence of these countries was wide, 
particularly as central planning often became intertwined with aspects of national 
developmentalism in the developing world, with India as perhaps the foremost example 
of rigid state control of key economic sectors within the wider environment of a 
capitalist private sector. Inside the orthodoxy of Western development theory, 
however, such experiences were designated as perverse experiments. This designation 
was not primarily based on an inability to realise modernist aims, although failures in 
this respect were widely emphasised, but owing to their allegedly authoritarian 
character and their restriction of the 'essential freedoms' of capitalist society. I I 
9 Kay 1975: 7. 
10 cf. Munck 2000. 
II Walt Rostow's "Non-Communist Manifesto" (1960) is a case in point. Moreover, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the socialist states of Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1990s, added to the rapidly 
growing capitalist private sector in China, has seemingly reconfirmed the essential association between 
capitalism and development. 
In this respect, the association of the ends of development with specifically capitalist 
social phenomena applies equally to the newer micro-foundations of 'human 
development' that privilege the individual as the unit of development. The 'cutting 
edge' of Bank research has been an attempt to broaden its approach to development and 
poverty so as to embrace a focus on the micro-level of individual empowerment. 12 The 
basic purpose of development within this is to expand what Amartya Sen terms "the 
real freedoms that humans enjoy".13 The United Nations Development Programme, 
which compared to the Bank was an earlier proponent of this line of development 
analysis, neatly summarises how this can be conceptualised as the expansion of choice: 
These choices should include access to income and employment 
opportunities, education and health, and a clean safe physical 
environment. Each individual should also have the opportunity to 
participate fully in community decisions and to enjoy the human, 
economic and political freedoms. 14 
Such freedoms, however, are predicated upon inherently capitalist social relations of 
societal reproduction that constitute humans as individuals dependent upon finding 
waged labour and underscores the division of social relations into seemingly 
autonomous spheres of life (the political, economic, civil society) in which individuals 
can then participate. Moreover, as elaborated more fully below, the formal freedoms of 
capitalist society are constituted within a pervasive social complex of abstract 
disciplines that give rise to a contradictory intermeshing of formal freedom with 
substantive domination. Temporarily setting aside this critique, however, what is clear 
12 World Bank 2001a. 
13 cf. Sen 2000: 3. 
14 UNDP 1990: 1. 
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is that the unspoken social basis for development, even in the Bank's transhistorical 
elaboration of the concept, is the emergence of specifically capitalist social relations. 
In pondering the uncertainness of 'official' post-war development theory to tackle the 
relationship between development and capitalism, Colin Leys has suggested that the 
reduction of development to a transhistorical process represents a political 
unwillingness to engage with the work of Marx and Hegel within the Cold War 
politico-academic environment of the United States. I5 However, at a more abstract 
level, the reason that the Bank's association between capitalism and development 
remains implicit is not derived from any desire to obfuscate a relation between the two, 
but rather is inherited from the weak theoretical basis of neoclassical economics which, 
owing to its peculiar ontological foundations, is unable to provide a satisfactory basis 
upon which to distinguish capitalism from other forms of social relations. The latter 
weakness, moreover, is rooted in neoclassicism's ahistorical conceptualisation of 
production as a universal and asocial relationship between humankind and nature 
undertaken in conditions of material scarcity.I6 The inability of liberalism to account 
for the specific trajectory or recurrent features of capitalist development, it is suggested, 
stems from this theoretical basis. Before broadening the critique of the World Bank's 
conceptualisation of development by deconstructing its theoretical roots in neoclassical 
economics and liberal social theory, it is pertinent to examine the social transformations 
upon which these latter attempts at theorising development were constructed. 
2. Capitalist Development and the Social Re-Constitution of Labour 
15 Leys 1996: 7. 
16 C\;rke 1991 a: 182-206. 
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As outlined in the above sections, concurrent to the idea of modernity itself, the notion 
of development is intrinsically related to the global expansion of capitalism as a 
specific form of social relations. This transformation was reflected in the work of the 
classical political economists. Grappling with the creative destruction unleashed by 
capitalist social transformation in eighteenth century Britain and Europe, the classical 
political economists and their critics probed the specific character and consequences of 
emergent capitalist social relations and the pressing political questions that they 
raised. 17 In this respect, the emergence of "modem" society and its specific 
characteristics was the central concern of Locke, Smith, Ricardo and other classical 
political economists who, faced with the imminent processes of the rise of industrial 
capitalism in Western Europe, offered what can be considered the first theories of 
capitalist development. 
Fundamental to the classical political economists' analysis of capitalist development as 
a social transformation into a qualitatively new modem era was the recognition that, 
with the advent of capitalism, labour was being reconstituted in a new and distinct 
form. For Adam Smith this reconstitution of labour into a modem form was effected 
through the specialisation of work within an increasingly complex division of labour. 18 
Specialisation was facilitated by the growth of the market, leading to a virtuous circle 
wherein specialisation induced greater productivity, higher national income and, 
therein, the further enlargement of the market. What Smith highlighted, therefore, was 
that the rise of capitalism was correlated with a tendency towards dramatic increases in 
the productivity of human labour. The importance of this trend cannot be understated, 
as it constitutes the material basis of the notion of development as a social process. 
17 cf. Sayer 1991; Clarke 1991a; Cowen and Shelton 1999. 
18 Smith 1991. 
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Through productive revolution, growing numbers of socially useful items (use-values) 
could be produced and, in so doing, capitalist development offered a potential solution 
to material scarcity. Furthermore, the process of removing humankind from unending 
toil of subsistence theoretically offered the basis for personal and social development 
by increasing the amount of time available to augment human potentials. Material 
advancement could therefore be seen as paving the way for social, cultural and political 
progress. 19 
The productive potentiality that seemed innate in the new social relations, however, 
was mitigated by the readily observable immiseration of the rapidly expanding working 
class. Freed from former relations of overt feudal domination and separated from 
alternati ve means of social reproduction, this growing mass of human beings was 
constituted as a great accumulation of potential labour, reliant on the provision of 
capitalist work to be able to reproduce itself. It became rapidly clear, however, that the 
dynamics inherent to capitalist social reproduction entailed that the provision of 
capitalist work was tenuous and marginalized significant parts of the population. On 
the one hand, the old, disabled, ill, and those with redundant skills, were systematically 
excluded from capitalist work and their social reproduction was strictly jeopardised. 
On the other, the development of modem industry seemed to contain within it a motion 
to continually reduce the need for labour within certain branches of production owing 
to technological advancement, thereby expelling labour from the productive process.20 
Whilst other branches of production might subsequently harness this relative surplus 
population, the overall tendency was for the maintenance of a fluctuating reserve army 
of labour that served to suppress the general level of wages and which faced an 
19 This formulation remains the basis for modern theories of development, cf. Weisband 1989: 16; 
Escobar 1997: 85. 
20 Marx 1976: chapter 25. 
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uncertain ability to secure its social reproduction. 21 At the same time, the outbreak of 
periodic crises accentuated the former trend by precipitating the mass ejection of labour 
from the production process and swelling the ranks of the reserve army. 
What these phenomena underscored, therefore, was that the newly emergent 
relationship between capitalist labour and wealth creation was a complex one. 
Although labour was widely recognised as the source of social wealth - as explored in 
the theories of value developed by Smith, Ricardo and others22 - the latter assumed a 
peculiarly dual form that greatly challenged the conceptual apparatus of classical 
political economy.23 On the one hand, the wealth creating properties of labour were 
represented in the expanded quantity of use-values in all their idiosyncratic concrete 
forms. On the other, however, social wealth was represented in the abstract form of a 
quantitative value ascribed to these commodities and made tangible in the form of 
money. The tendencies associated with fluctuations in value, moreover, appeared as 
complex laws that were divorced from the direct control of humankind. In sum, the 
abstract developmental potential of capitalism, concretely manifested in rising 
productivity, was accompanied by the experience of profoundly asymmetrical class 
relationships, material deprivation, social conflict and repeated crises that routinely 
jeopardised the sustained reproduction of the working class. 
That the social relations of capitalism were inherently conflictual and unstable was 
marked by the emergence of new forms of class struggle, both within the industrial 
realm and at the level of politics, which reached heightened levels of intensity during 
21 As discussed in chapter two, to the extent that the reserve army dwindles. increased wage costs 
pressures capital to replace living labour with machines. hence replenishing the surplus population. 
~~ d. Kay and Matt 1982: -'+6-50. 
2.1 cf. Marx 1973: 103-6. 
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crisis periods. These struggles imparted a formidable dynamic upon the existing forms 
of political organisation and propelled the materialization and subsequent development 
of the modem state. Continually pressured through insidious social struggles to 
intervene in the relations of social reproduction, the emerging modem state was forced 
repeatedly to: 
[Cjompensate for the negative propensities of capitalism through 
the reconstruction of social order ... to ameliorate the social 
misery which arose out of the immanent process of capitalist 
growth. 24 
In short, the capitalist state was propelled into systematic intervention in the relations of 
social reproduction and on this basis began to implement certain limits to exploitation 
within the capitalist enterprise (such as regulating the length of the working day) and, 
later, the staggered implementation of forms of social security that could guarantee the 
material reproduction of labourers when, for sickness, old age or lack of opportunity, 
they were unable to sell their labour-power. 25 
Building from the work of the classical political economists, contemporary social 
theory assumed an important function of analysing and providing theoretically 
grounded foundations for the emerging forms of state intervention. 26 The importance 
of this task was accentuated by the tendency for intervention to become 
institutionalised within an expanding state apparatus. Propelled by political exigencies, 
therefore, the mid- and late nineteenth century social theorists produced conflicting 
24 Cowen and Shenton 1996: 116. 
2:\ MUller and NeusUss 1975: 60-72; Ginsburg 1979 . 
.'<> Clarke 1991a: 174; Dinerstein and Neary 2002. 
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VISIons of the possibilities for, desirability of, and limits to, social refonn. 
Concurrently in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the emerging discipline of 
social administration began to evaluate the effects and efficiency of such interventions 
with new categories of scientific method.27 Fused together, these two fields of 
knowledge led to the creation of what can be called "development doctrines": a 
programme of scientifically appraised social intervention, to be undertaken primarily 
by the agency of the national state, coupled to the systematic elaboration of a justifying 
ideology grounded in contemporary social theory. 
Nonetheless, the legacy of classical political economy proved a political liability for 
this task. Rooted in an attempt to explain the development of social wealth in capitalist 
society as the product of labour, classical political economy was drawn towards a 
labour theory of value. The latter, however, imposed a correlate theory of class 
relations that, despite being represented as a natural and beneficial state, necessarily 
invoked a concept of exploitation. The potential ideological benefits of a new, 
depoliticised, basis to understand social relationships encouraged the generalised 
adoption of a 'value-free' approach that, through a retreat into fonnalism, could 
exorcise analytically the spectre of exploitation and class struggle. As such, the 
decades before the tum of the century witnessed the rise and increasing predominance 
of modem bourgeois economics. This so-called 'marginalist revolution' in economics 
has since been hailed as the theoretical movement that "freed political economy from 
extraneous political considerations, and so founded modem 'scientific' economics'·.28 
27 Mishra 1977. 
2S Clarke 1991 a: 182. For a rigorous critique of neoclassical economics, cf. Weeks 1989. 
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The original questions that had underlain classical political economy's interrogation of 
capitalist development - the revolution in the form of labour, the complex appearance 
and determinations of value, and the causes of the conflictual relationship between 
classes - were entombed within the petrified categories of bourgeois economics that 
saw no need to go beyond surface appearances to examine the relations constitutive of 
social phenomena. Within the parameters of neoclassical economics, the question of 
the radical social subjectivity of labour within capitalism disappears, to be replaced by 
a theory of the factors of production in which land, capital and labour are placed 
alongside each other as equal inputs into the production process and which derive 
specific sources of income. Concurrently, within the burgeoning paradigm of the social 
sciences, labour was assimilated as an object for sociological enquiry that belied its 
earlier conceptualisations as the "form giving fire" of modern society.29 In this way, 
the question of the historical specificity and essential character of capitalist 
development in the countries of the initial transition was rapidly dissipated under the 
reified and ahistorical categories of modern economics and the increasingJy 
technocratic realm of social administration. 
3. Liberalism, Production and Development 
Modern liberal economICS, like classical political economy, derives its fundamental 
categories from specifically capitalist social relations. As described above, the 
destruction of former overt social bonds, such as those that characterised the 
relationship between feudal lord and serf, was innate to the emergence of capitalist 
social relations. Once labour is constituted as a commodity its owner is freed from all 
29 cf. Dinerstein and Neary 2002: 15-16. According to Nichols (1992. cited in Dinerstein and :\eary 
:2002: 16). within the narrow confines of the sociology of labour and the correlated discip.l.ine (It lab(lUr 
studies. labour became "nothing other than an intellectually pretentious way of saying work . 
specific relations of personal domination. In contrast to explicit extra-economic 
coercion, within capitalism human beings are constituted as free individuals in the 
sense that they are able to select with whom to exchange their personal commodities, 
including their capacity to labour. In place of subsumption within a politically 
articulated whole, therefore, an 'economic' realm of society emergences as a separate 
and separated domain of human activity in which the free labourer appears as a private 
individual who can freely choose with whom to conduct exchanges in the ambit of the 
market. As Marx put it, in capitalist society: 
The various forms of social connectedness confront the individual 
as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external 
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necesslty. 
Neoclassicism then proceeds to use this abstraction in order to create models of a social 
universe composed of freely exchanging individuals whose private activities are 
coordinated by a market mechanism that arises spontaneously from the freedom and 
rationality of the actors involved. From this model, the modem individual is 
conceptualised as a private owner of property who is able freely to trade his/her 
commodities under conditions of equality, reciprocity and freedom in order to improve 
his/her subjectively ascribed utility. Not only are private exchanges viewed as the 
natural quality of humanity, they are also seen to provide a mechanism to serve the 
common good. As Milton Friedman articulates, the basis of neoclassicism is the 
"elementary proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, 
provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed".31 The immediate aspect 
30 Marx 1973: 84. 
31 Friedman 1962: 55. 
of exchange, therefore, is a rational encounter between two individuals seeking to 
maximise the utility of the possessions they hold in relation to their personal material 
needs and desires. Moreover, given that the endless nature of human needs and desires 
must be reconciled with the finite provision of material goods (the condition of 
scarcity), the institution of private property that provides the legal basis for 
appropriation of scarce resources by the private individual is derived as the rational 
manifestation of a need to restrict potential conflict and anarchy.32 
The emphasis on exchange as the fundamental relationship of rational society IS 
reflected in the neoclassical representation of production. The latter is comprehended 
as a technical exercise of combining the necessary factors of production (capital, land, 
labour) in order to create final products with greater marginal utility. The production 
process, moreover, rewards the individual possessors of each factor of production 
according to the relative value of their contribution and the overall utility of the final 
product. In effect, this excludes the possibility of a direct relationship between profits, 
wages and rent - and therein between the classes of capitalists, workers and landowners 
- as each is derived from the natural laws governing the value of commodities. 33 The 
value of the wage, for example, reflects the relative marginal productivity of labour in a 
particular task as a portion of the final utility of the good produced. The latter, in tum, 
merely reflects the aggregation of individual evaluations of the marginal utility of a 
particular item. 
The fundamental theoretical postulates of modem economics, therefore, are that market 
relations (exchange) are the expression of inherently rational individuals expressing 
32 Clarke 1991a: 197: also cf. Kay and Mott 1982. 
33 Kay 1975: -+. 
their desire to maximise personal utility in conditions of scarcity, and that production is 
a natural extension of these principles to the creation of more complex goods. Upon 
this theoretical framework, these principles can be employed to understand economic 
relations without consideration of the particular social institutions in which they occur. 
Whilst restrictions upon individual utility maximisation can be imposed by specific 
institutional arrangements (slavery, feudalism, communism, etc.), the latter are 
conceived as artificial and illegitimate impediments upon a state in which individual 
rationality and freedom is maximised to the benefit of the common good. From this 
perspective, development constitutes precisely a process of the formal liberation of the 
individual from society, of stripping away the institutional aberrations that have 
withheld the highest state of individual rationality and utility maximisation. Intrinsic to 
this process is the free circulation of the factors of production in order to permit optimal 
resource utilisation and, as such, the commodification of labour-power through the 
separation of the labourer from the means of production is merely a further step 
towards the development of optimal rationality. Capitalism, therefore, represents the 
end of a long, historic process of the self-realisation of the indi vidual. 
On these foundations, the notion of development can be stripped of any historically 
specific character. Development becomes 'just development', a universal, timeless and 
asocial process of overcoming scarcity and associated human deprivations through the 
realisation of the rationality of modem individuals. This leads to a profoundly 
ahistorical conceptualisation that involves the collapsing of the distinct social forms of 
capitalism into transhistorical phenomena. A recent World Bank publication provides 
an excellent example. In opening the World Development Report 2002 with the 
concerns of eleventh century Maghribi peoples to expand trade in conditions of 
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imperfect information, the World Bank suggests that they have found the ideal 
anecdote to represent the development quandaries of the current age. As they see it: 
Today, a millennium later, people everywhere face similar 
problems in striving to improve their well-being through market 
activity.34 
By elevating the question of development to a transhistorical struggle to realise 
conditions unique to capitalist society, contemporary concerns unique to capitalism can 
then be read back onto the history of previous social formations. A fundamental 
consequence of this methodological stance is the implicit but pervasive teleology that 
discounts all alternative social formations to liberal capitalism as temporary, 
institutionally imposed, aberrations. In this conceptualisation of development as a 
transhistorical process that raises the same basic questions across the ages, the Bank 
renders development to a general human law of progress that has been latent 
throughout human history.35 
The fundamental weakness of liberal theory in both its economIC and sociological 
guises, however, is that modem society is not a social grouping of private individuals 
but is composed of socially constituted individuals within the context of an historically 
specific form of social relations. In this way, the modem individual is not a 
transhistorical social figure but rather, a determinate product of capitalism. It is only 
when capitalist social relations have dissolved the former ties of personal dependence 
and overtly social manners of mediating social reproduction that the independent 
14 World Bank 2002: 4. 
1'i In this sense, the Bank is following a trend well established since the classical political economists, cf. 
Marx 1973: 85-7. 
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individual of liberal theory emerges. However, whereas the genesis of capitalist social 
relations does indeed break up the former overtly social coordination of production that 
characterised pre-capitalist relations, this does not entail that social mediation comes to 
an end to leave a society of freely interacting individuals. On the contrary, within 
capitalism social mediation is reconstituted as an abstract social relation. The 
developed social forms of this abstract mediation, moreover, create a society of socially 
determined individuals, a determination that contradicts in a fundamental manner the 
liberal ideal of society being the agglomeration of the activities of natural, independent, 
rational, self-maximising individuals.36 
At heart lies the question of the dual form of capitalist development, one that the World 
Bank does not formally acknowledge. As is elaborated above (and in more detail in 
chapter two), capitalist development is predicated on the expanded reproduction of the 
material basis of society through the development of the forces of production and the 
creation of ever increasing quantities of useful things (use-values). This appears as the 
formal and rational provision for human needs and is based on a simple circuit starting 
with production according to needs, distribution of revenues allocated to factors of 
production, exchange to circulate goods to match human desires, and consumption. 
However, whilst the notion of development rests on the concrete manifestation of an 
ever-growing number of use-values, its capitalist social form is the expansion of value 
through the drive to accumulate capital. The subordination of use-value production and 
distribution to the contradictory dynamics of value, as elaborated below and in chapter 
two, is the essence of the manifest substantive irrationalities of capitalism as manifested 
in class struggle, uneven development, un- and under-employment, poverty and 
recurrent crises. Owing to its theoretical presupposition of the essential rationality of 
36 Marx 1973: 83-87. 
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production and exchange, however, liberal theory has no adequate manner by which to 
account for the latter except by labelling them as contingent irrationalities that arise 
from either the failure of capitalist social relations to be adequately established or from 
the inadequacies of the institutional forms governing capitalist social relations. 
As the following sections will attempt to demonstrate, such contradictions are not the 
result of contingencies of institutional forms but are inherent to capitalist social 
relations owing to the specific and contradictory character of the latter. The major 
implications of the Bank's ambiguous conceptualisation of development, therefore, do 
not reside within the realm of theory. On the contrary, the inability to provide a 
satisfactory basis on which to analyse the trajectory of and tendencies within capitalist 
development at a world scale gives rise to a substantial disjuncture between the Bank's 
projections for the course of development and the experiences of the vast majority of 
humankind residing in the global South.37 The latter divergence in tum engenders 
strong material and ideological tensions that react back upon the Bank in the form of 
institutional conflicts and contradictory policy prescriptions, as examined in the 
following chapters. A stronger conceptualisation of capitalist development, one that 
can go beyond the Bank's formalism and ahistoricism to reveal the social constitution 
and dynamics of capitalist development's phenomenological manifestations, can 
provide a significantly enhanced basis on which to examine the historical tendencies of 
capitalist expansion in the South. Hence, in contrast to the Bank's unwillingness to 
engage in analytical enquiry into the historical, social and material basis of 
development, the remainder of this chapter attempts to chart precisely this terrain 
through the prism of Marx's social theory. 
37 cf. (for example) Leys 1996; Chossudovsky 1996; Green 1995; Sutcliffe 2001; and even the more self-
critical moments in World Bank 2001a. 
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4. Alienated Labour as the Social Substance of Capitalist Development 
The marginalist revolution provided the basis on which the constitution of economic 
categories within the specific form of capitalist social relations could be removed from 
theoretical consideration and constrained within its own asocial discipline of 
'economics'. This did not blunt the intention to provide an analysis of society as a 
whole, but rather delegated this task to complementary disciplines within other 
branches of scientific enquiry that could examine the specific institutional dimensions 
of particular societies. Upon this theoretical basis, modern liberal social science 
emerged within the separate and detached disciplines of economics, politics and 
sociology, with each carving out a specific area of social enquiry. In this manner, 
mainstream social science attempts to provide an explanatory framework that can 
conceptually link the splintered character of social life by taking the surface forms of 
capitalist society as given and subsequently proceeding to integrate them through a 
series of external relations.38 Taking the fetishised forms of appearance of capitalist 
society as a starting point, however, obscures their essential unity as distinct yet 
internally related forms of capitalist social relations.39 Hence, an appropriate task for a 
truly social theory is not only to recognise the specific socio-historical constitution of 
the fractured nature of modern society, but also understand both the relations through 
which this separation is reproduced and the limits to this reproduction. An attempt to 
generate such a social theory was offered by Karl Marx. 
38 cf. Bonefeld 1993: 8-15. 
39 As Simon Clarke highlights, the worker, consumer and citizen are not three separate people, but one 
and the same person whose existence is fragmented into seemingly separated social spheres within and 
through capitalist social relations; Clarke 1991c. 
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The radical divergence of Marx's thought from its classical political economy 
predecessors and the subsequent neoclassical counter-revolution is to be found 
primarily in his conceptualisation of the historically specific and socially mediating 
nature of labour in capitalism. In this way, production - rooted in the expenditure of 
human labour-power to create useful things - IS not an ontologically defined, 
transhistorical relationship of humankind to nature. If, as in mainstream social science, 
labour is conceived in this universal manner, then it can be seen to vary only in tenns of 
the degree of technological sophistication and in the particular character of 
superimposed distribution relations. Marx's approach was fundamentally different. As 
he notes at the beginning of the Grundrisse: 
All production is the appropriation of nature on the part of an 
individual within and through a specific form of society.4o 
In capitalist society, Marx's argument proceeded, the specific and peculiar social 
organisation of labour brings into being abstract modes of social mediation that, in tum, 
create and structure the fonns of everyday social practise. This leads to the first 
defining point of the theoretical framework that guides this thesis: production in global 
capitalist society is indivisibly material and social in that it is both the production of 
material goods and of social relations. 41 
Labour in capitalist society is specifically aimed at the production of commodities for 
exchange within the relations of a generalised and seemingly accidental division of 
labour. Within this division, the total social labour undertaken to make the material 
40 Marx 1973: 87. 
41 Clarke 1980a: 18. 
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goods necessary for social reproduction is performed through the atomised acti vities of 
indi vidual commodity producing units. The distinctive character of capitalist society, 
therefore, is that social labour exists only in the form of its opposite, private labour, and 
each producer is dependent upon exchanges with others in order to obtain the privately 
created goods necessary for the satisfaction of her/his material needs. Concurrent to the 
fragmentation of social production, social wealth assumes the form of a great mass of 
privately owned commodities whose circulation rests on individual exchanges that, in 
their totality, comprise "the market". 
In contrast to the atomised nature of immediate production relations, however, the 
sociality of capitalist production assumes a more definite form through the process of 
exchange in the forum of the market. Owing to the division of productive functions 
into private activities, individuals find themselves subjected to an objective imposition 
to engage in continual exchange relationships in order to obtain the commodities 
needed to satisfy human needs. Through this series of market relations, producers 
bring the products of private labour into relation with each other. However, whilst 
individual producers remain bound up in particularistic and accidental exchange 
relations with only a contingent social character, the commodities they bring to market 
appear as inherently social things. This social nature of commodities manifests itself in 
the form of their universal exchangeability, regardless of their qualitative 
idiosyncrasies. In the ambit of the market, each commodity enjoys the ability to enter 
into a determinate quantitative relation with all other commodities. In short, all 
commodities are endowed with value, and it is precisely the generality of this value-
form, therefore, that allows commodities to relate as intrinsically exchangeable things. 
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Although it appears to be a quality inherent in the material substance of commodities, 
value is only explainable as a social substance, the result of the historically specific 
social relations of capitalism in which atomistic private labours assume an abstract 
social character through unplanned market exchanges. This relates to the dual nature of 
labour in its capitalist form. On the one hand, all labour has a concrete character, a 
qualitatively specific type of labour to produce a qualitatively specific use-value. 
However, as indicated above, the social relationship of value abstracts from the 
qualitative specificities of the use-value at hand, and places commodities in a 
homogeneous, quantitative relationship. Concurrently, the labour that stands behind 
the value of a specific commodity is socially constituted in an abstract and 
homogeneous form, devoid of its particular technical, physiological and intellectual 
characteristics. Socially abstracted labour, therefore, is specific to the relations of 
production in capitalism and constitutes the social substance of value. As Diane Elson 
clarifies, Marx's conceptualisation is not that of a universal 'labour theory of value', 
but rather a 'value theory of labour in capitalism', therein specifying the unique 
character of labour in capitalism as abstract value producing labour.42 
In exchange, value assumes the concrete form of an exchange-value that is expressed 
quantitatively in the form of money. This quantitative determination of value is 
ascribed to the commodity as the recognition of the socially necessary labour-time 
expended for the production of a particular commodity. Through a process of social 
averaging undertaken via the mediation of exchange relationships, the constitution of 
value tends towards the social labour time required to produce an article under the 
normal conditions of production and with the average degree of skill and intensity 
42 Elson 1979. 
prevalent at the time.43 Importantly, the conceptualisation of socially necessary labour 
as the substance of value differs fundamentally from the Ricardian conceptualisation of 
value as the specific time expended by the private producer for the creation of the 
commodity at hand (embodied labour). Socially necessary labour time, in contrast to 
the Ricardian conception, is not a pre-given quantity but is constituted socially and 
revealed through the process of commodity exchange on the market. 
Socially necessary labour, therefore, is disclosed to the producer post-factum through 
the forum of the market in the form of a monetary amount that appears as an element 
inherent to the commodity itself. Simultaneously, it manifests itself as an abstract 
imposition upon individual producers to conform their private production to the 
determinants of the social average in order to secure their self-reproduction. In the 
words of Moishe Postone, time becomes necessity, and this transformation of social 
temporality prefigures the increasing domination of society by abstract capitalist time 
measured in seconds, minutes and hours, with fundamental implications for the 
character of capitalist development.44 As is developed further in the following chapter, 
the imposition of abstract social domination that forces producers to constantly 
conform to socially averaged labour times measured in abstract capitalist time 
necessitates constant revolutions in the forces of production that engender the 
incredible productivity associated with capitalist social relations. 
The abstract character of capitalist labour has direct and essential implications for the 
form and content of social relations. Whilst the relations between individuals are 
sporadic and accidental, the relationship between commodities is constant and 
4, Marx 1976: 129. 
44 Postone 1993: 190. Relating to historical struggles over the imposition of abstract time see Thompson 
1967; and for a further development of the theory of capitalist social time see Neary and Rikowski 2002. 
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determinate. This is commodity fetishism, where the social relations between human 
beings become mediated through the products of their labour. The result is that the 
relationship of producer to producer appears not as a social relation between human 
beings but as a social relationship between material things. The apparent absurdity of 
capitalist social relations, however, is not a product of the self-delusion of those 
involved but reflects the real processes of social abstraction inherent to capitalist 
society. As stated by Norman Geras: 
It is the absurdity not of an illusion, but of reality itself, 
and to this extent it is an absurdity which is true. 45 
Human relations do indeed take the fetishised form of relations between commodities, 
exchanged in the forum of the market, and all of which communicate through the 
common parlance of value expressed in quantitative sums of money. The concrete 
form that commodity fetishism assumes is the subordination of the productive powers 
of humankind to the movement of value. The latter is fetishised in liberal theory as the 
"invisible hand", an inherent equilibrating quality of the market as a "device" or 
"mechanism" for coordinating the plans of many individuals.46 The formal 
independence of freely contracting individuals, however, masks the objective 
interdependence of society manifested through the impersonal movement of value that 
imposes itself upon actors as an objective and alienated social force. 
Socially abstracted labour is therefore the social form assumed by labour in capitalism 
and is the social substance of capitalist development. Marx referred to this as 
~5 Geras 1971: 76. 
46 Hayek 1978; for critique see De Angelis 2002. 
"alienated labour" in his early works, although this title has given rise to confusion. 
The alienation involved in alienated labour is not the separation of the labourer from 
the product, which is common to all forms of production that involve a social division 
of labour. Rather, it is the manner by which abstract labour becomes an alienated 
social force that reacts back onto humankind as an objective form of social domination. 
As Marx stated in the German Ideology: "The productive forces appear as a world for 
themselves, quite independent of and divorced from the individuals ... whose forces 
theyare".47 ResultantIy: 
Individuals are subsumed under social production, which exists, 
like a fate, outside of them; but social production is not subsumed 
under the individuals and is not managed by them as their 
common power or wealth.48 
This abstract domination is the social fabric of capitalist society upon which is 
inscribed increasingly complex forms of social relations. It is the abstract basis upon 
which the more concrete and immanent forms of exploitation and domination rest and 
its necessary development is towards a particular relationship between classes at a 
global level.49 The most immediate expression, however, is in the social power of 
money. 
47 Marx and Engels 1970: 86. 
48 Marx 1973: 164. 
4') An analysis of abstract labour, commodity fetishism and the movement of value provide the basis for a 
theory of social power in global capitalist society. In contrast to the overt political domination that 
characterised feudal and other pre-capitalist modes of production, domination in capitalist society is 
~xpressed in the alienated form of the ascendancy of things over people, where "social action takes the 
form of the actiol! of objects which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them" (Marx 1976: 75). 
In this respect, the domination of capital and the perpetuation of capitalist social relations do not firstly 
rest upon the political supremacy of the capitalist class but through the impersonal power that appears 
inherent in things, crystallised in the social power of money, and which is armoured by the rule of law; 
l'f. Blanke, Jurgens and Kastendiek 1976; Clarke 1988. 
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In a world where social labour takes the fonn of atomised private labour, the movement 
of value is the alienated fonn assumed by the inherent yet alienated sociality of 
capitalist relations. Money, the universal equivalent, becomes the medium through 
which this alienated sociality is concretely manifested. In Marx's fonnulation, 
therefore: 
Money is labour time in the form of a general object, or the 
objectification of general labour time, labour time as a general 
d · 50 commo lty. 
However, examined in a phenomenal sense, money indeed seems to possess the rational 
function of being simply a means of exchange, a remedy for the inconveniences of 
barter. On this basis, the classical political economists rightly critiqued the mercantilist 
fable that money was the intrinsic source of value by arguing that it was simply one 
more commodity that, owing to specific historical and phenomenological reasons, had 
come to serve as a universal equivalent. Nevertheless, in considering money as merely 
one commodity amongst others that, in conversion to the universal equivalent, 
facilitated man's transhistorical need to "truck, barter and exchange" as Adam Smith 
put it, the classical political economists failed to grapple with money as the fetishised 
fonn of val ue and a means to harness the social power generated through the abstract 
social domination of things over people. 
Through its ability to endow social power upon its holder, money does indeed possess 
the fabulous qualities assigned to it by mercantilist theory, a factor underscored by 
50 Marx 1973: 168 (emphasis in original), 
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money's status as being the end rather than the means of capitalist social relations. 
These qualities embedded in money, however, do not emanate from an inherent 
metaphysical quality, as the mercantilists speculated, but derive from its social function 
within capitalist society in which money, as an incarnate form of value, becomes the 
primary mediator between individual and society. Put simply, possession of money 
defines an individual's ability to command a portion of abstract social labour, either 
dead labour in terms of commodities or living labour in terms of labour power. It is 
therefore as a developed form of value that, within capitalist society, money constitutes 
a social power far removed from the benign means-of-exchange posited by orthodox 
economics in spite of its appearance as a rational and neutral instrument that merely 
mediates between commodities. Money, as the universal equivalent and therein the 
most abstract form of alienated labour, is the foremost expression of the fetishised 
world in which things dominate people. It is in this way that money emerges as the 
"nexus rerum of capitalist society, the supreme encapsulation of capitalist social 
relations that revolve around value".51 
Alongside the transformation of labour capacity into a commodity to be bought and 
sold on the market (as examined in the following chapter), the emergence of money as 
an abstract claim on social wealth paves the way for new forms of accumulation and, 
specifically, the transformation of the relations of production under the auspices of 
capital. Together, these conditions provide for the emergence of capital as a social 
relation predicated on the self-expansion of value. Within this relationship, the abstract 
domination of capitalist social relations reacts back upon the former as a coercive yet 
revolutionary form of social imposition that underscores the historically unprecedented 
dynamism of capitalist production. However, the implications of alienated labour, the 
51 Fine and Lapavitsas 2000: 367. 
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value-form, and abstract domination for understanding the global relations of capitalist 
development only become fully explicit when the analysis moves up a level of 
concreteness in order to consider the class basis of global capitalist society, its 
historical genesis, the global circuits of capital and the tendencies inherent in global 
social reproduction. This is the task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL CAPITAL AND THE SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 
OF THE WORLDWIDE WORKING CLASS 
The idealised society of commodity producers that appears as the abstract construction 
for Marx's initial theorisations is not to be understood as an historical stage but rather 
as a logical abstraction that needs to be theoretically and historically concretised. In 
this respect, three aspects are emphasised in this chapter. First, each of the categories 
employed by Marx presupposes the others,l and it is therefore necessary to map 
analytically the more complex forms assumed by capitalist social relations. As 
elaborated, this is to suggest how abstract social domination takes the form of a specific 
class relationship between capital and labour and competition between individual units 
of capital. These derivations can then be employed to analyse the relationship between 
capitalism and development by highlighting both the inherent productive drive of 
capitalist social relations alongside the contradictory tendencies inherent to them. 
Second, the dynamics of capital accumulation give rise to the tendency towards uneven 
expansion on a global scale. Historically this expansion has taken different forms, 
including the intemationalisation of commodity, productive and finance capital 
respectively. On this basis, it is therefore necessary to chart the historically specific 
development of global capitalist society in order to be able to recognise the character of 
and some of the tendencies inherent to these relations. Third, the global expansion of 
capital has created what I term the worldwide working class, creating a situation in 
which global social reproduction is increasingly wedded to the expanded reproduction 
of capital. The contradictory nature of capital accumulation, however, creates extreme 
tensions within this relationship. The nature of these tensions and the role of the state -
I Postone 1993: 128. 
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both national and international forms - are therefore analysed in the final two sections 
of the chapter. 
1. Capital, Class and Exploitation 
As highlighted in the prevIOus chapter, Marx characterised societies owmg to the 
distinct nature of their production relations. In this respect, production in capitalist 
society is characterised through the fundamental class relationship between capitalists, 
who monopolise control over the means of production and subsistence, and wage-
labourers, who possess solely the capacity to labour owing to their separation from the 
former. To posit the centrality of the division between capital and labour is not to 
suggest that all relationships in capitalist society fall neatly into this dichotomy. In 
contrast, as argued below, forms of employment that do not conform to this relationship 
are an inevitable feature of uneven capitalist development on a global scale. Rather, it 
is to suggest that this relationship is the primary and defining relationship of capitalist 
society. 2 As Marx stressed, capitalism is characterised by a situation in which: 
The owner of money must find the free worker available on the 
commodity-market; and this worker must be free in the double 
sense that as a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power 
as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no 
other commodity for sale, i.e. he is free of all the objects needed 
for the realisation of his labollr-power. 3 
2 d. Fine 1998: 175-6. 
3 Marx 1976: 272. 
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Historically, this specific class relationship first emerged in Western Europe through a 
process of 'primitive accumulation' that, by way of enclosure and mass dispossession, 
divorced the peasantry and many petty producers from the means of production in order 
to create a labouring class. Abetted by the power of the state, this historical movement 
created the basis for the capitalist mode of production by destroying non-capitalist 
forms of social relations and turning the ability to labour into a commodity to be sold 
and bought on the market.4 Within this process the social means of production - and 
therefore the means to social reproduction - are turned into capital and become the 
property of a capitalist class. Hence, in contrast to the basic notion of liberal theory 
that society is composed of freely contracting individuals who meet in the marketplace 
with diverse commodities to trade, capitalist society is composed of specific social 
relations, the primary relationship of which is a class relation between capitalist, owner 
of means of production, and worker, possessing only the capacity to labour. In short: 
[TJ he bourgeois theory of the market is a theory of a social 
institution which quite simply does not exist.s 
Once separated from the productive apparatus and thereby lacking the autonomous 
means for self-reproduction, the newly "free" labouring class has few options but to 
continually enter into a relation with capitalists in order to socially reproduce itself, 
therein creating the class relation intrinsic to capitalist society. It is important to make 
clear the precise nature of the class relation that this historical process created. If class 
is understood sociologically in terms of social stratification, then we are faced not only 
" rf. Brenner (1977), Wood (1999) and Perelman (2000) for distinct interpretations. 
5 Clarke 1990a: .+52. 
with the three great classes of modem society according to sources of revenue 
(capitalists, workers and landowners), but these in tum can be broken down in infinite 
regress according to incomes derived from specific locations within the branches of 
production. Moreover, as the post-modem critique would assert, there is no need to 
privilege sources of income revenue when delineating social groupings. In contrast, if 
the sociality of individuals is built upwards according to voluntarist principals of 
individual self-association, there is a multiplicity of divergent identities that the 
individual can assume based upon stratification according to ethnicity, gender, income, 
consumption patterns, etc. From this basis, as emphasised by 'post-Marxist' critics 
such as Laclau and Mouffe, there is no limit to the plethora of social groups that can be 
formed from these identities and no grounds on which to prioritise the importance of 
different social groupings vis-a-vis an emancipatory ideal.6 In this way, the reality of 
social stratification appears to impose a terminal challenge to Marx's insistence on the 
primacy of the capital-labour dichotomy and the importance of the struggle between 
capital and labour.7 
However, this critique represents a fundamental misinterpretation of the level of 
analysis that Marx was using. Viewed from the perspective of the historically specific 
dynamics of social reproduction within capitalist social relations, the primary relation 
unique to capitalist society is that of the owners of production vis-a-vis those that own 
solely labour-power, and the fundamental dynamic that underscores this relationship is 
the appropriation of surplus value within the production process, as examined below. 
In this respect, from a materialist perspective, class is to be understood as a constitutive 
form of capitalist social relations derived from the value-form and predicated upon a 
6 This is the basic proposition of LacIau and Mouffe's (1985) critique of Marxism. 
7 Marx's final chapter of Capital Vol. 3 (1981: 1025-6) anticipates this manner of critique. but the 
manuscript terminates before a reply is articulated. 
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relationship of exploitation at the level of social capital and social labour. Like other 
forms of capitalist social relations, moreover, class necessarily assumes complex forms 
at higher levels of concreteness. In this respect, as developed in section five below, the 
concrete manifestation of the 'working class' is that of disarticulated social fractions 
stratified according to locations within different branches of production, levels of skill, 
productive and unproductive labour, and a plethora of other differences. However, by 
understanding class as a necessary development of the value-relation inherent to the 
alienated form of social labour, it is possible to chart the internal constitution of what 
appears as externally differentiated social stratification.8 
The dynamic properties of this historically specific "capital relation" become evident 
on examination of the circuit of industrial capital, a movement that expresses the unity 
of production and circulation in capitalist social relations as differentiated moments of 
total social reproduction: 9 
M-C (LP+ MP) ... P ... C' -M' 
Starting from the basic relation of capitalist and worker established above, the capitalist 
exchanges money for labour-power and the means of production. 1O Subsequently, in 
the production process, the labourer is set to work, using the means of production to 
8 Allman et al. (2000) provide a similar account of the fundamental class dynamic but do not emphasise 
how social stratification that, in appearance, belies this relationship is the necessary form of appearance 
of class relations. 
9 M = money; C = commodities; LP = labour-power; MP = means of production; P = process of 
Prroduction. 
o Labour-power is sold like any other commodity at a price that revolves around a socially composed 
value. The latter is historically constituted through struggle at a level that generally oscillates between 
the value of the commodities necessary for subsistence and the limits of the profitability of the capitalist 
enterprise. If the price of labour-power is forced below the level of subsistence, the social reproduction 
of the working class is jeopardised, and hence the basis of capitalist production. On the other hand, if the 
price of labour-power increases the capitalist enterprise comes under pressure to replace living labour 
with machines. 
produce commodities whose value exceeds that of the original capital. These use-
values - as the depository of value - are then placed on the market where their sale 
realises their value and completes the social circuit of capital with a greater sum of 
money than originally advanced. Whilst value is generated in production, it is only 
realised in the act of commodity exchange through circulation. The excess value 
created in the production process and realised through circulation constitutes the 
capitalist's surplus value. 
Within this process labour-power is the dynamic commodity as it is only the 
application of labour-power that has the ability to create value. I I The creation of 
surplus value from the labour-power commodity rests in the ability of its purchaser to 
compel the labourer to work above and beyond the time necessary to produce the value 
expended in the wage, and this can be accomplished in two primary manners. On the 
one hand, absolute surplus value refers to increasing the amount of time laboured 
beyond that necessary to produce an amount equivalent to the value of labour-power. 
This is achieved through lengthening the working day, or an increase in the intensity of 
work. The absolute limit to this form of surplus extraction is the physiological 
exhaustion of the worker, although the contingent limits are set by the course of class 
struggle that aims to institutionalise limits to the length of the working day and the 
conditions of work.I2 On the other hand, relative surplus value is produced through 
diminishing the value of the goods needed for the reproduction of the labourer, thereby 
reducing the value of labour-power. This occurs when productivity increases result in 
the cheapening of consumer goods that are used for subsistence. The latter is a process 
II Marx 1976: 270-280. 
12 d. Marx 1976: 389; MillieI' and Neusilss 1975. 
that does not take place within the circuit of an individual capital, but rests upon a 
generalised increase in labour productivity in the consumption goods sector. 
Surplus-value creation constitutes the fundamental driving force of capitalist 
production, although the valorisation process as the unity of surplus-value creation and 
realisation stretches beyond production. 13 The capitalist production process must create 
more value than that invested in the purchase of labour-power and means of production 
and this value in tum must be encapsulated through the production of socially accepted 
use-values. Finally, the product must be exchanged for money to complete the circuit. 
Assuming that commodities exchange at their values, the ability of the capitalist to 
create more value, and therein make a profit, depends on the production of surplus 
value in the labour process and this adds a critical dimension to the movement of value 
outlined in the previous section. First, the subsumption of the production process under 
capital entails the subordination of use-value production to the expansion of value as 
represented in its money form. Capitalist production is not aimed at creating use-values 
for consumption, for this is only the material embodiment of production and not its 
social form. Within capitalist social relations, production is aimed at the creation of 
use-values as the material bearers of value and, specifically, the surplus value that 
underlies profit. Second, the facilitation of the self-expansion of value necessitates an 
exploitative vertical relationship between the owners of capital and the owners of 
labour-power. The purchase of labour-power as a commodity entails that the working 
class receives only a portion of the value that it has produced through labour. 
Subsequently, all value embedded in the products of labour, including the surplus 
value, is realised through the circulation and purchase of the commodities and, thus, 
13 Fine 1975; Clarke 198Gb. 
appropriated by the capitalist. This results in the generalised process of what can be 
termed permanent primitive accumulation through which: 
On the one hand, the production process incessantly converts 
material wealth into capital, into the capitalist's means of 
enjoyment and means of valorisation. On the other hand, the 
labourer, on quitting the process, is what he was on entering it, a 
source of wealth, but devoid of all means of making that wealth his 
14 
own. 
In this manner, once analysis moves away from the neoclassical fixation upon 
circulation and free-exchange to examine capitalist social relations in their totality as 
the relations between classes, then not only does the extraction of surplus value through 
the expansion of value beyond that necessary to reproduce labour-power become 
evident, but concurrently it is appreciable that the motion of capitalist social relations 
serves to reproduce the original nature of the class divide. As such, the social relations 
of capitalist production involve not only the production and consumption of material 
goods but also the production and reproduction of definite social relations. 15 
2. Competition and the Reproduction of Capital 
Whilst the production of value involves a direct, exploitative and conflictive 
relationship of capital and labour, the process of valorisation as the unity of production 
14 Marx 1976: 716. 
15 Clarke 1980a: 18. 
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and realisation of value necessarily invokes a process of competition between capitals, 
as social capital exists not collectively but in a fractured unity of many individual parts. 
These increasingly complex dynamics of capitalist social reproduction represent a more 
concretely developed expression of the alienated form of social labour under 
capitalism. The objective social imposition inherent to the value-form is represented in 
the pressures upon individual capitals to produce and sell at a profit. Inefficient 
capitals that are producing at above the social average production cost (i.e. above the 
socially necessary labour time) will be faced with cheaper products cutting into their 
market share and, consequently, the erosion of profits. A capitalist that fails to produce 
a necessary degree of profit, whether through technological backwardness or inability 
to compel sufficiently long or intense labour from the workforce, will jeopardise 
survival as a capitalist. As such, the necessity of the expanded reproduction of capital 
through the valorisation process is imposed objectively on the individual capitalist as 
the precondition for his or her own existence~ and the medium through which these 
abstract pressures are imposed is competition. In short, competition represents the 
conduit by which the movement of value imposes itself on individual capitals and it 
does so in a manner that impels individual capitals to become more productive under 
threat of social extinction. 
At this point it IS important to stress that, in contrast to the assumption that 
commodities exchange at their values, prices deviate systematically from their values 
and this disjuncture is, moreover, a necessary implication of capitalist social relations -
a further development of the fetishism of capitalist social forms. As Moishe Postone 
suggests: 
The level of social reality expressed by prices represents ... a fonn 
of appearance of value which veils the underlying essence. The 
category of value is neither a rough, first approximation of 
capitalist reality nor a category valid for pre-capitalist societies; 
rather it expresses the 'inner nexus of connections' of the 
capitalist social fonnation. 16 
Although surplus value is the social substance from which all forms of capitalist 
revenue are derived (i.e. profits, interest and rent), this derivation takes a mediated form 
through the determinations of the social form of capitalist production wherein social 
capital is constituted as a multiplicity of competing capitals. In this respect, whilst the 
extraction of surplus value from the working class by the capitalist class as a whole is 
the social substance of profit, the dynamics of inter-capitalist competition entail that 
profits do not correspond directly to the amount of labour-power marshalled by the 
individual capital but rather tend towards an average rate of profit upon the specific 
mass of capital advanced. 17 
This process must be examined at two levels - first, within a specific branch of 
production and, second, between branches of production. As indicated in the 
discussion of value in the previous chapter, abstract imposition in the form of 
competition forges a socially constituted value (market price) for a particular 
commodity based on the socially necessary labour time for production at average 
conditions. This market price represents not the value of the specific commodities 
produced by an individual capitalist according to their particular composition of capital 
16 Postone 1993: 134. 
17 Marx 1981: 273-4. 
-1-9 
but the social average for the branch of production. Based on this market price, 
capitalists orientate their productive activities around cost prices of production, which 
refer to the sum of capital advanced for constant capital (means of production) and 
variable capital (labour-power) combined. The rate of profit, therefore, is calculated on 
the sum of capital advanced, and increased profit appears to correspond not to the 
exploitation of labour but to the mass of capital advanced and the relative productivity 
of the production process. 18 Competition therein renders invisible the class relation of 
which it is a moment. 19 At a social level, it is only through an understanding of the 
movement of value that it is possible to understand the connection between the vertical 
class relations between capital and labour, and the horizontal relations between 
individual units of capital. 
Secondly, at the level of different branches of production, acting on the basis of the rate 
of profit upon the cost price of production (i.e. the sum of capital advanced for 
production irrespective of whether it purchased constant or variable capital), capital 
tends to migrate between different branches of production in order to exploit those with 
above average rates of profit. The movement of capital between branches of 
production leads tendentially to a general equalisation of profit rates. 20 It is a process, 
moreover, facilitated greatly by the development of credit systems, sophisticated 
financial architectures, and the removal of political baniers to the movement of capital 
between branches of production. Moreover, as detailed in chapter five, the ability of 
capital to switch investments can also depend on the degree of flexibility of its 
relationship with the workforce, including the ability to dispose of labour-power in a 
manner relatively unhindered by institutionalised forms of regulation. 
IX Marx 1981: 118. 
19 Bonefeld 1999: 18. 
'0 
- Marx 1981: 297. 
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To indicate that there exists a tendency for capital to conform to social averages within 
a branch of production or to move to alternative branches in order to receive an 
adequate share of social surplus value in the form of profit, however, is not to suggest 
that Marx created an equilibrium theory of capitalist competition in the manner of 
neoclassical theory. On the contrary, the reactions of capital in response to the 
pressures of competition repeatedly exacerbate the uneven development of capital. In 
spite of a common market price, within a given branch of production different capitals 
function with markedly different production techniques and operate at different rates of 
profit. Competition compels producers to conform their production efficiency towards 
the social norm on pain of extinction. However, as elaborated below, this is an uneven 
process that tends toward overproduction, disjunctures between surplus value 
production and its realisation, disproportionality between branches of production 
creating means of production and consumption goods, and (potentially) generalised 
. . 21 
cnsls. 
The potential responses of individual capitals to competition as abstract social 
imposition are manifold, impacting upon both the distribution of profit within the 
capitalist class, also upon the extraction of surplus value at a social level and also the 
incredible productive drive of capitalism that underscores the association of capitalism 
and development. Aside from a range of lesser strategies that serve to distribute a 
greater share of surplus to the more enterprising capitalists - such as economisation in 
the use of constant capital, increasing the turnover time of capital circuits, and creating 
an exaggerated demand through sales promotion - three primary responses can be 
21 L' f. Clarke 1990a. 1994; Bonefeld 1999; Weeks 2001; Fine et al. 1999. 
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identified that have manifest implications for the contradictory dynamics of capitalist 
social relations and the uneven character of capitalist development. 
First, expanding the market - either to augment the quantity of consumers, incorporate 
cheaper inputs or by creating new social needs - can mitigate the pressures of abstract 
social imposition. Increasing the spatial coverage of the circuits of capital to include 
new areas and populations is the primary manner by which markets have been 
expanded and these dynamics have given capital a dramatic spatial expansionary 
momentum. As Marx suggested: 
A precondition of production based on capital is therefore the 
production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation ... the 
tendency to create the world market is directly given in the 
concept of capital itself.22 
The ability for capitals to access new markets on an international scale, however, 
commonly involves breaking down potential political barriers to the entry of products 
into specific national state forms - a dynamic that lies at the heart of inter-imperialist 
competition and the relationship between North and South which is examined in the 
following chapter. With respect to the present discussion, whilst the expansion of the 
market can provide temporary relief to the pressures of abstract social imposition, the 
limits to this expansion are met both through political limits, i.e. the failure to remove 
political enforced barriers such as tariffs, or social limits in the exhaustion of the new 
capitalisation of areas of social reproduction. 23 These are not natural limits but ones 
)) 
~~ Marx 1973: 407-8. 
23 See chapters three and five respectively. 
constituted through processes of struggle, of both an inter-imperialist and class nature. 
The limits to potential market expansion, therefore, entail that capitals are repeatedly 
thrown back onto the class basis of their existence and, in order to secure social 
reproduction under the pressures of abstract social imposition, must seek a new 
relationship with labour in the production process in an attempt to compress the 
component of necessary labour. 
Second, therefore, capitals can seek to engineer a greater degree of exploitation of the 
labour force through the imposition of longer or more intense work, or a suppression of 
wages below the average for the branch of production. At the level of an individual 
capital, accomplishing these aims can increase profit at the expense of competitors by 
lowering the cost of production. At the level of social capital, moreover, the potential 
generalisation of such trends through the establishment of new social averages expands 
the mass of surplus value available to capital-in-general. Nonetheless, this strategy 
inevitably involves direct conflict with the working class. Whilst the development of 
the working class movement has been able to enforce limits to the extension of the 
working day and other social provisions, struggles over absolute surplus value 
extraction are ongoing. First, the tendency to relocate productive capital in order to 
take advantage of more exploitable workforces has been a predominant trend of the last 
f 24 our decades. As such, incorporating Southern labour-power with its lower 
reproduction costs and potentially subject to a higher intensity of work can serve to 
both increase a capital's competitiveness and, concurrently, redefine the process of 
global social averaging. Second, the gains of working class movements can be subject 
to assault. In many national social formations recent struggles under the banner of 
"labour flexibilisation" have targeted these institutionalised forms of state regulation in 
24 cf. Lieten 2001. 
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order to achieve greater freedom for capital, including a greater potential for absolute 
surplus value extraction.25 
Third, competitive pressures elicit the response of productivity increases that have the 
effect of driving forward the productive capacity of humankind. Enhanced productivity 
can be engineered through improved work coordination using scientific management 
processes or, commonly, through the deployment of superior technology within the 
labour process that boosts worker productivity. By increasing the mass of commodities 
produced by a given labour-power within a specific time, productivity increase serves 
to redefine the distribution of surplus value within the capitalist class by allowing the 
technologically advanced capital to undercut competitors. Such development of the 
productive forces forges a new social standard for necessary labour time, thereby 
impressing the demands of a new social average upon individual capitals and increasing 
the pressure upon technologically less advanced capitals. Far from resolving the 
abstract pressures of competition, therefore, productivity enhancement merely serves to 
impose an incessant dynamic upon the competitive process. 
Whilst increasing the productivity of labour appears as a necessary social imposition 
upon an individual capitalist involved in competitive struggle, at a social level it 
hastens the encroaching limits of the market within a particular branch of production. 
This creates recurring tension between the production of surplus value and its 
realisation in the realm of circulation. However, rather than individual capitals 
responding to barriers to profitability by downscaling production - as neoclassical 
equilibrium theory would predict - individual capitals view the limits of profitability as 
barriers to be overcome in order to avoid social extinction. As Simon Clarke details, 
25 This is discussed at length in chapter five; also see Weeks 1999. 
this leads to a situation wherein production is expanded without regard for the limit of 
the market - therein exacerbating (rather than assuaging) the competitive struggle. 26 
This situation can persist (and escalate) until generalised crisis imposes a destructive re-
composition of capital in line with the dictates of profitability (at the level of the 
individual capital) and surplus value extraction (at the level of social capital).27 Crisis 
can therefore temporarily enforce a move towards a more equilibrium status in the 
deployment of capital, but only at the cost of the destruction of capital - and nonnally 
its increased centralisation within surviving enterprises - with manifold implications 
for the social reproduction of the working class. At one and the same time, therefore, 
abstract social imposition is the source of the dynamic productive drive of capitalism, 
and the cause of uneven development and crisis. The latter tendencies, moreover, are 
immanent within the very dynamics of the reproduction of capital. As Marx suggests: 
Conceptually, competition is nothing other than the inner nature 
of capital, its essential character, appearing in and realized as the 
reciprocal interaction of many capitals with one another, the inner 
d I · 28 ten ency as extema neceSSlty. 
In this fashion, the pressures of competition expressed in the constant drive to 
revolutionise the means of production, to increase relative surplus value, and to 
suppress the absolute value of labour-power through driving down wages and the 
extension or intensification of the working day, are all manifestations of the "inner 
nature of capital" rooted in the dual character of labour within capitalist social relations 
26 Clarke 1990a: 456. 
27 The role of credit, both as a means of postponing the effects of social imposition, but also potentially 
socialising crisis tendencies is an essential dynamic within this process; cf. Clarke 1994; Bonefeld and 
Holloway 1995; Fine et al. 1999. 
28 Marx 1973: ..J.l..J. (emphasis added). 
and the contradictory dialectic between development of the productive forces (use-
value) and the social relations of production (value). The following sections begin to 
examine the implications of this inner nature of capitalist development for the 
worldwide working class. First, the next section examines the constitution of the latter 
by examining the expansionary tendencies of capital accumulation in its commodity, 
financial and productive moments. Second, the chapter proceeds to analyse the 
immanent tensions between the global reproduction of capital and the social 
reproduction of the worldwide working class. Finally, the chapter closes by charting 
the implications of the latter tensions for the development of the institutional forms and 
functions of the state, including the emergence of international organisations with state-
like qualities, such as the World Bank. 
3. Primitive Accumulation and the International Division of Labour 
It was highlighted above that, with the subsumption of commodity production under the 
ambit of capital, a new drive to expand markets was created. By intensifying existing 
trade linkages between Europe and Southern territories - often through direct colonial 
control and the reorganisation of local populations to meet colonial trading needs - the 
expansion of merchant capital had an uneven effect on the transformation of social 
relations in the non-core world. On the one hand, it often served to disintegrate 
indigenous artisanal forms of production. As in the case of India, for example, the 
heavy hand of colonialism was commonly employed to ensure the dissolution of 
competitors to industrial products. These processes of breaking down non-capitalist 
production relations prompted Marx and Engels to herald the 'progressive' nature of 
the internationalisation of commodity capital: 
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of 
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, 
draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The 
cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it 
batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the 
barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. 
It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the 
bourgeois mode of production ... In one word, it creates a world 
if! . . 29 a er lts own lmage. 
However, debates in the 1970s - partly as a reaction to the 'neo-Smithian' assumptions 
of dependency and World Systems theory - noted how the incorporation of new 
territories and peoples into the global circuits of commodity capital entailed diverse and 
sometimes contrary effects, including the entrenchment of non-capitalist production 
relations. 3o Reacting to incorporation within the global circuits of commodity capital, 
non-capitalist forms of surplus extraction could operate through the intensification of 
exploitation without necessarily reconstituting the social relations of production. 3 ) For 
example, the extraction of precious metals in the Andean region in colonial Latin 
America often revolved around extending pre-capitalist forms of forced labour (the 
mita), whereas hacienda production for national and world markets commonly involved 
intensified debt-peonage rather than waged labour.32 In this manner, far from resulting 
in a universal transformation of social relations, together with the uniform imposition 
of abstract forms of capitalist social imposition and the sustained development of the 
29 Marx and Engels 1992: 36. 
30 Kay 1975; Brenner 1977; Weeks 1985. 
31 Brenner 1976: ..J.J. 
J2 cf., for example, Galeano 1973. 
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forces of production, the global expansion of the circuits of merchant capital resulted in 
an uneven global social transformation that entrenched certain non-capitalist production 
methods, reconstituting them under the ambit of global commodity capital, whilst 
liquidating others?3 
Similarly, the export of money capital on a large scale in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was suggested by many authors, including V.I. Lenin in his treatise 
on imperialism, to have wrought greater qualitative changes in global social relations. 
Once again, however, the impact of financial capital circuits proved uneven. On the 
one hand, as Lenin highlighted, the export of capital - particularly in the North 
American context - gave a significant boost to processes of capitalist development, 
including the financing of infrastructural projects that facilitated industrial 
developments. Moreover, the penetration of British finance-capital into, for example, 
Latin America led to the control and expansion of raw material production and the 
growth of a comprador bourgeoisie.34 However, on the other hand, lending to 
governments in the South often served to reinforce the control of oligarchic factions, 
particularly landed elites, whose production for local, national and world markets rested 
heavily on the utilisation of non-free labour.35 
Also notable, however, are the limitations placed on the social reproduction of non-
capitalist production relations. Once subsumed under the global expansion of capital, 
non-capitalist production forms can survive the competition of products produced under 
capitalist conditions only by increasing the level of exploitation. This involves 
constantly intensifying labour, extending the working day and forcing down living 
.1J Kay 1975: 104-5. 
J.j 6 Berberoglu 1987: 1. 
1~ 
.. Weeks 2001: 431. 
standards. The limits to such techniques are encountered in the social obliteration of 
the workforce and, of course, potentially violent resistance to such an occurrence. 
Outside of areas whereby unique local circumstances provide an ability to remain 
competitive, primitive production forms are gradually destroyed as the conditions of 
their reproduction are eroded. Moreover, as in Europe two centuries previously, there 
exists a long and bloody historical record of the state forcibly displacing non-capitalist 
production relations and inducing the separation of human beings from the means of 
their reproduction. 36 Whilst the specific dynamics of this process are heavily 
determined by the course of world market developments and specific global, national 
and local struggles, the overall trend is for the displacement of non-capitalist 
production forms. 
In this respect, in the early decades of the twentieth century, production in many parts 
of Latin America and East Asia that was subsumed under the expanded reproduction of 
global capital yet utilised non-free labour became increasingly tenuous. By the 1930s 
many Latin American countries experienced a notable growth in industrial production 
and, by cutting off imports of industrial products, the effects of the Great Depression 
and World War II provided further impetus for indigenous industrial development. 
Land enclosure, the capitalisation of agriculture, and the rapid dispossession of peasant 
communities were all increasingly predominant tendencies in Mexico, for example, 
during the Porfiriato decades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.37 As 
such, these processes are complex and have occurred at different historical junctures 
and within the context of specific historical and social contexts and varying strategies 
of resistance or accommodation . 
.16 l'f. (e.g.) Cooper et aJ. 1993. 
17 
. Hart 1997. 
Responding to changing social dynamics and shifting balances of class power, 
moreover, Southern states began increasingly to nurture domestic industrial production 
through subsidies to the industrial sector, manipulation of exchange rates to cheapen 
machinery and technological imports, and imposing high tariffs on foreign consumer 
goods. This form of "import substitution industrialisation" (lSI), as discussed in 
chapters four and six, became a common strategy in many countries in the immediate 
post-War periods, although its emergence in such countries as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, 
Iran, Turkey and Korea dates to the 1930s.38 Under state tutelage and within 
precipitous world market conditions, industrialisation in the global South proceeded at 
a substantial rate, particularly in specific Latin American and East Asian countries in 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, leading to the suggested "end of the Third World" owing 
to growing differentiation through uneven capitalist development. 39 Whilst many 
authors attributed this process to the internationalisation of productive capital from core 
to periphery (the "New International Division of Labour" or "Global Fordism" 
theses),4o these interpretations tended to underestimate the longstanding dynamics of 
social change in the global South and the processes of indigenous industrialisation that 
had been ongoing for several decades. 41 Indeed, successful processes of 
industrialisation in the South were as much the cause of productive relocation from the 
core as the consequence. 
38 Its early success was largely dependent on hospitable world market conditions for primary goods 
owing to sustained industrial expansion in the capitalist core. Falling commodity prices in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, however, exposed many of the fault lines within import substitution development. 
39 Harris 1986. 
40 e.g. Frobel. Heinrichs and Kreye 1980; Lipietz 1982. 
41 Jenkins 198",),: -+:2. 
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In this respect, the growing role of the state in encouraging the conditions for industrial 
development through both selective economic interventions and reconstituting social 
relations by encouraging primitive accumulation was essentially important.42 For 
example, agrarian reform in post-War Taiwan and Korea led to the dissolution of feudal 
agrarian relations and subsequently encouraged a re-consolidation of land tenure, the 
capitalisation of agriculture, and a constant yet controlled stream of out-migration from 
rural areas into the cities. This in tum has been suggested as a major factor in this 
region's relative success in industrial development.43 Concurrently, in Latin America-
related to the absence of successful land reforms - between 1950 and 1975 the urban 
population grew massively, from sixty-nine million to one hundred and ninety-seven 
million, transforming the continent into a heavily urbanised region in comparison to 
Asia and Africa.44 
Global primitive accumulation and the subsumption of an ever-greater percentage of 
the global population under capital reached new levels in the 1980s and 1990s with, on 
the one hand, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, on the other, the growing 
incorporation of the vast Chinese populace into global capital circuits.45 Moreover, the 
global trend towards liberalisation of the political barriers to the movement of capital 
gave renewed impetus to the internationalisation of capital circuits and has fashioned a 
new global - albeit enormously asymmetrical - division of labour.46 Structural 
adjustment and liberalisation, as discussed in chapter four, have served to incorporate 
more directly Southern populations in to the dynamics of global accumulation and the 
42 cf. B ina and Yaghmaian 1991. 
4:1 Kay 2002. Burkett and Hart-Landsberg (2000), however, rightly indicate the importance of hyper-
disciplinary regimes of labour control and high levels of surplus extraction. 
44 United Nations Population Division 2000: 5. 
4' Clarke 2003; Holmstrom and Smith 2000. 
46 Munck 2002: 106-11; Mittelman 1995. 
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abstract imposition of global social averagIng, leading to trends such as the 
capitalisation of agriculture, the further dissolution of the peasantry and the ongoing 
process of primitive accumulation in the rural areas of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America.47 As the UNEP notes, virtually all population growth between 2000 and 2030 
will be in urban areas.48 Moreover, as a further United Nations report elaborates, close 
to one-third of all urban households in the global South exist in conditions of absolute 
poverty, meaning that the combined household income is insufficient to meet all basic 
49 
needs. Global urban pauperisation, therefore, is a major phenomenon of 
contemporary world development and, with the movement towards accelerated 
urbanization, is likely to deepen. 
The overall trend of capitalist expansion at a global level has been the creation of a 
worldwide working class that is dependent on the relation of capitalist work in order to 
secure its social reproduction, resulting in the creation of a single yet heavily 
differentiated global division of labour. In 1995 the World Bank triumphantly 
proclaimed that, by 2000, ninety percent of the global labour force would be integrated 
into the dynamics of the world market.50 As Michael Neary and Ana Dinerstein 
suggest, the dependence of global society on capitalist work is the unavoidable reality 
of the modem world. 51 This certainly does not entail that all labour in the global South 
is undertaken under capitalist industrial processes, but rather that the majority of 
populations in the South have been removed, through the 'invisible hand' of the market 
or the visible coercion of the state, from previous forms of social relations and are now 
constituted as modem individuals reliant primarily on wage labour for their social 
H Amin 2003. 
48 United Nations Population Division 2000: 1. 
49 United Nations Habitat 2001: 2. 
50 World Bank 1995: 50. 
:\1 Dinerstein and Neary ~002: 1. 
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reproduction and subject to the abstract and seemingly objective compulsions of global 
capitalist social relations. Essentially, with the spatial expansion of primitive 
accumulation at a world level, the dynamic of global social reproduction, and with it 
the fate of the global working class, has become contingent on the reproduction of 
capital. As indicated by the escalating numbers of urban absolute poor, however, 
global capital appears unable to secure the sustained reproduction of the worldwide 
working class. 
4. Global Capital and the Reproduction of the Worldwide Working Class 
As examined above, the abstract imposition inherent in global capitalist social relations 
- expressed in the form of competition - underscores the considerable productive drive 
of capitalism. However, whilst capitalism has indeed historically developed the 
productive forces at unprecedented rates, the social form of capitalist relations assures 
that this has been a contradictory process. Objectified in the movement of value, 
domination in its most fundamental capitalist form finds expression through the 
subordination of individuals and society to the expanded reproduction of capital as the 
self-expansion of value. The latter imposes itself in the form of objective and 
impersonal compulsion that ties the material reproduction of individuals and society to 
the expanded reproduction of capital. 
If we examme the reflection of these forces in the movements of the mass of 
exploitable labour, i.e. the worldwide working class, it is possible to identify some of 
the underlying reasons why the expansion of social wealth has been accompanied by 
uneven development, inequality and poverty at a global level. Such dynamics have 
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been analysed within, for example, the Latin American debates over the 'marginal 
mass' and also wider examinations of informality in the global South, although the 
latter often considered the former solely on a national level.52 Previously, Marx 
highlighted many of these tendencies under what he termed the 'absolute general law of 
capitalist accumulation', which can be adequately re-titled and re-thought as the 
'absolute global dynamic of capitalist accumulation' .53 Several aspects of the 'absolute 
global dynamic' can be highlighted that relate the existence of mass unemployment, 
underemployment and wage poverty on a global scale to the dynamics of global capital 
accumulation and the tendency of capitalist social relations to perpetually jeopardise 
the social reproduction of the working class. 
First, with the expansion of capitalist work, those individuals that for reasons of age, 
disability or illness are unsuited to the capitalist labour process are systematically 
excluded from capitalist work and their social reproduction is strictly jeopardised. This 
also applies to those who were once incorporated yet owing to exhaustion, redundant 
skills or injury, are no longer appropriate for the needs of capitalist production. The 
tendency of the expansion of capital to undermine communal forms of social 
organisation and extended kinship structures, moreover, without the ability to secure a 
means of subsistence within the capitalist labour market this sector of the population is 
reliant on either familial, community, or state support to avoid total immiseration. 
Second, despite the existence of free labour across the globe, the spatial establishment 
of global productive capital is heavily concentrated. For example, close to eighty 
percent of global direct investment remains concentrated in the advanced capitalist core 
5~ Kay 1989: 88-124; Wilson 1998; Nun 2000. 
53 Marx 1976: chapter 25. 
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where productivity is higher, value extraction greater and, concurrently, investment 
more profitable. Of the remaining twenty percent that goes to the global South, eighty 
percent of this total is concentrated in approximately ten key emerging markets that 
offer not just a cheap workforce, but one that is relatively skilled, disciplined, and 
where a satisfactory physical infrastructure and political environment exists.54 As such, 
uneven development on a global scale continues to augment the vast disparities 
between different national social formations and the labour located within them.55 
Whereas in the capitalist core over-production is the systematic tendency of global 
accumulation wherein growing amounts of use-values cannot be reconciled to the 
successful realisation of value, large parts of the global South remain characterised by 
under-production. In spite of the explanation provided by neoclassical economists and 
institutions such as the World Bank and IMP, this is not necessarily for lack of 
structural reforms to dissolve remaining non-capitalist production relations and 
encourage investment. 56 On the contrary, it is a result of the surplus-nature of these 
populations for the creation and realisation of value within global capital. As Geoffrey 
Kay presciently surmised: 
If we square up to it, we have to face the unpalatable fact that 
capitalism has created underdevelopment not simply because it 
has exploited the underdeveloped countries, but because it has not 
exploited them enough. 57 
q Lieten 2001. World Bank 2001 b. 
55 cf Weeks 2001. 
56 Many sub-Saharan African countries implemented avid structural adjustment policies, yet have been 
fundamentally excluded from a substantial role within the creation and appropriation of global surplus; 
cf. Sender 2002, Milanovic 1003. 
57 Kay 1975: 55. 
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The latter phenomenon highlights that, whilst the expansion of capitalist social relations 
creates a growing working class dependent on capital for its social reproduction,58 the 
ability of capital to provide adequate waged labour is in no way commensurate to 
global needs. The 'absolute global dynamic' involves the recognition, therefore, that 
the majority of labour in the South is not performed under strictly capitalist conditions 
of production, but rather is subject to capitalist conditions of social reproduction, 
including the subordination of consumption of use-values to the production of the value 
form of social wealth. In short, setting the worker 'free' through primitive 
accumulation in no way guarantees the provision of capitalist work, despite removing 
other forms of social reproduction. As was evident to the early political economists, 
the capitalist work was a tenuous affair subject to extreme fluctuations, and this 
tendency towards precarious social reproduction characterises the relation of capitalist 
work for large segments of the worldwide working class. The ILO, for example, warns 
that: 
If economic and productivity growth rates up to 2010 remazn 
similar to those of the 1990s, a depressingly clear employment 
picture emerges: the working poor will grow in number, in a more 
populous world. At least 160 million people are outright 
unemployed, over 300 million people are in jobs but looking for 
more work and more than one billion are living on less than one 
59 dollar per day. 
58 This growing working class is not just the consequence of the incorporation of existing human beings 
through spatial expansion, but also the consequence of the demographic explosion in the South as 
families sought to guarantee their social reproduction under capital through having numerous children 
who could contribute. 
59 ILO 2001. 
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This worldwide reserve labour army constitutes a constant feature of global capitalist 
society, although it is variable in its composition and size according to the trajectory of 
global accumulation including, on the one hand, the tendency to reduce the need for 
labour within certain branches of production owing to technological advancement 
driven by competition and, on the other, the course of primitive accumulation to create 
new potential labourers. 60 Marginalized from capitalist work, the global reserve labour 
army is dependent on the precarious existence offered through various forms of 
underemployment. On the one hand, many workers exist as a "disguised" proletariat 
that subsists through self-employment, informal sector tasks or partial subsistence 
agriculture, all of which may offer tenuous means to obtain the use-values necessary for 
social reproduction in societies dominated by capital yet in which underemployment is 
endemic. On the other hand, the need to secure social reproduction has seen the 
growing incorporation of women into the workforce in order to gain another sub-
subsistence wage, predominantly in the informal sector.61 
Third, the above tendencies are exacerbated by the dynamics of capital accumulation 
wherein abstract social domination forces capital to attempt constantly to suppress the 
portion of labour devoted to the reproduction of the labourer in order to produce surplus 
value in the form of profit. As highlighted above, this imposition includes the 
intensification of labour, the lengthening of the working day, and forcing down wages 
alongside introduction of advanced methods of production that can make labour 
redundant within the production process. Moreover, crisis - which, as examined above, 
is inherent to the dynamics of global accumulation - is the form in which social 
imposition most brutally imposes itself. The results of generalised crisis are the 
60 Marx 1976: 762. 
61 Munck 2002: 117; Bagchi 2000: 81. 
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destruction of existing capital, the ejection of labour from unprofitable industries. the 
suppression of wages, and the centralisation of capital all of which can serve to reduce 
the conditions of social reproduction of the working class and to expand the reserve 
labour army. Crisis, therefore, is the most dramatic manner through which global 
labour can be disciplined in line with the profitability dictates of capital accumulation 
and this is examined with specific focus on Chile in chapters six through eight. 
As such, whilst increases in the absolute mass of global capital through expanded 
reproduction indeed implies a growing mass of labourers on a world scale, uneven 
development within sectors implies a constant instability of employment as various 
branches of production undergo fluctuations and technological change. This 
contributes to a stratification of the working class and aids in the reproduction of the 
reserve labour army at national and global levels that serves to suppress the general 
level of wages and which faces an uncertain ability to secure its social reproduction 
owing to its being superfluous to the needs of capital. 
In sum, therefore, whilst the global expanSIOn of capital carnes forward primitive 
accumulation by undermining all alternative forms of social reproduction, the uneven 
dynamic of the reproduction of capital is unable to guarantee the stable reproduction of 
the growing worldwide working class. In contrast, under the global expansion of 
capital, the latter has necessarily been constituted in the form of pronounced 
stratification on a global scale, including unemployment, underemployment and 
poverty. Significant portions of the worldwide working class can find no employment 
through a direct relationship with capital and are forced into extremely tenuous forms 
of social reproduction on the margins of capital circuits. Moreover, the tendencies 
within accumulation for capital to intensify work, forcibly lower wages, and eject 
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labour from production - particularly in times of crisis - has repeatedly underscored the 
tenuous nature of social reproduction under capital. Whereas Marx indicated that he 
believed capitalism would thus produce the agent of its own demise in the form of the 
immiserated working class, the course of class struggle has not (yet?) manifested this 
tendency. In part, this is owing to the specific intervention of capitalist states and other 
institutionalised forms of social mediation, such as the World Bank, that operate at an 
international level. 
5. Social Reproduction and the State 
When approaching the question of the form and functions of the modem state from a 
materialist perspective, as a theoretical starting point it is important to emphasise that 
the state in capitalist society is necessarily a capitalist state with an inherent 
predisposition towards securing the expanded reproduction of social capita1.62 This 
capitalist essence does not result from the predominance of capitalist class interests 
within the state but from the dependence of the material reproduction of capitalist 
society - the state included - on the accumulation of capital. The capitalist state is 
therefore a regulative institutional corpus resting upon and operating within the context 
established by the various social forms of capitalist relations and the abstract forms of 
domination inherent to them. In this manner, by enforcing the rule of law and the 
social power of money - the two primary functions that the capitalist state has 
historically performed - the state plays an essential role in reinforcing capitalist social 
relations. 63 It does this by providing the political and legal infrastructure for the 
62 Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Clarke 1991c. 
63 Clarke 1988: 130. 
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abstract domination of things over people and the particular form of class relations that 
the latter upholds.64 
Conversely, however, the constitution of the capitalist state within capitalist social 
relations as an apparently neutral political realm in separation from the economy (the 
realm of free-exchanges) situates it as the primary institutional locus of political 
struggles. The repeated tendencies of capital accumulation to jeopardise the social 
reproduction of the working class has repeatedly led to the historical agency of various 
social movements to levy demands upon the national-state for the mediation of the 
accumulation process. As such, capitalist development contains within itself the social 
dynamics that lead the capitalist state continually to attempt to mediate the tensions 
between expanded accumulation and the inherent conflicts therein engendered.65 
Politicised struggles emerge at many levels, from struggles over the nature of labour 
relations, conflicts within the institutionalised political process, and in diverse social 
movements that challenge the quotidian forms of state intervention into social 
reproduction. Driven by these pressures, the state must intervene perpetually in civil 
society - in both the spheres of production and circulation - in order to mediate specific 
struggles and also to alleviate some of capital's (self)-destructive tendencies. These 
interventions commonly find expression in the changing institutional form of the state, 
an historical movement that is clearly identifiable in various manifestations of social 
policy, labour policy and other expressions of institutionalised state-society relations 
that aim at the containment of the immediate contradictions of accumulation. 
64 d. Kay and Mott 1982. 
65 l't". Ginsburg 1979, 
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Propelled by these multifarious instances of political and social conflict, the state 
expenences changes in its institutional form and specific functions. As Bob Fine 
indicates: 
From one period to the next it may become more or less alienated 
from the people, more or less subject to democratic control, more 
or less bureaucratic, more or less bound by the rules of law, more 
or less permissive of working-class organisations, etc.66 
This is the basis on which the contradictory essence of capitalism becomes embedded 
in the institutional form of the state. Ultimately, however, the limits to the 
interventionist character of the state are located in its capitalist form imposed by its 
historical subsumption within the relations of capitalist social reproduction. If, 
propelled by the pressures of particular struggles, the state intervenes to an extent 
whereby it threatens the social foundations of capital accumulation then this will be at 
the cost of precipitating further and deeper crisis tendencies.67 The historical 
consequences of such a trend are the sharpening of struggles between those who strive 
to return the state to within the perceived limits of its capitalist form and those who 
pursue more fundamental social change.68 
As such, the changing nature of the form and functions of the modem state cannot be 
derived logically from the nature of capitalist society but represent the outcomes of a 
process driven by historical struggles constituted within the contradictory dynamics of 
66 Fine 1984. 
67 Muller and Neususs 1975. 
68 An explicit historical manifestation of this trend is the socialist government of Salvador Allende in 
Chile, 1970-3, as discussed in chapter six. 
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capitalist social relations. 69 Specific historical and contingent factors include the 
balance of social forces at a particular historical juncture, with the latter conditioned by 
the results of previous struggles and the institutionalised forms these may have taken, 
and also the specific relationship between the reproduction of capital within the 
national state and the course of global accumulation.7o Given the inherent fluidity of 
capital in its money and commodity forms, the general tendencies of capital 
accumulation apply not to individual national capitalisms but to capitalism as a whole, 
as a global social relation. Such tendencies do not operate within a "national" 
framework, because the relationships, processes and structures that commonly have 
been comprehended as a 'national economy' are better conceptualised as zones of 
relatively deeper economic integration within a single, highly differentiated, world 
economy.71 However, the globality of capital is nonetheless mediated through its 
existence within a fragmented unity of national-state formations. 72 As examined in the 
following chapter, national states repeatedly seek to alter the nature of the relationship 
between nationally located capital and global social capital through political regulation 
in order to aid the expanded reproduction of the former, yet this serves to widen the 
range of struggles that impinge upon the state. A more complete elaboration of the 
changing relation between state and social reproduction, therefore, must take the form 
of an historical case study and, in this respect, chapters six through eight provide such 
an analysis in respect to the turbulent trajectory of capitalist development in Chile. 
69 This attempt to logically derive the state from the categories of capital was the major problem of the 
German state derivation debate (English translations in Holloway and Picciotto 1978; critique in Clarke 
1991 b). 
70 Milller and Neussils 1975; Clarke 1991c. 
71 Radice 1984; 1999. 
7' 
- Hollo\V'ay 1995b. 
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The regulation of capitalist social relations, however, has not become institutionalised 
merely at the level of the national or sub-national state apparatus. Tensions between 
the globaJ character of accumulation and the fragmentation of social capital within 
national state forms has historically led to repeated attempts to create international 
regulatory forms that can mediate the global character of capitalist social 
reproduction.73 Concurrent to the national state form, however, the internationalisation 
of state functions equally carry the contradictory essence of capitalist social relations. 
To develop this argument, the following two chapters examine theoretically and 
historically the constitution of the World Bank as a moment of global capitalist 
relations. 
73 cf. Picciotto 1991. 
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CHAPTER 3 - POSITIONING THE WORLD BANK AS A GLOBAL 
DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION 
This third chapter performs two tasks that enable the formulation of a materialist 
perspective on the World Bank as an international organising that mediates the 
trajectory of global capitalist development. The first section presents a critical 
examination of the major theoretical approaches (realism, liberalism, neo-
Gramscianism) that attempt to explicate the power relations that permeate and 
condition the institutional form of the Bank, its production of development knowledge, 
and the nature of its relationships with client countries. Second, although the chapter 
suggests that various insights of these perspectives offer pertinent vantage points, 
through critiquing these perspectives it begins to elaborate an alternative approach that, 
it is proposed, can better explain the form and content of Bank agency by locating the 
organisation within the context of the contradictory movement of global capitalist 
social relations. It is argued, therefore, that a theoretical analysis of the World Bank 
must examine the various mediated forms by which the organisation is integrated into 
global capitalist relations and the complex manners by which these varied forms of 
integration affect both the institutional form and substantive content of World Bank 
practices. This entails synthesising aspects concerning capitalist development and 
social power raised in chapters one and two with the critical examination of theories of 
the World Bank in the first two sections of the current chapter. 
1. States and International Institutions - Realism, Liberalism and Materialist 
Critique 
7.+ 
This section is concerned with elucidating the detenninants of both the institutional 
fonn of the World Bank, i.e. its organisational structure and how this conditions its 
relations with member countries, alongside the content of its practices, namely the aims 
and objectives of the policy prescriptions that it promulgates in the developing world. 
Given that much academic literature on international institutions emanates from debates 
framed within the paradigm of international relations (IR), the most predominant 
concern has been to theorize the relationship between the World Bank and the 
international state system. The dominant paradigms of international relations, realist 
and liberal approaches, bring particular epistemological and ontological perspectives to 
bear on the historical constitution and the subsequent role of international organisations 
within the inter-state system. On the one hand, realism, with its ontology of inherent 
antagonism between sovereign nation states and its preference for examining the latter 
as the foremost actors on the global stage, is predisposed to understanding international 
relations and their institutional fonns as constituted within and limited by the 
conflictual power relations between nation states. I In essence, therefore, international 
organisations, as an embodiment of international regimes, will tend to be manipulated 
by states engaged in conflictual relations over economic hierarchy and issues of 
security. On the other hand, liberal institutionalism, whilst not challenging the 
characterisation of international anarchy as a natural condition nor of states as key 
actors, offers a contrary perspective that emphasises the absolute gains to be made from 
the cooperative dimensions of international orders and global cosmopolitanism. 
Building from this normative stance, versions of neoliberal institutionalism stress the 
mutually beneficial potential of organisations geared to providing rational solutions to a 
range of global problems. International organisations can therefore be understood as 
I e.g. Mearsheimer 1994. 
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offering global public goods, such as technical expertise, as part of reciprocally 
advantageous cooperati ve regimes. 
These debates play themselves out in relation to the determinants of the institutional 
form and the policy practices of the World Bank. Given the realist preoccupation with 
the structural and relational power of states, the question of the direct and mediated 
forms by which particular states influence the World Bank has been a major 
problematic. In this respect, to explain World Bank policy orientation many analysts 
emphasise the dominance exerted upon the institution by the United States government, 
a concern also shared by many on the political I eft. 2 This emphasis is not without 
historical basis gi ven that the Bank was formed as one aspect of the US-dominated 
Bretton Woods order. Moreover, since its inception the principal external body 
influencing the World Bank's policy direction has been the US state or, more 
specifically, the US State Department and Treasury, with the latter responsible for 
providing the financial pledges that form the largest portion of the Bank's state-granted 
finances. 3 
As established at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, various modes of exercising 
US executive power within the Bank were written into its constitutional framework. 
The Bank's constitution, like that of the IMF, linked the voting rights of individual 
states on the Board of Governors at the Bank to the amount of financing each 
participant country outlays. Rather than one member one vote, as is the norm in other 
United Nations organisations, the World Bank operates on a "one dollar one vote" 
principal. In this respect, the US began with command over thirty-five percent of 
2 e.g. Caufield 1996; Wade 2002. 
3 Kapur 2002: 63. 
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voting rights, a block that reflected the relative size of its financial contribution to the 
Bank's base capital. Although the original voting power of the US facilitated its total 
dominance of Board decision-making, its current position of holding seventeen percent 
still allows it to wield a veto over constitutional amendments. Over the last half 
century the US has used such direct forms of influence to shape Bank policy, placing 
considerable pressure on the Bank to make loans that are particularly beneficial to 
strategically important countries and to US businesses who are a major recipient of 
development contracts. This power was displayed in, for example, the disproportionate 
amount of World Bank assistance granted to key US allies during the Cold War period, 
such as Nicaragua, Indonesia, and Iran.4 Concurrently, US pressure has also worked to 
veto loans which either threaten US interests by fortifying competition to US industries 
or that undermine US strategic and political goals.s 
Although the degree of US influence in the Bank might have been expected to fall 
concurrent with its declining relative share of financial contributions, and therein voting 
power, the US nonetheless supplements the control offered by its shareholding with 
constant monitoring of Bank activity and daily meetings between top Bank directors 
and US Treasury officials. Moreover, the US still chooses the Bank's director and is 
the only country with a unilateral veto over constitutional amendments. As Ravi 
Kanbur, a former Bank economist and original project leader of the World 
Development Report 2000/2001, has stated with respect to the pressures on current 
World Bank president James Wolfensohn: 
4 Woods 2000: 146. 
5CaufieJd 1996: 197-:205. 
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To save the Bank, and his own reputation, it is essential that the 
Bank's policies and public pronouncements do not err too far 
from its main shareholder and political protector, the US 
Treasury.6 
Nonetheless, despite the considerable "hard power" enjoyed by the US executive 
branch, the World Bank is not a simple tool of the Treasury Department and its 
interventions, pronouncements and decisions do not always unerringly tally with the 
designs of the latter. Over the years many Bank decisions have met with stiff resistance 
from the US Treasury and governmental bodies. For example, Caufield lists several 
occasions on which the Bank has openly defied US governmental pressure and Robert 
Wade describes how the form of the World Development Report 2000/1 was bitterly 
opposed by the US Treasury, which would have preferred to see a document that 
reiterated a far more orthodox neoliberal approach.7 
To explain these disjunctures in lending practices and development policy, some 
authors, commonly argumg from a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, have 
emphasised the Bank's institutional autonomy.8 Many of these defences of the Bank's 
independent status come from analysts who are employed at the Bank or closely 
involved with Bank activities. 9 The theoretical basis of neoliberal institutionalism is 
rooted in neoclassical economics and rests on a universal ontology of the mutually 
beneficial nature of free economic exchange. The theoretical postulate of shared 
absolute gains through economic liberalism provides the material basis on which a 
6 Kanbur cited in Braathen 2001: 5. 
7 Caufield 1996: 199; Wade 2001. 2002. 
8 e.g. Woods 2003: Kapur 2002; Gilbert and Vines 2000. 
9 
e.g. Ray 1997. 
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cosmopolitan global order can be fashioned. Liberal internationalism, thereby, 
promises to extend globally the general good of economic competition through 
international cooperation within rational institutional structures, or regImes. An 
accepted international regime, therefore, provides the basis for international 
organisations that would promote public goods and the latter would aim to solve 
internationally determined technical problems of global scope. IO In order to perfonn 
this function adequately, however, an international organisation would need to be seen 
to operate in an impartial, rule-bound manner. If an organisation were percei ved as 
overly influenced by a particular state interest, then this would undennine the political 
basis of its existence. In short, liberal institutionalism grounds the principal of the 
autonomy of the World Bank in its functional needs: to function adequately the World 
Bank requires autonomy. I I 
For many institutionalists, once an international organisation has been constituted 
within a regime, questions of power can largely be eschewed. The Bank has a founding 
constitution (the Articles of Agreement) that defines its goals, rules of procedure 
constraining the modes of behaviour, and a large bureaucracy with technical expertise 
to undertake decision-making in an impartial manner based on the technical 
considerations established in its mandate. Under these conditions, a proper 
understanding of the World Bank is to be achieved by categorizing is major functions: 
namely, the Bank as a multilateral lending institution, as a producer and distributor of 
10 An excellent critique of this liberal interpretation of the World Bank is to be found in the work of 
Arturo Escobar who charts how the Bank has been at the forefront of classifying "abnormalities" to the 
liberal vision of seamless global capitalist development (such as poverty, underemployment, landless 
farmers, illiteracy, etc.) to which the application of the development economist's privileged scientific 
knowledge could be applied (cf. Escobar 1997: 88). However, Escobar's approach suffers from 
remaining at the level of a cultural-theory critique. By not adequately analysing the real social relations 
and material processes that underscore these phenomena, his critique remains one of the constitution of 
development discourse and not the social basis of uneven development on a global scale. 
II This is the position adopted by both Woods 2003 and Wade 2002 despite their methodological and 
political differences. 
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development knowledge, and as a development agency.12 Building from the 
functionalist emphasis on forging cooperative technical solutions to common problems, 
liberal accounts stress that the leading force of change within the Bank is the increasing 
rationalisation and perfection of development knowledge, and a major problematic 
becomes the relative lag, caused by various forms of institutional inertia, between the 
onward march of good science, the practices of the Bank, and the relative willingness 
and ability of governments to implement the requisite measures. 13 Specifically, in 
relation to the latter, the liberal perspective employs a pluralist sociology to elaborate 
how the particular interests of powerful stakeholder groups, such as corrupt 
governments or obtuse trades unions, block the optimal policy actions that stem from 
World Bank advice. Hence, through conditionality agreements, the World Bank can 
"oblige a government to adopt reforms which are in the best interests of its population, 
but run against the narrow interests of the government or its clients".14 
Given the common theoretical concerns of both realist and liberal institutionalist 
approaches, there is significant room for convergence. In so doing, a perspective arises 
that, whilst recognising several concrete mechanisms by which states can attempt to 
influence the Bank, nonetheless emphasises the relative autonomy of the World Bank 
owing to its institutional form and its functional needs, and thereby grants it powers of 
action independent from the particular interests of its most dominant shareholders. As 
Ngaire Woods elaborates, although particular state interests indeed seek expression 
through the World Bank, the direct pressures of influential shareholders do not inscribe 
content into a tabula rasa. On the contrary, the Bank has a "relatively autonomous" 
position vis-a-vis its most dominant member, the United States, and other leading states 
12 Gilbert, Powell and Vines 2000: 44. 
13 e.g. Kanbur and Vines 2000; Krueger 1997. 
14 Gilbert and Vines ~OOO: 25. 
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owing to two primary institutional factors. Firstly, it enjoys financial autonomy from 
shareholders as its day-to-day financial needs are not dependent on member 
subscriptions but are met by drawing credit from international financial markets. 15 The 
importance of this factor for granting a certain leeway from direct political influence 
was noted back in the 1950s by then Bank President John McCloy who stated that "the 
necessity of going to private investors for funds, in addition to keeping the Bank's 
management in touch with financial markets also ensures that its operations will be free 
of political influence" .16 
Secondly, the Bank's position as the largest research institution for development issues 
allows it to confer legitimacy upon its own projected solutions to issues, permitting a 
degree of buffer room from direct influences regarding policy implementation. 17 In 
1997 the Bank spent a total of over one hundred million dollars on research activities, 
including both on-the-ground research in each of the 150 member countries, and 
comparative and theoretical work, with over two hundred permanent researchers based 
at its Washington address. 18 This makes it the largest development research institution 
in the world, dwarfing any comparable academic centre, and has led to a trend within 
the Bank and sympathetic observers to constitute its primary function as the 
dissemination of global public knowledge in the form of codes of best development 
practice. 19 
15 This is the case with the IBRD, but less so with the IDA as the latter depends heavily on direct state 
funds. Refer to the discussion in chapter four. 
16 Cited in Kapur, Lewis and Webb 1997: 1112. 
17 Woods 2000; 2003. 
18 Stern 1997: 52-.+: Squire 2000: 113. 
19 World Bank 1999: Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999. 
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At this point, however, the limits of the realist and liberal approaches begin 
increasingly to be manifested. The nature of their shared ontological assumptions leads 
to a narrow range of concerns that exclude many of the factors necessary for an 
adequate understanding of international organisations. As indicated above, most 
analytical flexibility can be gained by blending the two perspectives to form a theory of 
the relati ve autonomy of the World Bank. This is to argue that the Bank is 
institutionally autonomous from the US and other leading shareholders on a day-to-day 
functioning basis. It is therefore able to develop and legitimate its own projected 
solutions to development quandaries and has a large degree of manoeuvre in its lending 
practices. Relative autonomy of this nature, however, is circumscribed within the 
parameters of the degree to which national state institutions, such as the US Treasury, 
attempt to exercise influence. Such parameters are not fixed but are formed In 
conflictual relationships over particular issues between Bank and state, as well as 
between internal Bank factions, and historical evidence suggests that confrontations 
normally lead to some form of accommodation and compromise. 2o However, what this 
perspective does not address is the global social context in which the Bank operates and 
that conditions and constrains its form and the content of its actions, both through and 
beyond the remit of national states. 
A major part of the problem is that the realist-liberal analysis has dubious theoretical 
underpinnings that are embedded in its basic ontology. This is because both 
approaches share a similar conceptualisation of the naturalness and permanence of the 
interstate system, and of the predominance of inter-state relations in the explanation of 
global power relations. Both take the existence of an inter-state system for granted and, 
therefore, neglect to conceptualise the modem inter-state system as socially and 
cO cf. Wade 2000; 2002. 
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historically constituted in-and-through global capitalist relations. The latter are 
relations, moreover, that transcend the political division of the globe into spatially 
delimited territorial units. In contrast to realist and liberal assumptions about the 
timeless character of state entities, the very constitution of the inter-state system in the 
modem period was decisively shaped by the development and global expansion of 
capitalism as a mode of social reproduction. It was within the dynamics of escalating 
simple accumulation, impelled by the expansion of foreign trade, that the modem 
nation-state form and the modem inter-state system began to emerge from the absolutist 
structures of the feudal state in Western Europe. 21 
From its ongms, therefore, the modem national state form has ansen at the nexus 
between the global circulation of goods and money and the appropriation of labour-
power by capital within a politically delimited spatiality. At this early stage, capitalism 
was not a national phenomenon that developed global dimensions only in its 
subsequent unfolding. Rather, the world market was, in the words of Marx, "the very 
basis and living atmosphere of the capitalist mode of production".22 This is not to 
suggest that capitalism, as a form of global social relations, spontaneously emerged as a 
fully constituted and homogeneous phenomenon across the entire global space. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the spatial expansion of capitalist social relations has 
been an historical, ongoing and profoundly uneven process, much of which was forged 
through conquest and colonialism that served to forcibly harness non-capitalist forms of 
production into a subservient relation to global capital. In contrast, it is to argue that 
the social relations of capitalist production that underpin the formation of the modem 
21 Corrigan and Sayer 1985. 
11 
.. Marx 1982: ~05. 
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state developed within and in relation to the crucible of a pre-existing world market for 
commodities and the global circulation of credit money.23 
Within a society In which social relations assume the form of relations between 
commodities that are circulated through exchange, a new relationship between social 
relations and space is constituted. Capitalist social relations, manifested in the 
alienated form of the circulation of commodities and money, are not bound in their 
essence by considerations of local or personal attachments. Commodity exchange in its 
fundamental characteristics, as noted by Tilla Siegel, "does not bear the shackles of 
nationality, ethnicity, religion, or direct dependency,,?4 Although the instance of 
production must indeed be conducted within a specific spatial location, and therefore 
within a specific national social-formation, the immediate process of production is 
simply itself an "evanescent moment", one moment in an ongoing circuit that 
continually passes from production into circulation only to return to production and 
begin again. 25 The moment of production, therefore, is simply one necessary nodal 
point in a continual circuit of value creation and realisation. Whilst the labour process 
facilitates capital valorisation, the value contained within a commodity is realised only 
in the sphere of circulation via sale on the market and the realisation of value does not 
terminate the circuit but merely mark one further point in a perpetual process. On 
returning to the money form, the expansion of value requires that money must be 
employed in the form of productive investment.26 In sum, owing to the predication of 
capitalism on commodity production, i.e. through the anonymous exchange of goods on 
23 cf. von Braunmtihl 1978; Picciotto 1991. 
24 Siegel 1984: 3. 
25 Marx 1981: 13"+. 
'6 
- Marx 1978: 180-199. 
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the market, its essence is global. 27 Nonetheless, the inherent globality of capital is 
indeed heavily mediated by the existence of national-state formations that alter the 
nature of the relationship between domestic accumulation and global capital through 
various forms of political regulation. 
Constituted within global capitalist social relations, the modem state has found itself 
under constant pressure to attempt to secure the expanded reproduction of capital 
within the national territory as the basis for social reproduction. 28 This has historically 
involved a constant process of reorganising the relationship between capital and labour 
in various manners both within and, if possible, beyond national boundaries. The 
national state, therefore, is both heavily conditioned by, but also seeks to condition, 
global social relations in order to safeguard accumulation within the national territory. 
As a constant process of manoeuvring within the relations of global capitalism, various 
state activities seek to alter the manner of their integration into the world economy in 
respect to the three differentiated moments of capital circuits - i.e. the circulation of 
money and commodities and the instance of production. As expressed in the previous 
paragraph, the circuits of capital are not inherently constrained to a national territory 
but are global in essence. States, therein, have constantly been confronted with the task 
of formulating strategies that modify the relationship between the domestic 
accumulation process and the global circulation of capital in both money and 
commodity forms. Imperialism, in its most general and abstract moment, is an 
expression of the globality of capital and the immobility of the state form. The basis of 
imperialism is the activities of the state, in the concrete forms of diplomatic pressure, 
military compUlsion, etc., designed to aid the expanded reproduction of capital 
27 d. Holloway 1995b; Burnham 200l. 
28 cf. Milller and Neussils 1975; Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Clarke 1988, 1991c; Holloway 1995b. 
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accumulation through ensuring and abetting circuits of capital which stretch beyond the 
limits of national territorial jurisdiction. 
Composed within these dynamics, the form of international regulatory organisations 
have been the object of struggle between states as the latter seek to manipulate the 
terms by which international trade, money flows, and other forms of regulating global 
capital relations, should proceed. This is particularly pertinent given that the current 
era has witnessed the rapid growth of such organisations, paralleling the renewed 
internationalising course of contemporary capitalism during the post-War period. As 
this suggests, there is constant conflict and compromise between states over the 
institutions and forms of intervention that govern the relations between capitals, and 
between capital and labour, at a global level. Moreover, it is important to recognise 
that even the executive branches of national states do not necessarily have a unified 
voice, owing to the stratification of interests that they may wish to placate. As Devesh 
Kapur highlights with respect to the paramount influence of the United States, the latter 
represents a "complex amalgam of diverse economic, financial, security and ideological 
interests".29 This applies equally to borrowing countries, and such diversity of 
pressures serves to create disjunctures within the Bank itself. Moreover, given the 
disjunctures within various state institutions, different parts of the state apparatus can 
put contending pressures on the Bank. This is most evident in the oft-conflictual 
relationship between the US executive and legislative branches vis-a-vis financial 
commitments to the Bank and the policy framework that these should go towards. 3D 
'<) 
- Kapur 2002: 59. 
30 cf. Pincus and Winters :200:2: Rich 2002; Kapur 2002. 
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This leads us to readdress the concerns of realist and liberal theories of international 
relations. The first important aspect to stress is that the tendencies towards inter-state 
anarchy or cooperation cannot be derived from some metaphysical nature of states -
either Hobbesian antagonism or Kantian cosmopolitanism - but is driven by the uneven 
dynamic of capital accumulation at a global level. Political regulation of the 
movements of money and commodities, imposed by states, can appear to capitals as 
barriers to capital accumulation and therefore societal reproduction at a national level. 
In periods of global expansion of capital, cooperative actions between states to aid the 
global expansion of production and the circulation of money and commodities may 
indeed offer mutual benefits to capitals through the opening of new markets, sources of 
investment and credit, and opportunities for productive investment. However, the 
inherent tendencies toward repeated overaccumulation and crisis impose a different and 
more contradictory dynamic. In periods of escalating overaccumulation, market 
expansion remains a potential solution to overproduction. However, furthering the 
universal internationalisation of capital simultaneously appears as a barrier to 
profitability owing to the threat of increased international competition. Under such 
conditions, unilateral protectionism within an atmosphere of multilateral openness 
appears as a preferable manner by which to attempt to safeguard the reproduction of 
domestic productive capitaL 31 In such periods, conflict between states over the rules 
and institutions that govern the relations between capitals and between capital and 
labour at a transnational level are generally heightened. 
31 cf. Clarke 2001: 80-81. N.B. The reproduction of domestic productive capital does not necessarily 
involve the protection of capitals of domestic nationality, but owing to the global nature of capital 
circuits, can involve protecting capitals of foreign ownership located within the domestic ambit. cf. 
Harris 2003 and, for an older theoretisation, Poulantzas 1974. 
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That the Bank is strongly conditioned by the trajectory of accumulation at a global level 
necessarily means that it is constituted as a moment of interstate relations. To re-
emphasise, this is the basis (and the limit) of both realist and liberal theories of 
international institutions, with the differences between the two perspectives founded on 
superficial propensities towards viewing the international realm as ontologically 
predisposed towards conflict or stability respectively. Returning to the theoretical 
content of the first two chapters, it was argued that although the social relations of 
capital are global in scope, the latter is spatially fragmented into diverse national state 
forms. At issue in reconstructing a Marxist approach to the World Bank, therefore, are 
the conflictual tendencies that are impressed upon the Bank owing to the tensions 
between capital's global nature and its spatial fragmentation. On the one hand, the 
global nature of capital underlies a significant compulsion to create forms of 
international regulation that can sustain the global conditions for the expanded 
reproduction of capital, in which all states necessarily have a vested interest as it 
underlies the material basis of their own material reproduction. However, in spite of 
structural inclinations towards cooperative internationalism, the contradictory 
tendencies raised by the trajectory of accumulation also ensure that the relationships 
between national states within global capital are inherently instable. As examined 
above, the dynamics of cooperation and conflict are underscored by global cycles of 
crisis. The latter serve to sharpen the pressures upon national states to act in a self-
interested and potentially destructive fashion. 
Global asymmetries within the highly differentiated spatial composition of capital add a 
fUI1her level of analysis. The uneven development of capitalism on a global scale 
creates vast contrasts in the respective ability of states to enhance the conditions of 
accumulation, with respect to both the global and domestic ambits. Uneven 
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development has historically placed the majority of capital in the Northern core thereby 
giving these states far greater power to shape the contours of global accumulation by 
mediating the conditions under which credit circulates internationally. What could be 
called the contemporary "international division of money" in which the majority of 
investment funds resides in the hands of capitals located in northern financial centres, 
therefore, gi ves these states far greater power to shape the contours of global 
accumulation. The World Bank, as an international organisation that provides credit 
for capitalist development activities in the South, reflects this unequal development of 
capital and the power relations involved. This occurs both explicitly - in the political 
influence derived from provision of a majority of Bank standing capital and loans to the 
International Development Agency (IDA) - but also abstractly through the 
subordination of the Bank to the global relations of capitalist development in which 
Southern countries are heavily reliant on private capital movements from the North. 
2. Neo-Gramscianism and the Politics and Ideology of Neoliberalism 
The immediate thrust of the critique of realism and liberal institutionalism, therefore, is 
that to understand the many determinants of World Bank form and content, it is 
necessary to examine a much broader range of relationships than those immediately 
posited at the level of the inter-state system. In this respect, approaches that could be 
loosely defined as 'Neo-Gramscian' offer a perspective that, owing to its critical-theory 
basis and its social forces-centred paradigm, might offer a significantly better lens 
through which to view the varied determinants of World Bank form and content.32 In 
contrast to the neo-realist assumption of sovereign states acting in the international 
arena to protect natural and objective national interests, neo-Gramscians emphasise the 
.n Lee 1995. 
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construction of hegemonic interests by specific social forces. These social forces, 
which are particular interest groups defined primarily in relation to particular income 
sources derived from respective positions within the social relations of production, 
attempt to formulate a hegemonic project around a particular conjuncture of ideas. In 
the initial, genre-defining formulations of Robert Cox, hegemonic strategy occurs first 
and foremost at the level of the national state. Once a particular underlying 
configuration of social forces has reached a national hegemonic position and has 
become ingrained in the state form, however, it can begin to propagate this particular 
ideology at a global level, often using international organisations as a means to this end. 
The making of a relatively cohesive 'world order', therefore, involves projecting 
globally from the national state a structure of values and understandings about the 
nature of order that "permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities".33 
The advantages of this formulation as compared to the realist and neoliberal 
institutionalist perspectives are immediately apparent. Rather than relying on 
naturalistic conceptions of a general interest, at either a national (realist) or 
cosmopolitan (neoliberal) level, Cox problematises the construction of state interests 
and roots these in the conflictual relations between social groups stemming primarily 
from different locations in the social relations of production. An immediate issue of 
contention, however, was the conceptualisation of the construction of an historical bloc 
as a national phenomenon, based on the hegemonic position of a social class within a 
. I . I 34 partIcu ar natlOna state. To accommodate the increasing internationalisation of 
production and the challenges that this posed to analyses of hegemony in terms of 
national strategies, subsequent writings from a neo-Gramscian paradigm have tended to 
33 Cox 1996 [1992]: 151. 
J.j 
COX 1996 [1983]: 135. 
90 
highlight the agency of transnationalised bourgeois class fractions in the propagation of 
neoliberal ideology at state and international institution levels. From this perspective, 
the rise of a transnational bourgeoisie since the 1960s is the product of an increasingly 
internationalised mode of production that involves firms whose component 
organisations are located in different territorial jurisdictions. Owing to the strong 
reliance of these multi-national corporations upon forging comparative advantages 
through differential location of the various nodes in their production and finance 
networks, they form the bulwark of support and propagation of the neoliberal model 
which became the hegemonic world order following the crisis of the 1970s. The 
hegemonic strategies of ideology propagation pursued by the dominant 
internationalised class fractions, particularly global finance, serve to entrench the 
neoliberal ethos in "the modes of thought of key individuals in government and of 
groups and institutions in various civil societies in strong as well as less powerful 
nations".35 Their ability to promote this hegemonic ideology rests upon structural 
power resulting from growing resources and mobility. 
In this manner, by using these strategies and supported by the bulwark of economic 
supremacy, transnational capitalists have been able to form a hegemonic block at the 
international level that exercises authority over states and multilateral institutions by 
asserting the universal norms, institutions and mechanisms to which all actors must 
abide. 36 Consequently, from this perspective the World Bank is constituted as a 
thoroughly neoliberal capitalist institution owing to the hegemonic position, mediated 
through the structures of leading states, of a transnationalised bourgeoisie rooted in 
35 Gill 1991: 49. 
36 Gill 1991. 
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global production and finance networks. 37 To support this argument, neo-Gramscians 
could point to several conduits of neoliberal ideology into the World Bank. At the site 
of intellectual production, a neo-Gramscian approach could highlight the hiring 
practices of the World Bank that, whilst more heterogeneous than the IMF in terms of 
nationalities, remain characterised by a heavy preponderance of recruits from the 
economics departments of top U.S. universities where the neoliberal ethos is strongest. 
Therein, the hegemony of neoclassicism that is preponderant within the US academy 
becomes transposed into the Bank through recruitment practices. 38 
Secondly, neo-Gramscian authors could also point to the tight links between World 
Bank staff and Wall Street, the epicentre of global finance. The managing director of 
the Bank is commonly a former banker, or someone with close ties to Wall Street, and 
the Bank is in constant contact with international financial managers with whom it must 
negotiate its major sources of loan credit. Aside from personal linkages, the interests of 
finance capital are imposed on the World Bank via the constraints of its structural 
position as an institution reliant on the support of, on the one hand, principally western 
countries for its political and financial sponsorship and, on the other, private financial 
markets for raising the bulk of its capital. The Bank relies on its AAA credit rating 
allowing it to access financial markets at preferential rates in order to fund projects. 
This coveted rating rests upon the perceived soundness of World Bank lending and also 
upon the continued support of its major (Western) shareholders. Both these 
constituencies have a clear idea of what they will tolerate from the World Bank in 
terms of macro-development policy, but also expect the Bank to act in a manner that 
reinforces and stabilizes the major tenets of the global capitalist system. 
37 cf. van der Pijl 1998: -1.7; Cox 1993: 62--1.. 
38 Kapur 2002. 
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Given the form of the World Bank as one aspect of a transnational hegemonic bloc, its 
function is then derived as an integral institution for imposing a form of disciplinary 
neo-liberalism. As Robert Cox elaborates, international institutions such as the World 
Bank playa key ideological role in constructing a form of hegemony as they help to 
"define policy guidelines for states and to legitimate certain institutions and practices 
at the national level", a conceptualisation that has significant resonance with the World 
Bank's self-presentation as a "knowledge bank" dedicated to promoting "best-
development practice".39 As Gilbert, Powell and Vines, the most avid promoters of the 
World Bank as a "knowledge bank", suggest: 
The Bank is like an Oxbridge college or a private university. It is 
involved in the education business and uses an endowment income 
- obtained from its subscribed capital and accumulated reserves -
to subsidise its provision of knowledge and of public goods.4o 
In this respect, more nuanced Gramscian-influenced perspectives emphasise that the act 
of creating agendas and norms - for example, approaches to understanding and dealing 
with global poverty - does not revolve merely around the active pursuit of gaining 
'consent', but rather constitutes an attempt to define the very parameters of a debate. 
Continued hegemony of the neoliberal project, as expressed by William Roseberry, is 
therefore sought by attempting to ingrain its central assumptions into the "words, 
images, symbols. fom1s, organisations, institutions, and movements llsed by 
subordinate populations" so that the very ways In which resistance forms and 
39 Cox 1993: 63. For a presentation of the World Bank as a knowledge bank, cf. Gilbert, Powell and 
Vines 2000. 
~o Gilbert, Powell and Vines 1999: 612. 
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articulates remains within the contours of the former. 41 In this manner, the Bank aims 
to use its position and money to exert influence over the entire 'development 
community' of smaller regional development banks, other public and private aid 
agencies, NGOs, academics and national governments and hence keep the development 
agenda and practice constrained within the parameters of a neoliberal model. 
Moreover, the Bank actively seeks to convince the recipients of World Bank 
development 'products' of the soundness of the Washington doctrine and to assuage the 
doubts of public opinion in the West. 
As the leading global producer of development doctrine, it enjoys substantial influence 
over not only client states but also the global terms of debate over development issues. 
This influence could be termed the "soft power" of the Bank, in contrast to the "hard 
power" of direct conditionality lending, and is one aspect of a larger process, 
highlighted by Arturo Escobar, whereby the production and reproduction of 
development knowledge attempts to create a discursive space in which "only certain 
things can be said or even imagined".42 One manifestation of the discursive power of 
World Bank vetting is manifested in the need for national and sub-national 
governments, communities and NGOs to couch projects requiring public or private 
funding in the concepts and terminology propagated by the Bank. Justifying projects 
within the context of World Bank discourse is seen as a method of validating their 
soundness by emphasising their basis in a scientific and internationally verified body of 
development knowledge, and is often a prerequisite for attaining funding from public or 
private lending agencies. Such influence, however, has made the Bank the direct target 
of critique from across the political spectrum. 
41 Roseberry 1994. 
4~ Escobar 1997: 85. 
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Indeed, gIven these roles, it is easily recognisable, moreover, why the World Bank 
should be constituted as an object of political struggle at a global level, as the Bank 
plays a key role in the global politics of capitalist development that transcends its 
immediate role as a source of credit. The recognition that national states are by no 
means the only actors on the global stage is highlighted as one of the key facets of the 
'new' international political economy and, although such a perspective can be justly 
criticised for extreme short sightedness that tends to ignore the long historical role of 
internationally orientated social movements, it is nonetheless related to the observable 
phenomenon of a variety of internationally organised and orientated movements 
targeting multilateral institutions as a central locus of struggle.43 The last decade, 
however, has seen the emergence of strong internationally organised social movements 
that have directly contested the World Bank's historical legacy and contemporary 
policy prescriptions. The centrality of the World Bank in the global conflict over 
international development policy in the late 1990s and its effects on Bank rhetoric and 
prescription are examined in the conclusion, where it is emphasised that the major 
effect of this current internationalisation of struggle has been a legitimacy crisis within 
the institution. 
Whilst not contradicting the World Bank's role in the global propagation of neoliberal 
forms of restructuring and the struggles this gives rise to, it is nonetheless necessary to 
critique the neo-Gramscians for an overemphasis of the role of ideology in the 
determination of global power relations. Within the neo-Gramscian framework, 
ideology is merely the set of ideas that a particular social force - preponderantly 
~.1 O'Brien et al. 2000; for a historical sociological interpretation of the role of social movements in 
international politics since the advent of capitalist modernity, cf. Colas 2001. 
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fractions of capital - seeks to establish as the ruling ideas in order to directly affirm 
their material interests. It is on these grounds that the neo-Gramscian approach has 
been attacked as a form of "Weberian pluralism".44 Like other fractionalist 
perspectives that champion the subjective imposition of modes of domination by 
particular interest groups, neo-Gramscian analysis tends toward a mechanistic theory of 
production, class, ideology and subjectivity.45 In contrast to a conceptualisation of 
class as a dynamic and contradictory relationship constituted at a level that belies 
immediate forms of appearance, the neo-Gramscian theory of class is a theory of 
"social forces" that are constituted in the realm of circulation owing to divergent 
revenue sources (e.g. wages, profits and rents), and which are drawn into a common 
political project cemented at the level of ideology. 
Such a perspective operates on a static "pie-division" conceptualisation of production, 
which finds its theoretical basis In neo-Ricardian theory. Within the Ricardian 
framework, production is viewed as a rigid technical exerCIse of joining the three 
principal factors of production (capital, labour and land) in order to produce use-values 
(useful things). By simplifying production into a technical process of use-value 
creation, the world of distribution and circulation, in which atomised consumers utilize 
their wages or profits to purchase commodities with a view to consumption (either 
personal or productive), appears to reside in an entirely separated sphere of social 
relations. Struggle is reduced to social conflict over the social relations of distribution 
or, more specifically, the distribution of a fixed amount of use-values materializing 
from the static production process. This leads to a rather mechanical and unmediated 
association of the material interests of social forces with political projects aimed at 
44 Burnham 1991. 
4.' For more expansive critiques of fractionalist analysis, cf. Clarke 1978; 1979. 
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furthering those interests. Accordingly, the state is generally theorised in a sociological 
manner as playing a pivotal and relatively unhindered role in the reconciliation of 
divergent interests and its content is defined by which interest group is best able to 
advance its own interests by promoting them as universal. 
Production, however, is not merely a technical process of adding units of labour to raw 
materials, but rather constitutes a set of contradictory relationships between the owners 
of capital and workers. At the most abstract level, by employing what is essentially a 
technical understanding of the relations of production and deriving a concept of class 
from the former, neo-Gramscianism does not examine the contradictory essence of 
capitalist social relations expressed in the inherent tension between the development of 
productive forces and the social form assumed by the relations of production in 
capitalism. In so doing, there is no concept of the specific social form of capitalist 
production in which the subjective activity of labour is constituted as an objective and 
dominating social force. In contrast to neo-Gramscianism, a theory of power as a social 
relation predicated upon the fetishised forms of alienated labour allows for a richer 
understanding of global social domination as it not only establishes the social 
foundations upon which different subjective forces can attempt to impose their interests 
but also provides a basis on which to comprehend the social limits to these strategies. 
The tensions inherent in the value form of labour problematise the question of 
subjectivity by showing how the fetishised appearances of capitalist social relations 
create alienated and inherently contradictory subjectivities. This allows for significant 
disjunctures between the intentions and outcomes of social agency, including, for 
example, breaches between the immediate necessities of individual capitals and those 
of the sustained reproduction of capital in general. The neo-Gramscian approach, 
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centred only on the antagonism between different social groups in the sphere of 
circulation, has no substantive manner to investigate how these contradictions work 
themselves out at the level of individual capitals, social capital and the state. Clearly 
capitals located in different sectors of production or, pertinently, different moments of 
the circulation of capital (finance, industrial, merchant) will have contingently diverse 
interests and may indeed organise politically to pursue these aIms, as neo-
Gramscianism assumes that they do.46 However, there are limits to this 
conceptualisation. On the one hand, despite different functional moments in the 
circulation of capital, all capitalists are dependent upon the extraction of surplus value 
by capital-in-general from global labour. To understand the complex interaction of 
vertical inter-class relations with horizontal intra-class relations reqUIres a more 
sophisticated theory of the creation and distribution of value. 
Secondly, it is important to re-emphasise that the conflict between classes does not 
exist solely as a question of distribution but, in contrast, a vital and conflictual 
relationship between classes exists within the sphere of production even before the 
issue of distribution is broached. As indicated in the previous chapter, a defining aspect 
of capitalist social relations is the worker's sale of labour-power - the capacity to 
labour - to the capitalist.47 Production relationships, therefore, involve a range of 
struggles over numerous aspects of the conditions under which this labour-power is 
expended, including the length of the working day, the organisation and intensity of 
46 It should be noted that the primary manner by which neo-Gramscianism justifies the ascendancy of a 
particular fraction of capital is through the outcome of state (or international institution) policies and the 
particular interests these are viewed to serve. This involves a tautological form of reasoning, whereby 
hegemony is read backwards through the policies of the state. For a more systematic presentation of 
class fractions as subjectivities based on the individual forms capital assumes within the circuit of 
capital. see Fine 1975. 
47 This relates to the fundamental differentiation made by Marx between labour and labour-power. with 
the latter denoting the capacity to labour, the precise realisation of which is constituted as a contlictual 
relationship between capitalist and worker. Ricardianism. however, makes no such distinction. 
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work, and the deployment of automated machinery, as well as over the wage. At their 
most basic level, these struggles relate to the necessity for capital to make workers 
labour beyond the socially necessary labour time equivalent to that represented in the 
value of the wage. The relations of production, therefore, are not analytically limited to 
the isolated realm of "industrial relations", for the nature of their resolution exercises a 
determinate effect upon the movement of value in the circuit of capital. The latter ties 
together production and distribution, not as isolated acts, but as a continual process of 
value creation and realisation that underscores the dynamics of social reproduction and 
such considerations constitute the necessary basis on which to understand the form, 
functions and limits of the modem state.48 
Finally, to the limited extent that neo-Gramscianism presents contradictions within the 
social relations of production, these are understood as political contradictions: namely, 
the distributional struggle between social forces located within different moments of 
the distribution process. The trajectory of economic development, state form and world 
orders, therefore, is primarily determined through political struggles over the 
distribution of incomes. Without a theory that can explain the dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation as social processes that appear in objective forms, the trajectory of capital 
accumulation becomes a phenomenon contingent on political struggle at the level of 
appearances. For example, in the case of Cox's discussion of the world economic crisis 
in the 1970s, he is forced to understand the crisis as essentially a political one: an 
organic crisis of hegemony within the national state unleashed by the profit squeeze of 
manufacturers owing to labour demands and the competition of foreign products.49 
Understood in this way, crises can potentially be solved at a political level by re-
48 cf. Milller and Neustiss 1975. 
49 Cox 1987: 273-308. This is a restatement of the 'profit squeeze' theory of crisis. as propounded by 
Glyn and Sutcliffe (1971) and critiqued by Fine and Harris 1979: 76. 
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establishing hegemony through a dominant social class finding the right "fit" of power, 
ideas and institutions. Neo-Gramscianism tends towards this over-politicisation of the 
dynamics of global capitalism owing to the lack of a theoretical basis on which to 
examine the contradictory social form of capitalist relations and the inherent crisis 
tendencies they engender. 50 
For the purpose of analysing the World Bank, the work of Cox and others in this genre 
is to be welcomed for re-asserting the importance of production and social struggle in 
the analysis of global power relations and the institutional forms they assume. 
However, the analysis provided is partial. Neo-Gramscian analysis is able to conceive 
how capitalist social relations give rise to political struggles between both capital and 
labour, and between capital fractions over distributional issues, and how these struggles 
can become articulated at an international level. However, it can provide no theoretical 
basis through which to understand how the contradictory social form of capitalism also 
conditions such struggles and places limits to the possibilities of their resolution. At 
the heart of the problem is that, despite assertions to the contrary, the levels of analysis 
initially put forward by Cox, and that subsequent neo-Gramscianism has accepted, are 
not dialectical in a Marxist sense.51 Analysis does not move between different levels of 
abstraction in order to locate determinations of social forms in the social relations and 
concrete practice of human beings. Rather, it is a systemic analysis, in which different 
levels of analysis - social forces, state forms and world orders - are understood as 
different yet interrelated structures within a system. Confined to analysing capitalist 
social relations at the level of appearances, neo-Gramscian analysis is unable to provide 
a firm conceptualisation of the fetishised nature of social practice, which stems from 
50 Holloway 1995b; Clarke 1988, 1994; Fine, Lapavitsas and Milonakis 1999. 
51 These levels of analysis are outlined in Cox 1996 [1981]: 101 and Bieler and Morton 2003. 
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the social form of capitalist global relations, operates through the struggle-driven 
movement of value, and manifests itself not just in political conflict but in the form of 
the global movement of money, commodities and the quantitative determination of 
economic magnitudes. 
The implications of this critique for understanding the World Bank within global 
capital are profound. Rather than limiting our conceptualising of the World Bank as 
the transmission belt for the ideology of hegemonic capitalist fractions, an historical 
materialist approach seeks to problematise the form and content of the World Bank 
through an examination of its position within historically changing and contradictory 
global capitalist social relations. This permits an examination of the World Bank that 
can go beyond the determination of its form and content by the subjective machinations 
of either a hegemonic class and/or dominant state, and is only achievable through a 
broader examination of the different modes of integration of the World Bank into 
global capitalist social relations. The latter task necessarily involves an analysis 
elaborated at different levels of abstraction appropriate to particular relations under 
scrutiny. Many of these modes of integration have been highlighted in the above 
discussion of realist, neoliberal institutionalist and neo-Gramscian perspectives yet, 
situated within those theoretical frameworks, were not imbued with the substantive 
content of being capitalist relations. 
3. The Bank and the Contradictions of Global Capitalism 
Through its quotidian activities as an implementer of development programmes in the 
South, as a key player in the international production of development knowledge, as 
subject to the turbulent dynamics of the inter-state system, and as a target of struggles 
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by global social forces, the Bank is fundamentally integrated within the relations and 
trajectory of capitalist development at a global level. The subsumption of the Bank to 
these social relations decisively conditions the nature of its activities in the South as 
well as the dynamic quality of its relationships with dominant states, client states, and 
various social groups that seek to influence (or undermine) it. In contrast to other 
recent conceptualisations of the Bank from within a materialist perspective,52 the 
approach currently elaborated emphasises that the Bank's constitution within global 
capitalist social relations imparts an inherently contradictory character upon the 
institution that manifests itself in both its policy prescription, substantive actions and 
the inter-state struggles over the institutional form and policy content of the Bank. 
The theoretically elaborated proposition that the dynamics of global capitalist 
development are inherently conflictual and driven by struggle, and that these 
contradictions are crystallized within the various political, economic and ideological 
social forms, was advanced in the opening two chapters of this thesis. Here, and in the 
following chapters, it is emphasised that the substantive irrationality of the World 
Bank's practices must be comprehended on this basis. In this respect, the Bank's often 
contradictory goals, its tendency towards repeated bouts of expansion beyond its 
capacities, and most fundamentally, its failure to make any serious impact on poverty in 
over fifty years, are not in essence the result of its sub-standard research, weak lending 
philosophies, personal failings of its management, or its subjugation to the designs of 
northern states or narrow capitalist interests; even if all of the latter have indeed been 
common features of the Bank's history. More fundamentally, the contradictions within 
the Bank are determined at the first level of analysis by the irrationality of capitalist 
development on a global scale, to which the Bank is conjoined. It is only within the 
52 Cammack 2001. 2003. 
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dynamics of the latter that the former contingent irrationalities can be adequately 
comprehended. 
In this respect, the first section of this chapter examined how the crisis-prone course of 
global accumulation fundamentally conditions the dynamics of the Bank's relationship 
to the international system of states. Likewise, by critically drawing on the insights of 
neo-Gramscian theory, the second section showed how the Bank's institutional position 
opens it to the specific influences of conflictual social forces that are involved in 
propagating specific forms of capitalist global governance. Both these factors are 
important mediating forms through which a specific capitalist character is imposed 
upon the Bank. However, to view the particular constitution of the World Bank as 
imparted solely through the dominant state or social forces, even if these are placed 
within the dynamics of global accumulation, is to succumb to an instrumentalism that 
overlooks the wider context of the Bank's activities. 
As set forward in liberal accounts of the Bank, the latter is an organisation created to 
address the internationally determined problem of underdevelopment in the South. 
However, it was argued in section one that liberal accounts of this role prove 
inadequate to explain the Bank's character owing to their inability to grasp the 
fundamental relations and contradictory essence of global capitalist development. A 
more precise formulation, therefore, is that the World Bank was created as an 
organisation in an international regulatory system intended to ensure the sustained 
accumulation of capital at a global level through selective interventions in global 
capitalist social relations. These interventions, moreover, have been aimed at 
promoting trends associated with capitalist development in the North through 
facilitating dramatic social transformation In the South. Primarily, they involved 
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promoting the spread of capitalist social relations (modernisation), often with foreign 
investment seen as a primary motor of this process. As discussed in the followina := 
chapter, the modernisation task was initially conceived in terms of providing the 
physical infrastructure necessary for incipient capitalist industrialisation, but has since 
expanded to include refining the human infrastructure by directly reconstituting the 
social and political structures of Southern populations in order to provide the social 
conditions for capitalist development. As such, the Bank has been deeply integrated 
into the dynamics of expanding capitalist social relations in the South. Moreover, Bank 
policy has from its initiation been aimed towards supporting private, particularly 
foreign, investment as the primary means to spur capitalist development and this has 
entailed that the Bank has consistently relied upon global capital circuits and the 
prevailing modes of the internationalisation of capital.s3 
The institutional subordination of the Bank to the project of fostering capitalist social 
relations and the global expansion of capital circuits, however, imparts a complex and 
contradictory character upon the Bank. To restate the principal argument of chapters 
one and two, development in capitalist form constitutes the extension of the productive 
forces through the incessant yet haphazard movement of value. This entails the 
subordination of human needs and desires to the self-expansion of capital, a process 
that necessarily produces contradictory tendencies that repeatedly serve to undermine 
the social reproduction of the labour force. Therefore, whilst capitalism indeed 
53 This necessity reflects back upon the Bank's position within interstate relations. The actions of the 
Bank have typically rested on the projection of a convergence of interests between borrowers and 
creditors. To the former, the Bank presents itself not only as undertaking an ethical good of improving 
the plight of the vast majority of the world's population, but also as acting as a global accumulation 
caretaker, a role that necessarily involves fostering the conditions for profitable investment. To the latter, 
the Bank is presented as an aid in fostering the conditions for the expanded accumulation of capital 
within the national state form by promoting the conditions for foreign investment. Moreover. it IS 
notable that both these functions were and continue to be justified as promoting Western security. 
originally preventing the spread of communism and lately from the emergence of rogue states. 
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develops the productive forces at unprecedented rates (the material basis of capitalist 
development), the social form of capitalist relations assures that the growth of actual 
social wealth is accompanied by unremitting social struggle, uneven development, 
recurrent crises, inequality and poverty. On this basis, at a global level, the World 
Bank is best understood as integrally involved in a contradictory project of fostering 
capitalist development in the global South whilst concurrently attempting to assuage 
the contradictions inherent in the latter. 
As such, and in spite of the early optimism that capitalist modernisation of the South 
would be a relatively quick and harmonious process, capitalist development has given 
rise to a multiplicity of new problems and struggles.54 Concurrent to the expansion of 
capitalist social relations and social contradictions in the South, the Bank has responded 
by its own process of expansion, therein augmenting its involvement in the 
contradictory dynamics of capitalist development in the South. In this respect, the 
primary form of Bank activity has become increasingly that of reactive mediation to the 
contradictions of global capitalist development and the specific character of the Bank is 
heavily determined by its direct role as an institution that both promulgates and 
attempts to mediate the tensions inherent to capitalist development in the South. The 
Bank is under considerable pressure to make its forms of intervention into specific 
social relations in developing countries practically pertinent to the emerging 
contradictions of social restructuring in the South through which the social conflicts 
over capitalist development and restructuring are passed through to the Bank. This 
interpretation contrasts with more instrumentalist accounts that emphasise that the 
54 This trajectory is examined at a global level in the following chapter, and with respect to the Chilean 
experience in chapters six through eight. 
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content of Bank interventions are formed merely at a politico-ideological level 
according to the contemporary conjuncture of state and social power at a globallevel. 55 
Understanding the Bank as a reactive mediator of contradictory global capitalist social 
relations also permits a different understanding of its role in ideological propagation as 
compared to that advanced by neo-Gramscian accounts.56 The latter tend to present the 
Bank as instrumentally elaborating a cohesive delineation of neoliberal policy to be 
subsequently transferred to the global South and set into policy practice. One problem 
with this understanding of the Bank, however, is the widespread recognition that World 
Bank research is far from cutting edge. On the one hand, Bank research is often 
characterised by manifold weaknesses that undermine its ability to decisively influence 
ongoing policy debates and belie its image as the avatar of neoliberalism. For example, 
Knut Nustad suggests that, in terms of its theoretical and analytical coherence, the 
World Development Report 2000/1, which the Bank regards as its definitive statement 
on poverty reduction, would not have passed as a Master's thesis.57 On the other hand, 
it is suggested that Bank theorisation and prescription commonly lags several years -
and sometimes as much as a decade - behind significant issues thrown up by 
restructuring processes in the South.58 This sentiment is reinforced by the nature of 
Bank knowledge production, which is commonly constituted by selecting prototype 
programmes from amongst those that have already been instigated by governments in 
the South, removing their social, geographic and historical specificities, and linking 
them to the more general principals of rational development policy as recognised by the 
55 
e.g. Wade 2002. 
,\6 This includes the work of Paul Cammack; cf. Cammack 2001, 2003. 
57 Nustad 2002: 3. Likewise, Ben Fine (2001a: 80) suggests that Bank research is marked by its: "Poor 
quality, poor engagement with alternatives (Americanisation), excessive dissemination at the expense of 
independent research capacity building, poor coherence and integration, ... and over- generalisation". 
58 cf. Pincus and Winters 2002; Kapur 2002. 
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Bank. Importantly, the Chilean experience has been a constant source of models for 
W orId Bank prescription, as examined in chapters six through eight. 
In this manner, a materialist account of the Bank's role in international knowledge 
production must emphasise its function as a reactive mediator that seeks to gIve 
coherence to restructuring processes that are often already taking shape or well 
established. As Peter Burnham provocatively argues: "Capital does not wait for the 
articulation of the ideology of monetarism before restructuring".59 In this respect, the 
ideological propagation of the Bank is best conceived as a rationalisation of processes 
that are often well developed in many countries; as an attempt to give ideological 
coherence to forms of restructuring by tying them to a wider body of 'scientific 
knowledge' that, importantly, is backed up by the power of capital. Certainly through 
its research and propagation activities the Bank attempts to give extra priority to 
particular forms of restructuring and institutional regulation as definitive solutions to 
development quandaries and can often attempt to facilitate their adoption in countries 
that, often through domestic political opposition, have failed to embrace restructuring 
trends.60 
Given its constitution as a reactive mediator of capitalist development in the South and 
its dependence upon the wider structure of private capital flows from North to South, it 
is unsurprising that major changes in World Bank actions and policy prescription have 
come at pivotal moments in the trajectory of global accumulation. This is not solely 
because such conjunctures heighten the political pressures upon the Bank, although 
59 Burnham 1991: 83. 
60 Given that its programme content has remained heavily dependent upon the theoretical underpinnings 
of development economics (firstly in Keynesian then in neoclassical guise) that is unable to provide an 
analysis of the specific social relations that underscore capitalist development, this task has proved 
inordinately hard. 
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coercion of this nature can certainly be an important influence, but because the social 
dynamics underscoring the accumulation of capital at a global level change. 
Specifically, as elaborated in the following chapter, the Bank can be viewed to have 
most significantly reformulated its self-projected role, policy prescription, lending 
philosophy and forms of mediating the policies of developing countries in reaction to 
the escalating crisis of national developmentalism in the early and mid 1970s, the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, and the series of financial crises in the mid to late 1990s.61 All 
these pivotal moments in post-War accumulation greatly accelerated processes of 
change within the institution. In this respect, the following chapter aims to historicize 
the approach to the World Bank outlined in this chapter and provide an account of the 
Bank's reactive mediations to the trajectory of uneven development in the South in the 
post-War period. 
61 Specifically, the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-5, followed by the Asian Debacle of 1997-8 and. the 
subsequent meltdowns in Russia and Brazil. The Argentinean crisis of 2001 has had more reper~usslOns 
within the IMF than the Bank, particularly in relation to debate over new rules for sovereIgn debt 
restructuring; cf. Soederberg 2003a. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE WORLD BANK AND THE TRAJECTORY OF 
GLOBAL CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter has two main functions. Firstly, the chapter attempts to historicize the 
approach to the World Bank elaborated in the previous chapter by situating the Bank as 
an international financial institution within the major tendencies of post-War global 
capitalist expansion and the subsequent crises of the 1970s and 1980s. To achieve this 
goal, the chapter examines the shifting structure and activities of the Bank in the period 
from its establi shment in the immediate post -W ar era, through the tumultuous changes 
that wracked the global South following the emergence of international economic crisis 
in the 1970s, and on to its transformation in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter does not 
offer a comprehensi ve history of the World Bank, but rather consolidates a materialist 
interpretation of the Bank by identifying the main trends of Bank evolution within the 
contours of the post-War global political economy.l Secondly, the chapter broaches the 
character of the restructuring that swept across the global South in response to crisis in 
the late 1970s. It is suggested that the essential core of neoliberal restructuring was an 
attempt to impose the discipline of capital on states and societies in the South through a 
struggle-driven process of retrenchment and reconstitution of the institutional forms by 
which the state mediated the social relations of capitalist development. As such, the 
discussion paves the way for both a more detailed examination of neoliberal 
restructuring of labour relations and social policy in the following chapter and the 
detailed examination of societal restructuring in Chile (chapters six through eight). 
1. The Changing World Bank: From Bretton Woods to Debt Crisis 
I Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997) provide the most comprehensive history of the World Bank. For a 
more critical appraisal. cf. George and Sabelli 1994. 
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Alongside its partner institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMP), the World 
Bank was established in concept in 1944 under the auspices of the US and British 
governments at the Bretton Woods conference. It would take another two years, 
however, before it assumed a concrete institutional form as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and a further year before it made its first 
loan. Although more emphasis had been placed on the establishment and role of the 
IMF, the Bank nonetheless formed an important pillar of the emerging institutional 
forms of the post-War "Pax Americana" and the reconstruction of global capitalist 
relations after the destruction of the war years. Anticipating the ending of the Second 
World War, the US government, supported by its British counterpart, sought to 
establish an international trade and financial infrastructure for a new and stable period 
of capitalist accumulation. Guiding the conference discussions were the principals of 
liberal internationalism that gave voice to the necessity of expanding global trade to 
create new markets for industrial products and secure international access to natural 
resources. 
Rationalised on this intellectual current, the basis of this new world order was an 
international monetary system based on fixed exchange rates that was intended to deter 
the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of aggressive devaluations and economic autarky 
that characterised the period of the depression. 2 The comer stone of this arrangement 
was universal dollar convertibility, with the greenback pegged to gold in order to act as 
a stable currency unit for global trade, and the functions of the IMP as an international 
creditor of last resort for those countries that were experiencing severe balance of 
payments difficulties and therefore could not maintain existing exchange rate 
agreements. In providing a framework for stable international payments, the Bretton 
2 Pauly 1994: 205-6. 
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Woods architects aimed to sustain an environment for the recuperation and expansion 
of the world market in conjunction with the further internationalisation of capital 
through expanded commodity circuits and foreign direct investment.3 As a moment of 
liberal internationalism, the establishment of the World Bank was a fundamental 
recognition that a stable and regulated expansion of the world market was a necessary 
dimension of sustained accumulation in the core. Not only did the South provide a 
source of raw materials necessary for the production of industrial goods, the latent 
expansion of Southern markets offered a potentially important outlet for industrial 
consumer goods and technological innovations. Indeed, the imperative to secure the 
conditions for the internationalisation of capital would become ever more pressing as 
the conditions that spurred the post-War boom led to a progressive overaccumulation of 
capital in the industrialised countries of the North. 
The role of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development within this 
framework was posited initially as that of providing credit to aid war-ravaged Europe 
and 'underdeveloped' countries to promote long-term economic growth. Nevertheless, 
in the wake of the Marshall Plan, by which the US financed Europe's reconstruction on 
a relatively unilateral footing, the activities of the Bank soon became focused on the 
latter, particularly upon those countries that gained independence from the colonial core 
through national-independence struggles in the immediate post-war period. These 
targeted countries were generally those that had seen more complete integration into 
international capital circuits owing to their position in the former colonial system. 
Processes of decolonisation, however, had created new challenges for the leading states 
and institutions of the capitalist global order. On the one hand, the ending of formal 
colonial rule brought an end to existing forms of political domination that secured the 
3 Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999: 185. 
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position of the colonies within the ambit of the imperial countries and the growing 
inequalities in global production and begged the fate of the non-core world. New forms 
of global regulation of trade and investment would be necessary to facilitate the 
maintenance and expanded reproduction of capital circuits between core and periphery. 
On the other hand, the relationship between the developed and developing worlds 
would become framed within the context of Cold War geopolitical dynamics. Through 
its activities as a provider of capital, the Bank was intended to harness developing 
nations into the capitalist world economy and, therein, into the web of Western 
patronage and away from possible Soviet influence or autarkic nationalism. 
Within these parameters the Bank would assume a function of what could be called a 
creditor of sole-resort for many countries that, unable to manage the interest rates 
demanded by international creditors to cover the high-risks associated with turbulent 
borrowers, would otherwise be without access to international credit sources. As 
advanced in the rapidly emerging paradigm of 'development economics', the rationale 
that underscored the World Bank's activities was to correct capital market 
imperfections in order to augment transfers of capital and technology to the developing 
world. IBRD loans were used primarily to fund large infrastructure and developmental 
projects intended to foment industrialisation and capital accumulation, particularly 
through integrating isolated and impoverished rural areas into wider capitalist relations. 
In this manner, in the twenty years following its establishment, two-thirds of Bank 
lending was destined for electricity supply and transport infrastructure projects.4 
Concurrently, at an international level, the production of development knowledge, 
including the identification of objects to be addressed through development practice 
4 Bakker 1996: 49. 
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and the prioritisation of specific objectives within these practices, was largely 
constituted within a constellation of institutions that was established in the immediate 
post-War period with close links to the US state and academe. As the foremost 
international institution for promoting capitalist development in the global South, the 
World Bank became an increasingly central cog in these relationships. As Arturo 
Escobar suggests, a pronounced synergy was formed between: 
[TJ he role of experts, from whom certain criteria of knowledge 
and competence were asked; institutions such as the United 
Nations, which had the moral, professional and legal authority to 
name subjects and define strategies; and the international lending 
organizations, which carried the symbols of capital and power.5 
It was not primarily the spread of the phenomena that theorists associated with 
development (industrialisation and modernisation) that led to this second wave of 
development theoretisation and practices, but rather the pervasive manner in which 
these phenomena were highly partial occurrences that created decidedly disaggregated 
social formations with considerable political instability. The overriding concern of the 
new development doctrines emanating from within this conjuncture of institutions and 
state power was posited as how to recreate the original transition to capitalist modernity 
in the European core.6 Much of the prescriptive detail of this task fell under the 
purview of the newly created and rapidly expanding field of "development economics" 
that was an offshoot of the marginalist-inspired modern economics that sought to apply 
the prevalent economic theories of the day to the idiosyncratic nature of ex-colonial 
) Escobar 1997: 87. 
6 Roxborough 1979. 
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economIes. At its birth, development economICS was heavily influenced by the 
prevailing Keynesian orthodoxy that advanced the necessity of sustained state 
interventions in social relations in order to overcome market failures that were regarded 
as particularly pervasive in developing economies. Nonetheless, a critical fringe based 
on fundamentalist neoclassical principals that professed a radically different policy 
prescription also flanked the paradigm. The latter, as detailed below, would gain 
increasing ascendancy in the context of crisis in the 1970s. Notwithstanding such 
divergences, both tendencies within development economics were predicated on the 
ahistorical and asocial abstractions of marginalism as the basis for the 'scientific' 
production of development knowledge within the post-War period. 8 
Although development economics provided the technical substance of the dominant 
development doctrine, its narrow range of concerns inhibited its ability to account 
adequately for - or address - major social phenomena in the South. In this respect, 
development economics was readily supplemented by incorporation of the themes and 
concerns of modernisation theory as developed primarily by sociologists working in the 
United States. In essence, modernisation theory was a profoundly teleological 
conceptualisation of development in which all countries were destined to pass through 
identical stages on a road to modernity. In tum, modernity was posited as the 
achievement of industrialised, mass-consumption society. As Hugo Radice 
summarises, modernisation theory presented a monotonic route to modernity in which: 
The economlC, social and political attributes of advanced 
capitalisms were to be gradually established, as the benign 
7 Escobar 1995; Leys 1996; Cypher and Dietz 1997. 
x K 197-ay ). 
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institutions of markets, civil society and the nation-state took 
A central feature of modernisation theory was its close symbiosis with the ontological 
standpoint of modem economic thought as embedded in a universal concept of 
development as rational progress. However, modernisation theory also provided a 
critique of development economics by suggesting that it was necessary to consider the 
wider social environment that could sustain a drive towards modernity through 
industrialisation. Major considerations within the modernisation paradigm, therefore, 
were cultural and political ones and the achievement of development was suggested as 
necessitating profound transition in the South through the implanting of Western values 
and institutions in order to make Southern populations appropriate to the rhythms and 
rigours of capitalist work. IO 
Within the development economics / modernisation theory paradigm, labour re-entered 
the imagination and practice of development though the parameters of marginalist 
economics in terms of its marginal productivity. As indicated above, within the 
confines of modem economics, labour is construed as a factor of production, socially 
equivalent to land and capital. Each factor rewards its owner with an appropriate 
source of revenue (wages, rent and profit) according to its respective contribution to 
production and the utility of the final product. If labour is more productive, therein 
providing a larger contribution to the value of the product, it will be rewarded with a 
higher wage. On this basis, development, in terms of per capita income, can be reduced 
9 
Radice 2001: 3. 
10 Stuart Corbridge irreverently refers to this as a "clocks and condoms" approach as the latter items were 
commonly disseminated as two primary instruments by which to instil capitalist work time and Western 
nuclear families respectively: Corbridge 1995: 2. 
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in essence to a relatively simple question of improving the productivity of labour at a 
national level. As article three of its founding constitution stated, the Bank was 
intended: 
To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade 
and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by 
encouraging international investment for the development of the 
productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising 
productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their 
. . II terrztorzes. 
Within developing countries, this aIm was commonly theorised by development 
economists as occurring within the framework of a dual economy. The latter built upon 
the observation in several major developing economies of relatively high-productivity 
capitalist industrial sectors that existed alongside large, non-capitalist and low-
producti ve agrarian and informal spheres. Development economists such as Arthur 
Lewis proceeded to suggest that it was necessary to encourage the incorporation of 
labour into manufacturing where it was more productive and where capitalists would 
reinvest the revenues from profits for further productive expansion. I2 As such, the 
motor of development was characterised as a process of removing labour from such 
"traditional" sectors followed by its subsequent subsumption within the high-
productivity realm of capitalist industry.13 In this manner, development was conceived 
II The World Bank articles of agreement are available at www.worldbank.org/. 
ill . 9 
- eWIS 1 54. 
13 Although the models of lewis and others were often criticised as being narrowly focused on the urban 
realm, to the extent of treating agriculture as a "bargain basement" for cheap labour, the realities of 
entrenched poverty and bitter social struggle in the rural ambit entailed that the kinds of rural 
development policies that the Bank would embrace in the 1970s were also well established in many areas 
from the 1950s; cf. Corbridge 1995: 78. 
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as being intimately correlated to the expansion of capitalist work relations in the South. 
Alternati ve manners of achieving this transformation were suggested, although the 
predominant post-war consensus was that this process could be facilitated by select 
interventions of the state to buttress emergent domestic industry, coupled to external 
financing to compensate for low saving rates. Concurrently, in the name of creating a 
modem work force, states repeatedly sought to break down explicit manifestations of 
non-capitalist social relations through policies that encouraged primitive accumulation, 
such as the rationalisation of agriculture through 'Green Revolution' techniques, 
infrastructural investment and agrarian reform. 14 As the World Bank stated in 1975, 
the strategy was: 
Concerned with the modernization and monetization of rural 
society, and with its transition from traditional isolation to 
integration with the national economy .. , [it] implies greater 
interaction between the modern and traditional sectors. 15 
To achieve its leading aim of promoting capitalist development, the Bank embraced 
these trends and embedded its lending projects within the prevailing patterns of global 
accumulation within the context of US-led liberal internationalism. Drawing upon the 
major tenets of modernisation theory and melding these with the Keynesian-influenced 
prescriptions of development economics for active state intervention to correct 
pervasive market failures to enhance the urban-industrial workforce, the Bank 
14 Johnston and Kilby 1975; Harriss 1992. 
15 World Bank (1975) cited in Escobar 1995: 162. The results, however, were generally disappointing, 
which in part reflected the adherence to the dual economy model despite long established and ongoing 
processes of (semi-) proletarianisation in the agrarian sphere. As James Ferguson underscored in his 
penetrating critique of Bank policy in Lesotho, development planning under the aegis of the Bank 
refused to recognise that the rural peasantry of the small African country were no longer a subsistence 
farming community but were heavily dependent on migrant labour in the South African mining sector; 
Ferguson 1994. 
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sanctioned the principal tenets of import substitution industrialisation strategies so long 
as these did not regress into autarkic nationalism. 16 Capitalist development was seen as 
synonymous with industrialisation and, given this key objective, the Bank recognised 
that certain elements of protectionism were needed to shelter infant industries alongside 
state promotion of industry through credit provision and technical advice. Indeed, 
through the activities of the International Finance Corporation (!FC) in particular, the 
Bank readily embraced the prevailing pattern of promoting foreign direct investment to 
industry sectors that grew under the protective walls of tariff regimes. I7 Furthermore, 
the support of national developmentalism could be adequately reconciled with 
promoting strategies of moderate welfarism, as the state took a greater role in providing 
health, education and social security.I8 
However, although flows of capital to key sites in the newly decolonised states were 
gaining momentum in the 1950s and, particularly, the 1960s, such investment was 
patchy and decisively uneven in both quantity and geographic spread. Focused 
uniquely on projects that would generate rates of return compatible with repayment of 
the ffiRD loan, these financing conditions excluded large sections of the newly 
independent countries. As such, and in spite of its lofty justifications, World Bank 
lending was limited and did not tend to mitigate the uneven development of capitalism 
in the South. On the contrary, by focusing on a concentrated number of post-colonial 
countries that could afford the terms of mRD loans, the Bank could even be suggested 
to have aided the trend towards growing differentiation in the South. To address such 
issues, the sub-institution of the International Development Agency (IDA) was formed 
16 cf. Fine 200 1 a: 133-4. 
17 The lFe was established in 1956 to promote private sector investment in the South by financially 
Supponing large initiatives. 
18 Mesa-La go 1989. 
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In 1960, a move that initiated the first stage of dramatically expanding the scope of 
World Bank activities. In establishing this institution, a division of labour was created 
within the World Bank between the mRD, which provided subsidised credit to middle-
income countries, and the IDA, which provided zero-interest loans to peripheral 
developing countries. IDA grants, like the IBRD loans, were focused on large-scale 
development projects, such as dams, roads and other items within the parameters of 
laying the infrastructural basis for capitalist development. However, their soft-loan 
status meant that they funded a range of projects that would not qualify under the IDRB 
conditions of profitability and repayment. In providing capital for development 
projects in which private capital would not invest and where governments lacked the 
ability to guarantee repayment, the Bank sought to give impetus to processes of 
capitalist industrial development in the more peripheral areas of the South, mitigate the 
uneven development of capital, and give credence to the teleology of modernization 
theory that provided an essential element of the ideological justification for the 
character of North-South relations in the post-War period. 19 
Unlike IBRD credit, however, the source of capital for IDA soft-loans was not 
international finance markets. Rather, it came directly from western governments, 
principally from the US, Japan and Northern European countries, that generally agreed 
to make three-year pledges to the institution. This system permitted a greater degree of 
influence for those providing capital and, in particular, allowed a new forum for the 
political interests of the United States executive and other major shareholders within 
19 Although global inequalities would continue to increase in the liberal world market order, the promis~s 
of modernization theory. as most famously propounded by Walt Rostow in his "Non-Communist 
Manifesto", stipulated that underdeveloped nations would inevitably follow the path of the de\eloped 
core in a constant process of modernization through industrialisation (Rostow 1960). 
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the Bank.2o In this regard, the IDA was viewed by leading states, and particularly the 
US, as an important initiative in the escalating global dynamics of the Cold War. It 
allowed money to be channelled through the multilateral institution to some of the 
poorest countries in the world that, following the Cuban Revolution of 1959, had 
proved to be the most likely theatres of socialist revolution. Whilst some authors have 
labelled the IDA as a Trojan horse for the US executive and other national governments 
to infiltrate the Bank,21 in the 1960s and 1970s this new forum of US influence was 
generally restrained to ensuring that a disproportionate amount of money was 
channelled to strategically crucial US allies. 22 With the exception of the latter, the US 
did not habitually challenge the form or content of World Bank lending until the 
1980s.23 Indeed, in the 1960s, there was considerable similarity between the Bank 
approach and that adopted by US aid policy as exemplified by President Kennedy's 
"Alliance for Progress". 
Nevertheless, as global economic conditions began to worsen in the late-1960s and 
1970s, therein exposing the fault lines in contemporary forms of capitalist development 
in the South, enthusiasm in the Bank for import-substitution strategies as an adequate 
means of promoting capitalist development began to be moderated. Urbanisation 
proceeded at unprecedented rates throughout the global South, as did the capitalisation 
of agriculture and the growth of urban industrial realms. Yet, despite a period of 
relative economic growth, developing countries did not emulate the take-off towards 
convergence and modernisation that was predicted in the models of development 
20 
cf. Kapur 2002: 62-3. 
'I 
- Kapur 2002: 65. 
~2 Woods 2000: 146. 
23 Caufield 1996: 197. However, by the 1990s the US had fallen into arrears in its payments to the IDA, 
thereby Iimitinu its influence (Bakker 1996: 63). Strategic policy towards the IDA, however, seems 
likely to be sig~ificantlY reformed under the current Bush administration and its proposed Millennium 
Challenge Accnunt; cf. Soederberg 2003b. 
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economICS. As Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, noted in a speech to 
the Board of Governors of the Bank: 
Even if the growth rate of the poor countries doubles, 
only seven would close the gap with the rich nations in 
one hundred years. Only another nine would reach our 
level in one thousand years. 24 
Industrialisation, to the degree that it occurred, remained partial and appeared in many 
cases to rest on, rather than dispel, various forms of informal, low productivity and low 
. k 25 mcome wor . Urban migration proved not to be a sign of progress heralding a 
transition of the population into a new modem industrial life, but a process of the 
dramatic expansion of shantytowns where the urban poor struggled for subsistence 
through mostly informal employment. 26 In place of a harmonious era of economic 
growth, social conflicts escalated and the growing urban working classes buttressed the 
state in order to mediate the newly emergent relations of social reproduction. 27 
The tendencies of uneven development, moreover, were exacerbated by the emerging 
fractures in the trajectory of global accumulation manifested in falling commodity 
prices and declining rates of profit, both of which increased social tensions in the 
24 Quoted in Thompson 1983: 29. Also cf. the statistical data presented in Weeks 2002. 
25 Wilson 1998. 
26 The issue of the urban marginalized classes permeated development literature, particularly in Latin 
America; cf. Kay 1989. 
27 New theoretical trends that attempted to account for the failure of development through radical 
theories of imperialism and dependency burgeoned in the late 1960s and 1970s. Dependency theory in 
particular took issue with all the key propositions of the modernisation doctrine and proposed the 
opposite effects - that capitalist expansion would develop only underdevelopment. promote authoritarian 
practices and necessitated de-linking and economic autarky in the South as the sole political-economic 
strategy able to promote modernisation; cf. (e.g.) Frank 1966. 
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South.28 Escalating inflationary pressures, rising public expenditure burdens, growing 
disjunctures between domestic and international prices for industrial goods, 
deteriorating terms of trade and balance of payments, and heightening social conflicts 
were all symptoms of the late 1960s and 1970s period. Such tendencies were only 
accentuated by the oil shocks and the ensuing international instability and breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system. Although at this point the World Bank moved to a more 
discriminating position vis-a-vis the financing of lSI initiatives, it retained its belief that 
state-sponsored industrialisation was the best means of promoting capitalist 
29 development. Its more proactive response to the fragility of lSI was a profound 
expansion of its own lending activities and the encouragement of Southern 
governments to borrow heavily from private credit institutions in order to ride out what 
was considered a temporary wave of external shocks. 
First and foremost, guided by the presidency of Robert McNamara, the Bank took 
advantage of the explosive growth in international financial markets to fund 
dramatically increased levels of borrowing. Lending activity swelled from $2 billion 
in 1970 to over $11 billion in 1980, more than a fivefold increase over the decade. 3D 
An immediate result was a profound deterioration of the quality of funded projects, as 
judged by the Bank's own criteria.3l More importantly than the Bank's own escalation 
of lending, however, was that the Bank also encouraged client countries to take 
advantage of the dramatic increases in global liquidity, brought about by the recycling 
of petro-dollars through offshore markets, to increase private borrowing to overcome 
expenditure shortfalls. The orgy of borrowing that followed left states across the global 
'8 
- Rapley 2002. 
29 Mason and Asher 1973: 378-9. 
30 Bakker 1996: 49. 
31 Rich 2002. 
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South heavily indebted to northern banks. In Latin America, for example, the total 
external debt (private and public) leapt from $100,000 million in 1976 to $336,230 
million in 1983.32 The trajectory of accumulation was one of inflation and debt-driven 
growth and, therein, extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in international interest rates. 
Secondly, the Bank expanded its range of activities and began to emphasise the issues 
of urban infrastructure, education and health, and rural development in what has been 
termed a shift to a "basic needs" approach. 33 This reorientation of emphasis was 
partially a reaction to the growing strength of critics that highlighted the tendencies of 
Bank projects to exacerbate the dramatic class inequalities that processes of capitalist 
development were creating. More importantly, however, it reflected the course of 
struggles within the developing world where sustained class-based conflicts -
particularly the urban-industrial working class - pressured national states to intervene 
more fully in mediating the social relations of reproduction of the working class.34 One 
consequence of these expanded forms of state intervention was a growing fiscal burden 
upon the state, a tendency that would contribute toward growing indebtedness. 
Simultaneously, crises in the rural sphere, partially caused by the tendency of lSI to 
curb the prices of agricultural products in order to suppress the value of labour-power 
in the urban centres, increased pressures towards land reform or other means of 
stymieing rural conflicts. Under McNamara's expansion, the Bank was no longer 
involved in merely promulgating the infrastructure for capitalist industrialisation, it was 
becoming integrally involved in a project to mediate the unseemly social dynamics of 
32 Dinerstein 2002: 10. 
:13 Gilbert and Vines 2000: 16. 
14 cf. Moore 1995. These tendencies are discussed in relation to the Chilean experience in the following 
chapter. 
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capitalist development in the South. As Colin Leys succinctly elaborates, the new 
development discourse was prompted by: 
[TJ he growing realization that the hopes of rapid and widespread 
development were going to be disappointed ... [leading to} 
sympathy for the masses m the ex-colonies and fear of their 
. 35 
reactlOns. 
In face of the growmg tensions m global accumulation that were manifesting 
themselves in the form of incipient economic cnSlS, amplified protectionism and 
heightening forms of social conflict, by the later 1970s changes within the operating 
philosophy of the Bank had gathered significant pace.36 The wisdom of state-centred 
national developmentalism was increasingly questioned in view of the seemingly 
intractable problems within lSI and the incipient shift towards alternatives in key 
countries in the North and South. Moreover, the election of Reagan's neo-conservative 
government in the United States in 1980 gave a particularly strong political impetus for 
change in the Bank. Many leading Reaganites displayed open antagonism towards the 
Bank, which they viewed as a leading proponent of statist development policies in the 
South, and significant pressures were placed on the institution to reform its governing 
philosophy. Specifically, the US used its own economic crisis as a pretext to threaten a 
significant withdrawal from IDA funding should the Bank fail to embrace the 
monetarist wave. 37 
35 Leys 1996: 12(fn). 
36 George and Sabelli 1994. 
37 Bello 1994: 26. 
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It was no coincidence that the leading success story employed to justify the virtues of 
this policy shift was that of Chile, which had implemented a primary round of radical 
restructuring in the mid-1970s and boasted significant GDP growth rates in the late 
1970s. With the profound crisis of Allende's attempted state-led, socialist strategy and 
the subsequent "economic miracle" of the Pinochet regime, the Chilean experience 
seemed to exemplify both the dangers of national developmentaIism and the benefits of 
the new paradigm of monetarism and export-orientation. The manner in which the 
dictatorial regime had gone significantly beyond the IMF's prescription for social 
restructuring with the 1974-5 crisis was acclaimed globally as a model for emulation by 
the advocates of monetarism, both outside and inside of Chile. Indeed, as Francisco 
Orrego, a leading Pinochet ideologue and early proponent of the 'Chilean model' 
thesis, stated in 1975: 
Chilean action can assume leadership characteristics ... and the 
Third World will be able to understand and benefit from the 
Ch 'l . 38 lean expenence. 
Owing to the extreme depth of crisis in the early 1980s, many other countries were 
indeed examining radical responses. As suggested above, by the 1970s the gap in 
productivity between those capitals operating under the protection of tariff walls and 
those operating at an international level was growing and, concurrently, placed greater 
strains on the states in the South. Cumulatively, the failure of capitals operating within 
a particular national social formation to adjust to dictates of the global movement of 
value is the unleashing of a 'heavy artillery' that impresses itself upon national states 
through pressures on the exchange rate, the accumulation of balance of payment 
38 Cited in Frank 1975: 19. 
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deficits and drains on the national reserves. 39 All these factors wracked countries 
across Latin America in the 1970s, a period in which the end of the post-War boom and 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates removed many of the 
mechanisms that national states had formerly enjoyed in order to mitigate these 
tensions.4o Through a combination of monetary pressures and heightened internal class 
struggles, the necessity of reconstructing adequate conditions for accumulation was 
manifested. Together, these manifestations threatened to further undermine the 
expanded reproduction of capital within the national state formation, upon which the 
reproduction of state and society in their capitalist form depend. 
As an attempt to mediate some of the rapidly emerging global tensions, a transition 
within the Bank from project-orientated lending toward "structural and sectoral 
lending" based on the new principals of monetarist fiscal policy and export-orientated 
development strategy began to take concrete form in the late 1970s. McNamara coined 
the term "structural adjustment" in a speech in 1979 to symbolise the need for sustained 
and far-reaching reform of the orientation of national economies in the South and rapid 
incorporation of structural adjustment principals into the Bank's lending operations 
followed. Subsequently, the first specific structural adjustment loan of US$200 
million was granted to Turkey in March 1980 in order to aid transition away from a 
national-developmentalist form of accumulation.41 Sensing the end of an era for the 
Bank, McNamara resigned in 1981. Within a year the tensions of capitalist 
development in the South were brought to a head by the unilateral decision of the US to 
dramatically raise interest rates, thereby prompting the spectre of mass debt default in 
many leading countries of the South. As the cataclysmic apex of the growing tensions 
39 Bonefeld 2000: 39. 
40 cf. Helleiner 1994; Pauly 1994; Clarke 1988; Leys 1996; Rapley 2002. 
41 d. George and Sabelli 1994. 
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of post-War capitalist development in the South, the debt crisis of the early 1980s 
plunged both the theory and practice of development into profound crisis.42 
2. The Debt Crisis, Restructuring and the Dynamics of Capitalist Development 
In direct response to the profound crisis of the global South in the early 1980s - and, 
importantly, that of the Western banking sector which was threatened with financial 
collapse owing to mass default - the World Bank began to pipeline billions of dollars to 
debt stricken countries in order to facilitate continued interest payments on their old 
debt. Reacting to these exigencies, the Bank introduced sweeping changes in the nature 
and extent of its own operations, sidelining its former emphasis on project-orientated 
lending and shifting to a conditionality-orientated approach that greatly broadened the 
scope of its mandate. This represented an attempt to transcend the immediate question 
of stabilisation by laying down a longer-term development strategy that disavowed the 
former emphasis on state-led national developmentalism. Likewise, the Bank also 
shifted to more performance-based lending criteria whereby successive portions of 
structural adjustment loans were dependent upon successful implementation of prior 
requirements, as decided by the IMF and Bank. Surveillance functions were 
heightened and both institutions took a much stronger role in setting the fundamental 
parameters of client country policy.43 With both the Bank and the IMF seeking to 
impose mutually reinforcing cross-conditionality restrictions on lending, the Bank 
became embroiled in a far closer association with the IMF than at any previous point. 
This rapprochement gave rise to the notion of the 'Washington Consensus' as both 
42 Escobar 1995; Leys 1996; Kiely 1995. 
43 Bello 1994: 24. Tony Killick, however, argues that compliance from borrowing governments was 
decidedly uneven. Gi ven the political costs of denying further funds. however, the Washington 
institutions generally continued to make further loans: Killick 1995. 
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these leading financial institutions wielded their considerable influence in order to 
propagate a moderately homogeneous neoliberal doctrine on a global scale. As John 
Williamson, who coined the term, stated: 
For these purposes, "Washington" meant primarily the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US 
executive branch, although the term was intended to cover also at 
least the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), those members 
of Congress who take an interest in Latin America, and the think 
tanks concerned with economic policy. It seemed to me that one 
could identify nine or ten policy areas in which "Washington" 
could muster something like a consensus on what countries ought 
to be doing '" A summary description of the content of this 
Washington agenda is macroeconomic prudence, outward 
orientation, and domestic liberalization. 44 
In becoming the major funnel for emergency credit to the South, the Bank began to 
assume an extended role as a global accumulation caretaker and a purveyor of drastic 
social reform in the South. In providing lines of credit to the crisis-tom countries, the 
Bank escalated the imposition of conditionality clauses that aimed to restructure 
radically the relationship between state and society in the South and alter fundamentally 
the mode of integration of Southern economies into the world market. From within the 
Bank, such policies were seen as a means of re-establishing the stability of capitalist 
development in the South and ensuring long-term debt repayment, therein re-
establishing the integrity of the international credit system. For this reason. they also 
44 W'll' 1 lamson 1990: 1. 
128 
appealed greatly to the Bank's major shareholders - an essential prerequisite of World 
Bank practices - as they sought to shore up the financial systems of the North, open 
new avenues for investment in the South, refocus the productive apparatus in the South 
towards low-cost primary and secondary exports, and thereby reinforce an ongoing 
shift in the international division of labour. The latter could subsequently be profitably 
incorporated into international capital circuits dominated by northern capitals. 
The immediate phase of adjustment, commonly managed by the IMF, constituted the 
imposition of severe austerity measures to restore macroeconomic balances, 
particularly the suppression of inflation.45 By undergoing a shock therapy programme 
of rapid liberalisation of prices, currency devaluation, and fiscal discipline, a 
deflationary period could be engineered within which 'excessive demand' was curtailed 
and inefficient producers sacrificed, along with their workforces, upon the alter of 
sound money. An emphasis on liquidity, moreover, was expected to enable capital to 
overcome the barriers to valorisation by escaping unprofitable engagements and 
concentrating in those sectors that offered more lucrative returns. Capital in mobile 
money-form would therefore be able to undergo a substantial recomposition: it could 
renounce inefficient engagements and, freed from established spatial and political 
constraints, seek a new relationship with labour. Societal 'rationalisation' in this 
manner almost invariably entailed a substantial destruction of existing capital and was 
commonly reflected in high levels of unemployment, with significant portions of the 
labour force relegated to the reserve army.46 The decomposition of labour would 
subsequently provide the conditions under which a new and more disciplinary mode of 
45 Korner 1984. 
46 For example, Weeks (1999) details trends in Latin American unemployment; also cf. Gutierrez 1990 
for a Mexican perspective, and chapters six through eight for Chile. 
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capitalist work could be imposed, and this latter trend ("labour fIexibiIisation") IS 
investigated further in the following chapter. 
Alongside what could be termed the 'creative destruction' of shock therapy measures, 
the Bank began to advocate an increasingly rigorous set of policy changes that entailed 
a major transformation in the relationship between capital and labour within national 
social formations, the form and content of political regulation, and the mode of 
integration of national states in the world market. Within this context, the broad tenets 
of neoliberal reform appeared uniquely suited to the task of resolving the crisis and re-
establishing the conditions for expanded global accumulation. Their salience as policy 
options did not derive from their often-questionable economic functionality, but 
because they seemingly offered a more comprehensive set of solutions to the economic, 
political and social dimensions of crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s. As John Holloway 
and Sol Picciotto emphasise: 
[Clrisis '" is neither an economic nor a political crisis. It is a 
crisis of the capital relation, a crisis made inevitable by the 
inherent contradictions of that relation. The crisis inevitably 
involves a restructuring of the capital relation, a restructuring 
which necessarily takes on economic and political fom1s. 47 
In reaction to the generalised social crisis of the South, manifested in distinct political 
and economic expressions, structural adjustment professed a fundamental re-
articulation of social relations that, through imparting a new disciplinary logic into the 
relations between individuals, social groups and classes, aimed not only to mitigate the 
~1 Holloway and Picciotto 1977: 133. 
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symptoms of cnSIS, In the manner of stabilisation, but to obliterate the social 
configurations in which cnSIS had ansen. It engineered a process by which the 
institutionalised regulation of social relations could be progressively fortified by the 
implicit disciplines of abstract domination, and its foremost ideological expression 
resided in neoclassical economics. 
The prescriptive core of neoclassical social theory, which continues to inform World 
Bank policy practice, argues that sustained accumulation can be achieved through 
policies that actively impress the discipline of market relations on both state and 
society. To impose this discipline is to enforce the limits of capitalist social forms upon 
social actors through the subordination of social relations to the logic of money and the 
rule of private property.48 In this manner, social relations can be reduced to market 
relations, which are conceived as neutral and, moreover, ultimately harmonious and, to 
achieve this, reality had to be rid of the institutional imperfections that prevented it 
operating in the manner of the abstract models of neoclassical economics. Within the 
context of the crisis, reforms in this mould attempt to resolve crisis on the basis of 
capital by forcibly restraining the aspirations of individuals, groups and classes within 
the limits of capitalist social relations. As long as social actors submit to the play of 
market forces mediated through neutral monetary relations, the neoclassical argument 
contends, the optimal conditions for accumulation will predominate, to the benefit of 
the common good. Accomplishing the latter, therefore, involves the removal of 
political and social constraints on these conditions, to be achieved in practice through 
the now-familiar policy package of state retreat, fiscal discipline, protection of private 
property, extension of commodification and expansion of market relations, and the 
containment of social demands within the confines of macro-economic prudence. 
48 
cf. Clarke 1988. 
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Under these conditions, the state was constituted as both the primary subject and object 
of restructuring. By purposefully reducing the political barriers to the discipline of 
capital, states have been involved in an attempt to reconstitute themselves as 
depoliticised apparatuses subject to the abstract pressures of global capital and 
therefore less responsive to the social struggles that buffet them. In this manner, 
structural adjustment involved states reacting to crisis by creating the political 
conditions under which they are more subject to the disciplinary pressures of capital by 
reconstituting the process of governance to a depoliticised exercise of technical 
expertise. The strategy promoted by the Bank and eventually adopted across much of 
the global South was based precisely upon a radical restructuring of the historically 
developed political forms that mediated capital accumulation. To assert the discipline 
of capital on state and society alike, the restructuring process rapidly tore down the 
politically imposed barriers to international competition, including the tariffs, credit 
subsidies, and fixed prices that commonly characterised former import substitution 
strategies. Structural change involved further liberalisation of trade, the opening of 
capital accounts and the entrenchment of fiscal discipline. Concurrent to this shedding 
of its interventionist character, states dramatically reduced their own presence in the 
economy by rapidly privatising state-owned enterprises. 
Such a strategy profoundly challenged the role of the state in the regulation of social 
reproduction as the new paradigm promoted the death of the state as a proactive agent 
in development practice. Within the parameters of neoliberal policy prescription, there 
is little room for the active mediation of the state in social reproduction save for a few 
basic tasks of providing necessary infrastructure and providing public goods that could 
not be devolved to the private sector owing to profitability constraints. Active 
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development policies are presented as distortion-inducing influences on a natural state 
of affairs and, therefore, at best profoundly counter-productive and, at worst, the 
malevolent interference of a rent-seeking political cadre. In contrast, market 
coordination of social relations is posited as the end in and of itself. As Ben Fine 
highlights, within this schematic: 
There is no need to define or characterise development - it's what 
the market brings if left to its own devices!49 
However, to proclaim that the history of development as conscious practice had ended 
was rapidly proved premature. The interventionist state-form that had grown in a 
sustained manner during the post-War period did not emerged from the subjective 
irrationality of state managers wedded to erroneous theoretical models, but had 
developed historically in response to specific social struggles within the context of the 
contradictory path of uneven capitalist accumulation. On the one hand, therefore, the 
degree to which the disciplinary character of structural adjustment could be 
successfully imposed, therefore, depended greatly on the outcome of political instances 
of struggle within the environment of crisis. On the other, even where the project of 
social depoliticisation was most rigorously implemented, such as in authoritarian Chile, 
social tensions tended to escalate. As discussed in chapters one and two, neoclassical 
theory remains theoretically shielded from the contradictory essence of its own political 
project. Guided by its conceptualisation of money as a tool to facilitate mutually 
beneficial market exchanges, it is unable to recognise the exploitative essence of 
market relations sanctified by the impersonal power of money. It therefore disregards 
the substantive and conflict-inducing irrationalities of capitalist development 
49 F' me 2001a: 135. 
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manifested in the subordination of social need to profit, the pervasiveness of human 
resistance to processes of commodification and exploitation, and the continual crisis 
tendencies of social relations that stubbornly refuse to conform to general equilibrium 
models. All of these tendencies, it can be argued, were given a freer reign through the 
dismantling of the historically developed institutional forms that sought to regulate 
them. 
In contrast to neoclassical theorists, however, the state cannot ignore these 
contradictions. On the one hand, the state is directly reliant upon the expansion of 
capital as, first, the precondition of capitalist development and, second, as the basis of 
its own material reproduction. On the other hand, it remains the institutional locus of 
political struggles and, as such, must continually attempt to mediate the tensions 
between sustaining accumulation and the conflicts therein engendered. The 
contradictory nature of state action, therefore, is rooted in the contradictions inherent in 
capitalist social relations. The empirically grounded demonstration of the diversity of 
responses to the transformation of global capitalist relations, moreover, highlights the 
importance of historical, geographical and institutional specificities of different spatial 
locales, particularly national social formations. As authors such as Paul Pierson and 
Ian Gough have suggested, in contrast to determination by the invisible hand of 
'globalisation', social struggle in its explicit political manifestations is still of major 
importance for the trajectory of policy making. 50 Despite attempts to demote societal 
regulation to the abstract domination of capitalist social relations, therefore, the very 
contradictions inherent within the latter has ensured that the national state form remains 
a primary locus of social struggle. 
50 Pierson 1996; Gough 2001. 
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3. Neoliberal Restructuring and the Question of Development 
In spite of its presentation as a radical break from state-centric national 
developmentalist development strategies, the new development prescription shares 
many of the underlying tenets of the former owing to their common capitalist character. 
Firstly, on the basis of improving global productivity, mainstream post-crisis 
development doctrine retained its unbridled faith in the globalising spread of capitalist 
social relations as the definitive solution to the quandary of underdevelopment in the 
global South. The problem with import substitution type strategies, it was suggested, 
was that the distortions it created through institutional interventions prevented the 
spread of capitalist labour forms across the economy, and particularly in the agrarian 
sphere, by preventing economic agents from pursuing rational strategies. Economic 
imbalances caused by lSI, therefore, perpetuated lingering low productivity 
'traditional' sectors because government policies kept returns within these sectors low 
and deprived individuals of capital. In contrast to the projections of post-War 
development theory, therefore, state intervention had actually served to frustrate 
capitalist development by militating against the real comparative advantages of the 
South, specifically agricultural produce and cheap labour.51 
Consequently, therefore, structural adjustment was suggested to re-orientate capitalist 
production in order to take advantage of these natural advantages by encouraging 
agricultural exports and, most fundamentally, the formation of labour-intensive 
industry. Openness to international capital flows and adoption of strict fiscal prudence. 
moreover, was suggested to pave the way for an influx of foreign investment that could 
II t' W 
. c. eeks 1995a. 
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power new growth and promote technological transfer. In order to promote these 
trends, states in the South were encouraged to take an active role in mediating the 
formation of human capital in order to complement the needs of a labour-intensive 
manufacturing sector. These interventions, as discussed at length in the following 
chapter, were to operate on the principals of selective and focused interventions that 
avoid the inefficiencies and fiscal burdens of universalised systems of social 
protection.52 If the right balance is struck, as the Bank restated in 1990, policy aimed to 
encourage labour intensive growth coupled to boosting human capital "can improve the 
lives of most of the world's poor": 
The first provides the poor with opportunities to use their most 
abundant asset - labor. The second improves their immediate 
well-being and increases their capacity to take advantage of the 
newly created possibilities.53 
There is an immediate and revealing contradiction in the Bank's presentation, however. 
On the one hand, the position adopted by the World Bank appears to be correct. 
Labour performed under capitalist conditions is generally more productive. Wages are 
commonly higher within the more modem sectors of the economy, and forms of social 
protection more readily available. In this respect, it is not surprising that the World 
Bank should celebrate the growing realisation of the imminent process of the spread of 
the capitalist work relation in the contemporary age. For example, in the 1995 World 
Development Report the Bank enthusiastically noted that by the year 2000 some ninety 
percent of global workers would be drawn into what they termed the "economic 
52 d. (e.g.) World Bank 1990; 1991. 
53 World Bank 1990: 51. 
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mainstream" of market relations.54 In its VIew, the spread of market relations, 
underpinned by the relation of capitalist work, remains the foremost manner of 
providing for the material needs of humanity and ending the incidence of poverty. By 
associating the process of capitalist development with the alleviation of poverty, 
moreover, the Bank creates an implicit yet unbreakable bond between the perceived 
benefits of capitalist development and the generalisation of capitalist work. 
On the other hand, however, if the liberating spread of market relations has reached 
globally unprecedented levels, then the question as to why the majority of workers in 
the South still labour under poor conditions for modest pay becomes more pertinent. 
Contrary to the expectations of neoclassical economists, structural adjustment did not 
bring an explosion of labour-intensive capitalist work in the South. As two IMF 
economists noted in 1997: 
There is no doubt that globalization has coincided with higher 
unemployment among the less skilled and with widening income 
inequalities... We might have expected trade liberalization to 
boost the demand for unskilled labour and raise unskilled wages, 
but in fact the opposite has happened in some developing 
. 55 
countnes. 
Rather, labour intensive industry has become concentrated in several key regions of the 
international division of labour that were not keen embracers of the neoliberal 
prescription. The Southeast Asian 'Tigers', like the 'Newly Industrialising Countries' 
54 World Bank 1995: 50. 
'i5 Slaughter and Swagel (1997) cited in Lieten 2001: 100. 
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(NICs) that preceded them, based their industrial strategy on selective yet pronounced 
state interventions to forge specific (if temporary) comparative advantages for 
exports.56 Likewise, China and India are both examples of countries that have rapidly 
expanded export-orientated labour-intensive manufacturing sectors yet in a manner that 
belies neoclassical prescriptions for rapid liberalisation and limited state intervention. 57 
Compounding these problems is the reluctance of the World Bank to probe the relations 
that underscore the capitalist international division of labour, preferring to rely on the 
scriptures of neoclassical economics that insist on the mechanical realisation of 
comparative advantages once the 'correct' policies are adopted. 58 Ostensibly, it is 
extremely surprising that, given the centrality of capitalist work to the World Bank's 
development doctrine, relatively little of the Bank's voluminous intellectual production 
acknowledges this reality or, still less, provides a rigorous analysis of the relationship 
between liberalisation, capitalist work, development and freedom that is implicit within 
its theoretical framework. 59 In short, the hidden abode of production is not an area in 
which the Bank has often had the courage to trespass despite their acknowledgement 
that: 
Throughout the World, most people spend most of their lives 
working. Even among the world's poorest, only a relative few are 
idle; the great mass of the poor works hard for little pay.GO 
56 Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2000. 
57 Milanovic 2003; Rodrik 2003. 
58 World Bank 1990.1991,1995, 2000a, 2000c; IMF 2000a. 
59 Significant Bank literature on production is largely confined to the World Developmem Report i995: 
Workers in an integrating World (World Bank 1995), which is scrutinised in chapter five. Also see 
Rama 2000 for a lonely Bank research document on "Globalization and Labour". 
60 World Bank 1995: back cover. 
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Before developing these themes in more detail in relation to the case study of Chile, 
however, the following chapter presents a more thorough analysis of state 
reconstitution through neoIiberal structural adjustment in respect to its mediation of the 
social reproduction of the working class. This entails a closer examination of 
production relations within structural adjustment through an examination of the rubric 
of labour flexibilisation. 61 
61 Chapter ten examines the further reinvention of the World Bank in the late 1990s. 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE WORLD BANK AND THE RESTRUCTURING 
OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined structural adjustment as a series of institutional reforms 
aimed to assert the discipline of the capitalist social forms upon state and society 
through the logic of money and other forms of the abstract domination of capital. The 
area in which the state has repeatedly attempted to implement this project of social 
depoliticisation is in reforms to institutionalised forms of state mediation of the social 
reproduction of the working class. In undertaking an analytical deconstruction of the 
fundamental tenets of World Bank sponsored reforms to labour and social policies, this 
chapter provides a bridge between the analysis of the World Bank and the Chilean case 
study. This analysis is undertaken within the context of the social theory laid out in the 
first two chapters and the historical political economy of the World Bank presented in 
chapter four. 
1. Flexibilisation and the Recomposition of the Capital Relation 
Systematic reform to state regulation of labour markets and the juridical framework 
governing capital-labour relations was formally introduced to the "Washington 
Consensus" model of structural adjustment in the mid 1990s. 1 Nevertheless, the 
emergence of labour reform as a key pillar of the "second generation" reforms was a 
further example of the Bank providing a systematic prescription and theoretical 
grounding to a process that was already well advanced in many Southern countries. 
Productive reorganisation was central to the aims of structural adjustment and the social 
conflicts over the institutional forms that regulated labour relations were integral 
I The Bank's principal statement on labour reform is to be found in the "World Development Report 
1995: Workers in an Integrating World" (World Bank 1995). 
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features of the 1980s political panorama. Reform emerged most virulently as a political 
strategy in the Latin American context in the early 1980s precisely because the effects 
of incipient crises not only demanded a refashioning of the capital relationship in order 
to reassert the profitability of accumulation, but also the immediate effects of crisis - in 
terms of mass unemployment and collapsing wages - thrust the organised working 
class into a position of unparalleled political weakness. Shock therapy and structural 
adjustment, therefore, provided many of the political and social conditions under which 
flexibilisation processes could begin through contributing to the expansion of a reserve 
labour army, mass expUlsion of labour from the public sector, and the weakening of 
unions. Resulting from struggles within this socio-economic climate, a wide spectrum 
of changes in the conditions under which labour is contracted and performed have been 
noted, ranging from the flexible organisation of labour processes, reconstituted patterns 
of regulating industrial relations, and the escalating deregulation of labour markets. 2 In 
particular, a growing body of empirical studies suggests that the struggles surrounding 
economic restructuring have served to refashion important facets of the relationship 
between capital and labour in a more 'flexible' form. 3 
To be sure, changes in the relations between capital, labour and the state vary 
dramatically from country to country and sector to sector. Similar to debates over the 
"death" of the welfare state in the advanced capitalist countries, it must be emphasised 
that global labour flexibilisation is not an inevitable process, implanted evenly across 
all social space by the augmented power of capital in a globalising world. On the 
contrary, as developed below, attempts to refashion the relations between capital, 
2 For example: Arzuaga and Senen 1998; de la Garza and Bouzas 1998; Weeks 1999; Bensusan Areous 
2000; Bagchi 2000; De la Garza Toledo 2000b; Wang 200l. 
.1 cf. Harvey 1990: 189-197; Standing 1997; Taylor-Gooby 1997; Edwards and Elger 1999; Waddington 
1999; Munck 2002; and, for a specific Latin American focus, Enrique de la Garza Toledo 2000a. 
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labour and the state have developed in a highly uneven manner across the globe owing 
to specific institutional legacies, the particular trajectory of struggles within domestic 
and international ambits, and the idiosyncrasies of different locations within the global 
circuits of capital. In this respect, the incorporation by the World Bank of labour 
reform as a pivotal aspect of their reform prescription reflects an attempt to influence 
the course of profound yet fragmentary changes in the relationship between capital and 
labour at a global level. 
Observing the aforementioned global changes in the capital relation, a paradigm of the 
'flexibilisation of labour' has often been applied to mark changes in employment 
relations across the international division of labour.4 In a fundamental respect, 
however, much contemporary usage of the term "the flexibilisation of labour" neglects 
that the flexible usage of labour by capital is a fundamental characteristic of capitalist 
social relations. Capitalism is predicated upon the existence of a labouring class 
divorced from the means of production and thereby continually dependent upon selling 
its capacity to labour in order to attain, temporarily, the means for subsistence. 
Flexibility is, to a considerable extent, not a facet of the current capitalist epoch but the 
essential hallmark of capitalist work. As elaborated in chapter two, once separated 
from the means of subsistence, the freedom of the worker to contract with whomever 
he or she chooses is matched by the commensurate freedom of capital to absorb and 
discard labour from the production process according to the dictates of profitability. In 
times of crisis, capital repeatedly ejects labour from the production process, thereby 
~ This characterization has been particularly evident in the debates over 'post-Fordism'; cf. Amin 1994; 
Bonefeld and Holloway 1994. 
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swelling the ranks of the reserve labour-army until such time as capital can once again 
profitably incorporate labour.5 As Marx suggested: 
It is similarly in the very nature of wage-labour subjected to 
capital that it is indifferent to the specific character of its work; it 
must be prepared to change according to the needs of capital and 
let itself be flung from one sphere of production to another. 6 
If it is accepted, therefore, that the very essence of the commodity labour-power is its 
flexible exploitation by capital, then what is to be made of the contemporary polemic of 
the 'flexibilisation of labour'? Here I contend that the flexibilisation of labour is best 
understood as a political strategy aimed at removing the historically forged restrictions 
upon the treatment by capital of labour-power as a commodity. In this respect, labour 
flexibilisation is both consonant with and an integral dimension of the wider process of 
imposing abstract domination that lays at the heart of neoliberal restructuring, and upon 
which more immediate forms of domination are constructed. This conceptualisation of 
flexibilisation as a project to reformulate the historically specific regulatory forms of 
the capital relation in order to impose more directly the abstract discipline of capitalist 
social relations is implicitly reflected in the discourses on flexibility coming from both 
neoclassical and post-Fordist perspectives, and also from empirical studies of labour 
transformation in particular sectors in various countries.? Furthermore, the historical 
case study of Chile in the following chapters demonstrates the emergence of many of 
these trends and, as discussed below, the World Bank's prescription for 'optimal' state 
intervention in labour markets is also extremely instructive in this regard. Indeed. 
5 cf. Marx 1976: chapter 25~ Kay and Mott 1982. 
6 Marx 1981: 297. 
cf. footnote ..f. 
] .. D 
through an examination of the World Bank's prognosis, several inter-related 
dimensions of flexibilisation as an attempt to impose the unrestricted treatment of 
labour-power as a commodity are discerned. This analysis therefore subsequently helps 
to structure the examination of labour flexibilisation in Chile in chapters six through 
eight. 
A pnmary target of the World Bank's 'second generation' prescription for labour 
reform is the institutional forms that designate the conditions under which labour is 
legally permitted to organise itself collectively. In the World Bank literature, labour 
markets are viewed through the lens of neoclassical theory, which constitutes labour-
power as just one more commodity to be traded on the market. Within the fetishised 
forms of appearance of capitalist social relations upon which the latter is based, the 
market presents itself as a realm of freedom in which the contradictions of bourgeois 
society are extinguished.8 Money appears as the neutral instrument of social 
transactions that mediates between commodities, rather than an abstract instrument of 
social power. On this basis, the relationship between employer and worker is presented 
as a rational and mutually beneficial exchange performed under conditions of 
equivalence. In derivation from this presupposition, labour flexibilisation is not only 
laudable in terms of efficiency questions, but also as a means of asserting the equality 
of exchange relationships in a neutral and technical manner. Any party to exchange 
transactions that, through collective influence, attempts to pervert the natural market 
price for a particular commodity is guilty of attempting to exact a rent, whereby a 
special interest distorts optimal equilibrium for personal gain and to the detriment of 
the common good. From this point of view, unions are precisely a monopoly of 
commodity owners that are attempting to raise the price of labour-power above its 
8 t' L' , (e,g,) Friedman 1962. 
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natural level. On this basis, therefore, the labour contract should preferably be an 
individual relationship between the owner of labour-power and the owner of capital, 
free from the pernicious influence of non-market factors such as of state or union 
power. The individualisation of the capital relation is, unsurprisingly, a hallmark of 
neoclassical prescriptions for flexibilised labour systems although, as discussed below, 
the Bank itself recognises flexibilisation in this most radical individualised form as an 
unrealistic and undesirable project.9 
According to the Bank, moreover, those that suffer most from monopolies that distort 
the price of labour-power are the underprivileged sections of the working class, 
specifically those in non-unionised sectors, and those reliant on state transfers. This is 
because, as explained by John Pencavel in one World Bank sponsored essay collection, 
raising wages above their natural rate in the formal sector dissuades capital from 
investing in more labour-power, thereby forcing an increased number of workers into 
the low-paying informal or 'competitive wage' sector. 10 Overall, therefore: 
[Clollective bargaining is less a struggle between labour and 
capital for the division of national income, and more a 
competition between different groups of workers and between 
9 Indeed, as Ben Fine has comprehensively demonstrated, the analytical coherence of labour 
flexibilisation in neoclassical and post-Fordist paradigms is extremely weak. For example, in contrast to 
neoclassical projections, the application of flexibility in one area of labour relations can lead directly to 
inflexibility in others; Fine 1998: 74-77. Likewise, de la Garza and Bouzas (1998) were surprised to find 
Mexican employers refraining from adopting the most radical models of flexibilisation owing to adverse 
effects on productivity. Once again, however, it is not the economic functionality of labour 
tlexihdisation that has led to its wide propagation, but its role as part of a wider strategy of social 
discipline. 
10 Pencavel 1997: 37-8. 
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workers as a whole and the population receiving income in the 
form of transfers through the state. 11 
The theoretical basis of this assertion is the theory of factors of production and the 
assumption of a single, unified labour market that is able, if public and private 
distortions are removed, to coalesce at an optimum level where supply and demand are 
equal. l2 Within this framework, when wages are allowed to coalesce upon the market 
equilibrium, this situation provides the conditions for a process of market clearing that, 
in theory, should result in minimal unemployment with wages set in accordance with 
the productive input of the particular worker as determined by human capital 
endowments. Notably, however, notwithstanding his initial argument that collective 
organisation presents primarily a danger to the working class itself, the predominant 
concern of Pencavel's subsequent analysis is precisely with the distribution of 
resources between labour and capital and the overall effects for economic growth. This 
is because, despite assertions that it affects primarily relations between different 
segments of the working class, flexibilisation strategies aim precisely to refashion the 
relationship between capital and labour within a national state formation. As Paul 
Schultz aptly characterises, although the perceived gains of flexibilisation are directed 
towards wage earners as part of the common good, the substantive changes occur in the 
relationship between capital-in-general and labour-in-general: 
Flexibility is most concretely defined as the ability to hire and fire 
without excessive costs and the mobility of workers to change jobs, 
II 
Pencavel 1997: '+5. 
12 Refer to the critiques in (e.g.) Weeks 1989. 1999 and Fine 1998. 
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sectors and reglOns of employment without legal or social 
restrictions. 13 
In contrast to neoclassical assertions of the hannonious exchange of labour for wages, 
however, this thesis has argued that the primary dynamic of the capital relation is a 
conflictive relationship wherein the abstract fonns of domination particular to 
capitalism impose an objective necessity upon employers to enforce their employees to 
work harder, longer and often to suppress their wages. Such considerations cannot 
enter into the theoretical paradigm of neoclassical economics owing to its 
conceptualisation of production as the mere joining of the productive factors (capital, 
labour, land), each of which is rewarded independently according to the marginal utility 
of the respective contribution (profit, wages, rent). Within this construct, the complete 
disregard of class relations that constitute the capital relation facilitates the portrayal of 
collective organisation by labour as the attempt to establish specific interest groups that 
seek to exact rent. 14 
By stripping away institutionally embedded fonns of collective protection, the 
individualisation of contracting often directly impacts on two pivotal aspects of the 
relationship between capital and labour: the price of labour-power and the ability to 
release the workers when they no longer offer a profitable contribution. Individualised 
contracting offers the promise of sidestepping collective wage negotiations, either at the 
level of the finn or according to generalised agreements by sector or profession. 
Flexibilisation in this manner can playa key role in suppressing the price of labour-
power by politically atomising the workforce through a plethora of individualised 
1.1 Schultz 2000: 300. 
14 
Weeks 1999: 163. 
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contractual arrangements. I5 Likewise, collective or state influence over the terms of 
contract can also distort the ability of capital to hire and fire labour-power in a manner 
consistent with the needs of the enterprise. Often integrated into the labour regulatory 
regimes common to national developmentalist states such as India, Bangladesh and 
Latin American corporatist regimes, were provisions that required firms to pay 
substantial severance pay to laid off workers and prohibited the closing of a firm 
without state permission. In short, collective and statist measures are deemed to 
interfere with capital's ability to use or discard as desired the commodity that it has 
freely purchased. From the neoclassical perspective, therefore, labour flexibilisation is 
a manner of avoiding: 
[MJisallocations of workers and human capital investments in the 
economy that seriously retard development. 16 
Resultantly, short-term contracts and greatly reduced job security, for example, are 
clearly identifiable aspects of a flexibilisation strategy aimed to minimise capital's 
purchase of superfluous labour-power. Likewise, removing political barriers to the 
suppression of wages also heightens the ability of capital to increase the extraction of 
absolute surplus labour. The latter appears to the individual capitalist as a method of 
sharpening his/her own competitive advantage within intra-capitalist competition. 
However, its results at the level of social capital are to enlarge the pool of surplus 
capital that is then divided up by capital according to the dictates of competition. 
Achieving a suitably flexibilized labour market of this nature repeatedly necessitates 
profound reorganisation of the relations between organised labour and capital, with 
I~ t' E 
' c, scobar and Lopez 1996, 
16 
Schultz 2000: ~9S, 
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changes ranging from the immediate level of the firm through to forms of regulation 
that have become institutionally embedded in the state. The potential benefits of 
flexibilisation to capital-in-general, however, are multiple as they allow the disciplinary 
mechanism of the relative surplus army to operate in a more systematic fashion. A 
labour force suitably commodified, in that it does not enjoy significant protection in 
terms of job security and employment rights, assists in the ability of capitals rapidly to 
downscale assets or switch investments according to the dictates of profitability. At a 
social level, therefore, flexibilisation facilitates the shifting of labour between different 
branches of production, and this has significant implications for the global movement 
of capital and the ongoing recomposition of the international division of labour. 17 
The misallocation of labour is understood in the neoclassical tradition as over-
employment within a particular sector or firm. Misallocation, however, can also be 
understood to occur within a specific firm, although, to examine this facet, analysis 
must part company with the neoclassical focus on exchange and enter the hidden abode 
of production in order to examine power relations over the organisation of work. 
Flexibility within the labour process is the aspect of flexible-labour that the post-
Fordism paradigm has most emphasised under the rubric of 'flexible specialisation'. 18 
Within post-Fordist paradigms, the rigidities of Taylorist production methods are seen 
as a barrier to profitability in an era where economies of scope are a key to greater 
Success than economies of scale. According to the latter approach, a paradigmatic 
change in the relations between capital, labour and state is becoming visible in which 
changing global markets impart the need for: 
17 Moreover, as examined in the following section of this chapter, labour fIexibilisation has often been 
linked in close conjunction with a reformulation of social policy. 
18 d I e a Garza Toledo 2000b: 159. 
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fAJ flexible production process based on flexible machines or 
systems and an appropriately flexible workforce. 19 
Collectively imposed restrictions on the forms of employment of labour-power within 
the enterprise can be seen to hinder the capitalist's free use of the purchased 
commodity. From this perspective, therefore, flexible production systems necessitate a 
degree of polyvalence in workers and the ability of capital to shift worker functions 
freely within the enterprise. It is on this basis that some authors have highlighted 
flexibilisation processes as requiring both cooperative management systems alongside 
sustained investments in workers, thereby accumulating human capital through training 
programmes.20 
These assertions are questionable on two grounds. First, it is clear that there is a heavy 
degree of romanticism involved in the post-Fordist paradigm, with little empirical 
evidence for its principal claims concerning the degree to which a 'post-Fordist' world 
has emerged in which the socio-economic conditions associated with mass-production 
are in crisis. 21 Given the explosive growth of mass-production industries in key areas 
of the global South during the 1980s and 1990s, the assumptions involved in such 
generalisation are painfully evident when attention is withdrawn from several key 
OEeD case studies (such as the textile sector in Italy) and refocused upon the 
international division of labour as a whole. Second, to the extent that 'flexible 
specialisation' within firms has been introduced, it should be noted that there are other 
methods for firms to achieve the effects of polyvalence without incuning the costs of 
19 Jessop 1994: 19. 
'0 
• Haagh 2002b: 23-.+3. 
21 cf. Fine 1998: 73. In part, this romanticism can be traced theoretically to the ambiguous and over-
generalised manner in which the original paradigm of 'Fordism' is understood, and to which post-
Fordism is contrasted; cf. Clarke 1990b. 
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intensive training schemes that utopian visions of post-Fordism emphasise. One is to 
ensure sufficiently flexible hiring practices that permit the contracting of the requisite 
skilled labour for the precise duration of time needed. If this is achievable, the 
particular composition of the skilled labour force within the production process, 
alongside the ratio of living-labour to constant capital, can be altered on a short-term 
basis through temporary contracting. Another is through outsourcing and 
subcontracting practices by which, in contrast to the Fordist model, firms undergo a 
process of vertical disintegration in order to reduce the contraction of unnecessary 
labour and to be able to pass down the costs of restructuring to lower levels of the 
subcontracting hierarchy in the event of market changes. The latter strategy has been 
particularly prevalent in Chile in the 1990s, as discussed in chapter eight. 22 
At the heart of the strategy of labour flexibilisation, therefore, is the attempt to 
eradicate 'non-market' influences upon labour markets and to remove institutional 
restrictions upon the usage of labour-power once it has been purchased. In short, the 
attack on labour is an attack on political structures that constrain capital's freedom of 
manoeuvre and this necessarily involves a political assault on the institutional forms 
regulating capital-labour relations. To the extent that such restrictions exist, and 
particularly the established patterns of collective organisation, they present a threat to 
the wider goals of liberalisation. Given that within the Washington Consensus 
paradigm liberalisation is equated with growth, inflexibility - or, the restrictions on the 
commodified form of labour - is seen as an impediment to the former. In short, 
unionisation risks obstructing the virtuous circle of mutually reinforcing positive 
tendencies predicted by neoclassical models in which: 
" 
.. For discussion d. Escobar and L6pez 1996. 
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[TJ rade market liberalisation and labour market flexibility should 
increase employment; general deregulation should foster growth; 
and faster growth should lead to higher wages. 23 
On this basis, the World Bank's 1995 World Development Report entitled "Workers in 
an Integrating World" asks rhetorically: 
How can policymakers create an environment that minimizes the 
negative effects trade unions can have, while encouraging them to 
make a positive contribution to economic growth and equity?24 
In short, the question posed is how, through the refashioning of the juridical forms of 
labour relations, can unions be made to support or at least be compliant with 
liberalisation, structural adjustment and flexibilisation? The answer provided is 
through the decentralisation of bargaining to the level of the individual enterprise 
within a free market environment that is considered to impose the discipline of market 
relations upon workers owing to their reliance upon making the enterprise efficient in 
order to retain their jobs. This, in the Bank's view, is the foremost manner by which 
the discipline of the market can be imposed on unions and, thereby, limit their 
"negati ve effects". Concurrently, it also bears close resemblance to the flexibilisation 
strategy introduced in Chile under Pinochet's reform of the labour code in 1980, and 
the subsequent reformulations in the early 1990s.25 
23 W k ee's 1999: 152. 
'4 
- World Bank 1995: 82. 
25 See chapters six, seven and eight. 
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Conspicuously, the pnmary reason the Bank can find for recognising the need for 
workers to be allowed to unionise to any extent is that, in the absence of unions and 
enterprise-level collective bargaining, the state tends to intervene and set wages and 
working conditions in a bureaucratic fashion that, unlike impersonal market forces, 
could be subject to particular political pressures.26 The unspoken recognition is that in 
the absence of any unionisation, and therein the complete individualisation of 
contracting, capital would use its power resulting from ownership of the means of 
social reproduction to force down wages and the conditions of work to levels that 
would threaten the reproduction of the working class and the sustained accumulation of 
capital. The latter is a process that, as discussed in chapter six, occurred in Chile in the 
first half of the 1980s. Resultantly, limited unionisation is viewed as necessary by the 
World Bank precisely in order to create 'equilibrium' in the respective bargaining 
powers of capital and labour and therefore assert the proper market rates in the 
determination of wages. This in tum restrains the need for the deleterious role of the 
state in setting such levels whilst avoiding the absolute immiseration of the working 
class. 
Finally, the Bank also approvingly notes the positive effects of the decentralisation of 
bargaining upon the politics of adjustment. Labour flexibilisation on an economy-wide 
scale and the downscaling of collective bargaining to the enterprise level are viewed as 
two aspects of undermining the power of organised labour at a national level. In the 
conflict-laden decades of structural adjustment, the latter was commonly viewed as a 
pressing political concern as national labour unions were often at the forefront of 
resisting the imposition of structural adjustment. 27 In this respect, juridically enforcing 
'() 
. World Bank 1995: 85. 
27 
Moody 1997. 
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the decentralisation of union activity to the level of the individual firm provides a 
significant offensive in a wider strategy to reduce the role, importance and political 
prowess of national federations. As the Bank argues, the latter rarely play a 
constructive role in neoliberal adjustment processes as: 
It is difficult to persuade a powerful pressure group to design and 
implement a stabilization plan, and eschew general strikes against 
restructuring measures aimed at increasing the outward 
orientation and privatization of industry, when the result is likely 
to be to reduce the relative wages of its members. 28 
Within this new framework, the onus of responsibility for change therefore rests upon 
unions accepting the new realities. For example, Victor Tokman, at the time the 
International Labour Organisation's Assistant Director General and Regional Director 
for the Americas, saluted the initiative of decentralised bargaining owing to its capacity 
to ensure "flexibility and more adequate" responses. Whilst he warns that 
decentralisation might deliver workers into an essentially unbalanced power 
relationship with capital owing to the removal of labour's power of national 
negotiation, he suggests that: 
This, however, need not be the inevitable outcome, provided that 
union strategies adapt to the new industrial relations scenario ... 
Federations and confederations of workers have a role to play in 
supporting negotiations at different levels, and new areas are 
opening possibilities for action at such levels (e.g. training and 
'S 
., World Bank 1995: 84. 
social security) where the execution of recent refonns has been 
displacedfrom government to the private sector. 29 
In this manner, Tokman advocates precisely the form of labour relations solidified in 
the 1990s in Chile, where decentralised bargaining changed the role of national labour 
federations into a political pressure group without a solid power base at the national 
level from which to influence policy decisions. The limits to Tokman's optimism, 
therefore, are well displayed in the turbulent trajectory of Chilean labour reform and 
labour relations, as detailed in chapters seven and eight. 
It should be clear from this brief analytical examination that the flexibilisation of labour 
within the parameters of structural adjustment is not simply a technical or economic 
feat, but constitutes an historical process that involves concrete struggles over existing 
and often institutionalised forms of state-capital-labour relations. As a struggle-driven 
process the results have been partial and varied across countries and sectors, with a 
multitude of different strategies levied by capital in an attempt to achieve similar 
effects. These struggles, moreover, necessarily comprise political, ideological and 
economic dimensions. To elaborate, the attempt to enhance the flexible exploitation of 
labour is an intrinsically political process in the sense that it involves the retrenchment 
and/or reformulation of the modes of regulating labour relations that have historically 
become interwoven into the form of the state through the complex interaction of social 
struggles within the dynamics of capitalist accumulation. Labour flexibilisation stands 
alongside other dimensions of neoliberal restructuring as representing a manner of 
capital disengaging from the positions and commitments taken up during the national-
'9 
. Tokman 1998: 213-214. 
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developmentalist era?O The degree to which flexibilisation practices have routinely - if 
not always successfully - been resisted, however, is testament that the neoliberal 
ideology of the marketplace as the realm of freedom and positive-sum games has found 
little acceptance amongst those exposed to the unseemly dynamics of capitalist 
exploitation and neoliberal restructuring processes. 
2. The Reformulation of Social Policy 
Similar to changes in the regulation of labour relations, there is an emerging consensus 
that the form and content of social policy in the global South have undergone a 
relatively profound transformation under processes of neoliberal restructuring in the 
past two decades. Drawing from the Latin American experience, during the first wave 
of crisis in the 1980s social policies were recognised to have suffered generalised 
quantitative cutbacks. However, under what are termed second-generation reforms in 
the 1990s these same policies have become increasingly the object of a more 
pronounced qualitative transformation. Viewing this transformation in the mid-1990s, 
Evelyne Huber suggested that Latin America stood at a crossroads in terms of the 
trajectory of social policy. The option, as she presented it, was between: "market-
determined, private, individualistic and inegalitarian models on the one hand, and 
market-correcting, public, solidaristic, and egalitarian models on the other".31 
Although her four-study analysis suggested that countries were split between a slow 
creep and a headlong rush towards the former, neoliberal, pole, her conclusion 
remained upbeat. She suggested that the return of democracy in many Latin American 
30 Clarke 1988; Gamble 2001. 
31 H b u er 1996: 1..J.1. 
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nations might prompt recognition that universalistic forms are desirable on grounds of 
both ethics and efficiency. 
By the close of the decade, however, such expectations seemed dim. An article by 
Susana Sottoli, although lacking the empirical richness present in Huber's piece, 
reaffirmed that a wide-seated transformation of social policy was ongoing in Latin 
America, converging towards a model with four comer stones: selectivity and 
focalisation In place of universalism, privatisation of serVIce provISIOn, 
decentralisation of remaining state responsibilities, and compensation for the social 
costs of structural adjustment through anti-poverty programmes.32 Other recent work 
supports Sottoli's characterisation of qualitative transformations in Latin America 
social policies and her four pillars of reform, moreover, closely mirror established 
World Bank wisdom on the subject. 33 As such, they express the growing influence of 
international financial institutions in the analysis and formation of social policy in the 
developing world.34 Indeed, Asa Laurell, for example, considers this influence to be 
the chief explanation of what she considers the "striking uniformity" in reform trends 
across the continent. 35 
The fact that the World Bank's prescription closely reflects the commonly identified 
themes in neoliberal social policy reform, however, is not just a measure of the 
influence of the Bank but also reflects two further factors. First, there has been a strong 
tendency to impose analytically a greater coherence to restructuring trends that, in 
32 Sottoh 2000. 
33 Raczynski 1998; Garland 2000; Szekely 2001; Szekely also notes the emergence of new programmes 
in the later 1990s that, whilst tentative in their regional spread, supersede the safety net style policies by 
seeking to selectively invest in the human capital of specific social groups through decentralised 
processes. Also, cf. World Bank 1990; 1993; 1994; 2001a; 2001c; 2002; 2003b. 
34 cf. Deacon 1997; Pender 2001; Weber 2001. 
35 L II aure 2000: 308. 
practical implementation, were often partial and fragmented between social sectors.36 
Second, the close relationship between Bank prescription and concrete tendencies is 
also testament to the reciprocal extent to which the international organisation has paid 
close attention to the forms assumed by a decade of conflict-laden restructuring at the 
national and sub-national levels. Within this process, the World Bank has undergone a 
continuous appropriation of instances of reform into its own prescription, and has 
sought to give them greater theoretical coherence by anchoring them to the projected 
rationality of the Bank's wider vision of social transformation. A brief examination of 
the Bank's literature reveals how much it borrows from what are judged to be 
successful instances of national reforms. In particular, the World Bank has drawn 
heavily on the forms of restructured social policy developed in Chile and Mexico, as 
detailed below and in chapter seven. 
Despite various degrees of empirical rigour, however, each of these above descriptions 
of the shifting contours of social policy in Latin America contains little analysis of the 
underlying causes of transformation. Whilst this is partially explainable by the 
uncomfortable level of abstraction involved in offering a "Latin American" panorama, 
at the expense of national level case-studies that could provide more causati ve insight, a 
focus on description at the expense of analysis mirrors tendencies that have long been 
present in the study of social policy. Ramesh Mishra, in his classic work on the 
different streams of social policy analysis, highlighted a tendency for what he labelled 
the "social administration" genre to assess the relative efficiency of state policies in a 
particular branch of social policy with the intention of promoting policy improvements 
to fUl1her rationalise the various instances of political-administrative intervention.37 
36 Ct' H 
. aagh 2002c: -+. 
37 M· h IS ra 1977. 
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Analyses of this nature are able to highlight general trends, offer specific insight into 
the workings of particular social policies and provide valuable evaluations of initiatives 
within the margins of their projected goals. 
Nevertheless, this kind of problem-solving approach is blind-sighted to many important 
analytical considerations that are not only necessary to help explain why social policy 
should have a particular content, but also why it should take a specific historical form. 
It is the contention of this section that in order adequately to explain the changing 
forms of social policy in Latin America an analysis must relate social policy 
transformation to the crisis-laden trajectory of capital accumulation and the politicised 
struggles over the restructuring of state-society relations in the era of neoliberal reform. 
From the perspective adopted in this thesis, therefore, social policy reform is one 
further dimension of the structural adjustment project to effect a fundamental 
reformulation of the social reproduction of the working class with economic (the 
reinstatement of the burden of social reproduction more firmly upon the individual), 
political (the disarticulation of movements and struggles), and ideological dimensions 
(notions of fairness, efficiency and choice). The following two sections therefore offer 
a framework for the comprehension of social policy reformulation that is subsequently 
concretised in the more detailed examination of social restructuring in Chile. 
3. Privatisation, Targeting and Decentralisation 
Over the last two decades, neoliberal restructuring of the institutional forms of social 
policy has repeatedly focused upon the transfer of potentially profitable social service 
provision into the private sector where, assuming a commodity form, it would proceed 
according to the dictates of market forces. This project underscores the increasingly 
1 Y> 
common practices of privatising various aspects of welfare provision, including social 
security, health and education, in which the state, and sometimes the employer, 
previously exercised a degree of responsibility. As the World Bank outlined in relation 
to health care, the model to follow involves three facets: 
First, the state should take responsibility for health interventions 
that have a public-good character (e.g. clean air and traffic 
safety) or that generate benefits to the community in addition to 
private benefits (e.g. immunization against communicable 
diseases). Second, in curative care the main role of the state as a 
provider of services should be to supply basic services in those 
regions that the private sector is unlikely to serve. Third, if a 
private delivery system is in place, the state should make sure the 
poor have access to basic care ... Chile again offers an example.38 
The principal rationales behind the privatisation tendency were fourfold. First, in 
conditions of fiscal cnSlS, states were attracted to reducing their fiscal burden and 
downsizing the state apparatus by offloading services into the private sector. Second, 
privatisation was presented as a manner of introducing market mechanisms to service 
provision that would maximise optimising efficiency and individual freedom of choice. 
Third, in a period of economic uncertainty, privatisation opened new avenues of 
profitable investment for the both domestic and foreign capital.39 Fourth, privatisation 
potentially offered the state an escape from political pressures aimed at improving 
38 World Bank 1990: 85; also cf. World Bank 1993, 1994. 
39 Indeed, with an increasing mass of surplus capital seeking investment opportunities at a global level. 
both the IMF and World Bank have been at the vanguard of prying open national capital accounts to 
allow financial investment on a greater scale. Amongst the consequences, however, has been the torrent 
of devastating financial crises during the 1990s; cf. Soederberg 2002a. 
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qualitatively and quantitatively state mediation of capitalist social reproduction. In 
short, privatisation constitutes an attempt to absolve the state from political 
responsibility for social reproduction. It therein seeks to reverse the institutionally 
embedded outcomes of popular struggles that had in many countries resulted in over 
half a century of welfare expansion.4o 
In many respects, the first two justifications of privatisation have proved to be chimeras 
of the neoliberal imagination. Although the immediate reaction to the crises of the 
1980s was often rapid expenditure retrenchment, leading to a twenty four percent drop 
in per capita social expenditure for Latin America as a whole during the 1980s, the 
social costs of adjustment and the resulting social instability and conflict commonly 
prompted the implementation of extensive safety nets and other anti-poverty measures 
that required extensive expenditure.41 Moreover, the manner in which privatisation has 
been fashioned necessarily entailed significant short and medium term costs for the 
state as the state took a leading role in systematically creating and expanding the 
conditions in which market-based provision could exist.42 The primary example of this 
process is found in the substantial expenditures involved in transferring public pensions 
into the private sector, as occurred in Chile in 1980, Peru 1993, Argentina 1994 and 
Bolivia in 1997.43 In addition to the immediate costs of transferring existing pensions 
to private pension funds, for example, the post-privatisation costs of public pension 
expenditure in Chile at the tum of the millennium still amounted to over six percent of 
GDP annually, a sum that represents double the pre-privatisation total.44 
40 For the post-War expansion of welfare state institutions in Latin America, cf. Mesa-Lago 1989. 
41 Ocampo 1998: 7. 
42 Prior to this sustained state intervention to create market providers, private provision tended to arise 
sporadically at the fringes of state institutions; cf. Haagh 2002c: 2. 
4 ' 
.' Mesa-Lago 2002: 1309-1321. 
44 Borzutzky :':001: 297. Also see Taylor 2003. 
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In this respect, the early 1990s saw a sharp reversal in social expenditure retrenchment 
with per capita social expenditure eighteen percent higher in 1995 than levels registered 
before the crisis.45 Although many have welcomed the return of a more socially active 
state, such figures must be sharply qualified by recognition that a very high proportion 
of the increase has been directed to pension payments (the least progressive form of 
distribution) and, to a lesser degree, anti-poverty programmes that seek to ameliorate 
the increased levels of social polarisation and social conflicts associated with them. In 
the case of education, for example, real per capita expenditure in 1995 had only 
recovered its 1980 level for the region as a whole and was still below that level in a 
considerable number of individual countries.46 Therefore, although the institutional 
forms of social policy have undergone a qualitative shift, the quantitative expenditure 
trend has been reflected in an unexpected resurgence in many countries in the period 
following the initial periods of retrenchment and stabilisation. This trend belies the 
neoliberal prediction of a generalised reduction in state expenditure and the creation of 
'lean states' through social policy reformulation.47 
In spite of World Bank assertions, it is also equally questionable that privatisation 
trends have improved service provision. The existing institutions of social provision, 
which in the post-War period had expanded rapidly in most Latin American countries, 
were commonly designated as inherently inefficient bureaucracies that tended to 
respond to politically articulated interests rather than objective needs. In contrast, the 
employment of market mechanisms in service provision was suggested to provide a 
4)CEPAL 1998. 
46 
Ocampo 1998: 9. 
47 For example, that social expenditures in the medium-term underwent a significant recovery, alt~ough 
in a qualitati vely different form, is born out both in the case in Mexico in the late 1980s and ChIle In the 
post-debt crisis period and throughout the 1990s, as detailed below. 
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neutral institution that could improve efficiency and personal choice through inducing 
competition between providers.48 Nevertheless, the essential presupposition of 
privatisation is that efficiency, personal choice and the provision of services can all be 
subordinated to profitability without compromising the perceived rationality of market-
based service provision. Within the Latin American context, not least in conditions of 
escalating social polarisation, the latter constraint effectively reduces the potential 
client group for new private sector companies to the relatively small middle and upper 
classes and a small proportion of the more affluent working class. As demonstrated in 
the Chilean case, but also with evidence from other Latin American studies, 
privatisation of pensions, health and education led to the private sector absorbing the 
most profitable individuals into private service provision whilst saddling the state with 
the burden of reproducing the less affluent social classes.49 Moreover, whilst those that 
have been able to subscribe to privatised systems have often been rewarded with better 
service choice and provision, the reassertion of the cash nexus has created a strong 
articulation between the quantity and quality of services received and the ability of the 
individual household to pay for them. Dualization of service provision, therefore, has 
been an entirely logical outcome of privatisation trends, resulting in the substantive 
irrationality and inefficiency of privatisation for the majority of the working class.50 
Indeed, when coupled together, the immediate result of retrenchment and privatisation 
has been precisely to reinstate the burden of social reproduction more fully on the 
shoulders of the working class. The primary aim of privatisation is to constitute social 
reproduction as a personal responsibility to be achieved through subordination to 
appropriate wage labour and strategies of familial or communal solidarity. Historically 
-18 
Huber 1996; Duhau 1997. 
49 
Taylor 2003. 
50 Huber 1996: Duhau 1997; Laurell 1999,2000; Taylor 2003. 
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developed forms of state social mediation of working class reproduction, and 
particularly those forms that involved a shared responsibility between worker, state and 
employer, were deemed to be anachronistic, inefficient, and ultimately prejudicial to 
those they ought to help. In this respect one of the most important dimensions of this 
process has been the privatisation of pensions. The Chilean model, which since the 
early 1990s has been propagated throughout the global South by the World Bank,5l is 
one in which responsibility for pensions is removed from the ambit of the state-worker-
firm triad and placed squarely in the relationship between the individual labourer and a 
private pension company. As an extension of the principles of labour flexibilisation, 
notions of collectivist solidarity are abandoned whilst the new systems tie the 
reproduction of individuals in old age to their ability to contribute to private pension 
plans during their working li ves and in disregard of their personal employment 
. 52 trajectory. 
Concurrently, there was a strong political motivation behind privatisation. In removing 
responsibility for social reproduction from the state and reconstituting it as a private 
relationship between private company and private individual, social reproduction, it 
was envisaged, would become increasingly an individual responsibility mediated solely 
by market relations. Concurrently, the state would be incrementally removed from its 
former position as the primary locus of social struggles that targeted the state in order 
to mediate their social reproduction. In this respect, privatisation appeared as a key 
aspect of fashioning the neoliberal ideal of atomised and thoroughly individualised 
societies and, therefore, a further moment in the ongoing attempt to disarticulate 
political struggle. In short, privatisation was part of a strategy that has been tenned a 
.\1 World Bank 1994; Mesa-Lago 2002. 
52 The Chilean model of pension reform is analysed in detail in Taylor 2003. 
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"de-politicisation of the social," concurrent to a "de-socialisation of the political", 
referring to the process of imposing a strict separation between the onus of social 
reproduction and the realm of politics.53 
Part of the failure of the reformulation of social policy as envisaged by neoliberal 
ideologues, however, is that the social relations of capitalism do not guarantee the 
social reproduction of the working class.54 Moreover, within the environment of crisis 
and restructuring, a substantial proportion of Latin American populations were 
comprehensively excluded from the relation of capitalist work on which they depended 
for a living wage. In conditions of growing un- and under-employment, the stagnation 
of real wages, growing income inequality, and sustained levels of poverty, 55 the ability 
of large sections of the population to participate in privatised systems was never a 
realistic proposition. Whilst the immediate repercussion was the adoption by 
households of alternative survival strategies,56 the political pressures resulting from the 
failures of social reproduction of the working class rapidly gave rise to the 
implementation of large-scale anti-poverty programmes and the targeting of social 
expenditures on those most marginalized by capitalist restructuring. 57 In this manner, 
the targeting of social expenditures is the reverse side of privatisation and 
retrenchment. State focalisation offers a potential manner of mediating the failure of 
the social reproduction of the poorest individuals within a climate of fiscal 
retrenchment that places an expanded burden upon the shoulders of the working class. 
\1 
.. cf. Taylor 1998; de la Maza 1999 . 
. \4 The other major factor blocking implementation of radical neoliberal social policy reform has been 
politically articulated opposition from the working class. Similar to the case of labour reform, variations 
in the effectiveness of opposition have created a fragmented map of reforms over the Latin American 
continent. This situation has spawned a growing literature on how to create the political conditions 
Propitious for reform: cf. Graham et at. 1999. 
II Altimir 1998; Weeks 1999. 
\6 Halebsky 1995. 
\7 
Graham 1994. 
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Within the context of societal restructuring (and beyond the altruistic language of the 
World Bank and national governments) expenditure targeting and reformed delivery 
procedures have been undertaken in order to construct new forms of regulating the poor 
in a period of escalating social polarisation.58 
Despite their universal pretensions, the uneven expansion of social policies in the 
global South in the post-War period led to fragmented forms of service provision and 
generally favoured the organised urban working class employed in the formal sector. 
On this basis, the ideological strength of the selective targeting of social expenditure is 
typically one of fairness and revolves around theories of social exclusion and 
. l' . 59 margma IsatlOn. In abstraction from the wider trends of restructuring, therefore, 
targeting appears both morally and practically justifiable. However, there are several 
problems with this simplistic duality. First, there is no direct correlation between 
market-based systems of social provision and the goals of targeted provision. Indeed, 
as Louise Haagh presciently surmises: 
Targeting is compatible with a range of universal policies, and 
would not have seemed out of place in either developmental or 
welfare states.60 
Second, much of the eulogising literature, including that provided by the World Bank, 
merely assumes that targeting is effective in that services are delivered precisely to the 
specified social group, without analysing the necessary institutional preconditions. For 
'S Especially considering that a key facet of adjustment policies was tax reform that increa:ed the 
regressive nature of the tax burden, targeted social policies represent primarily a redistribution of wealth 
within the working class. 
59 
Tendler 2000; Arce 2002. 
60 
Haagh 2002c: 26. 
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all but the smallest of programmes, however, successful targeting presupposes a 
sophisticated range of social mapping techniques in order to identify the social object, 
and subsequently an efficient bureaucracy that can effectively distribute the service to 
this population. In many cases, the institutional infrastructure for adequate targeting 
simply does not exist and, where it does, the extensive costs of social cartography and 
focused delivery raise questions as to the efficiency of the exercise vis-a-vis more 
uni versall y ori en tated programmes. 61 
In this respect, the main impetus behind targeted policies would seem to be ideological, 
in the manner by which assisting the social reproduction of the most vulnerable 
sections of society can be justified within the context of wide retrenchment and 
disciplinary reform. Politically, the importance of targeting has been placed upon the 
creation and mobilisation of new social groups that can become stakeholders in the 
reform process and, in this respect, anti -poverty policy and targeted local development 
initiatives can become important elements in political legitimation.62 Similar themes 
are also encountered in the third characteristic of neoliberal social policy reform -
decentralisation. The decentralisation of remaining state responsibilities to sub-national 
levels is a trend concordant with privatisation and targeting. The prospect of 
decentralisation of state functions, such as providing health, education and other social 
services, was a significant feature of the 1990s development discourse and was widely 
heralded by the World Bank.63 The latter enthusiastically proclaimed that: 
61 Tendler ~OOO: 96-9. 
62 Graham et al. 1999. 
63 t' A c. ngel\ et al. :2001. 
167 
By decentralizing government so that more decisions are made at 
subnational levels, closer to the voters, localization nourishes 
. d ,.f:I!,' • 64 responslve an ejjlClent governance. 
Such rosy assessments did little justice to the actual results of decentralised forms of 
social policy. There is no essential correlation between the decentralisation of 
government functions and responsive and efficient governance. The problem of the 
'capture' of local state resources does not dissipate through decentralisation. On the 
contrary, local structures of power relations and patronage can be equally, if not more, 
present at regional levels.65 As the Bank came to recognise at the tum of the 
millennium, the principal determinant of whether local resources will be delivered to 
those who most need them is not the formal institutional framework of governance but, 
rather, the relative impact of popular struggles to impart a more democratic character 
upon the structures of the state.66 Concurrently, there is no a priori reason to suggest 
that the latter are more effecti ve at a local level. 
Similarly, local government is not necessarily more efficient in its allocation of 
resources. In contrast, decentralisation has often presented local governments with 
administrative tasks that they are ill equipped to perform, a situation that can be 
heightened if the decentralisation of responsibility is not matched with a correlate 
decentralisation of funding. 67 As Allison Garland emphasises: 
(l4 W orld Bank 2000a: 4. 
65 For example, John Gledhill provides an interesting account of "caciquismo" (local boss rule) in 1990s 
Mexico and George Gray-Molina provides an account of inefficiency and the political usage of funds in a 
decentralised participatory programme in Bolivia; cf. Gledhill 1998 and Gray-Molina 2002. 
66 This is discussed in the concl usion. 
67 For a Mexican case study, cf. Munoz Patraca 1999. 
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Inefficiencies and weaknesses encountered In the central 
government similarly appear in local-level public institutions with 
the same implications for quality, productivity and effectiveness of 
. I . 68 sOCla servzces. 
Given the unsubstantiated nature of the claims to greater accountability, responsiveness 
and efficiency of decentralisation, the question remains as to why this trend has been so 
widely embraced by governments in the South and the international development 
institutions? One aspect generally left untouched by works on decentralisation is the 
macro-political motivations behind the trend. As I support with evidence from the 
Chilean experience in chapter six, a strong political impetus towards decentralisation 
can be found in the desire to fragment political opposition to both the wider parameters 
of social policy reform and to the neoliberal project in general. On one level, the most 
ardent opposition to the neoliberal restructuring of social services is commonly found 
within public sector unions, such as teachers and health workers. Decentralisation, 
alongside privatisation, is a clear method by which the power of such unions can be 
undermined through spatial dispersion. 
Secondly, as an attempt to transfer struggles over the conditions of social reproduction 
down to a localised level, decentralisation can aid in the process of fragmenting conflict 
over services from the macro-economic decisions that constitute the parameters in 
which social policies are formed. As discussed in relation to the World Bank's concept 
of "good governance" in the conclusion, a key facet of decentralisation and local 
participation in social development policy design and implementation is the 
68 Garland 2000: 6. 
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transformation of political struggles into effective vehicles of development policy.69 In 
this respect, whilst popular struggles are even encouraged to ensure efficient delivery at 
a local level by fighting corruption, key political decisions over macroeconomic policy 
direction operate at a different level of political articulation, thereby providing new 
challenges for popular struggles over social policy to link the micro with macro 
determinants. In sum, decentralisation can playa significant role in the attempt by the 
state to reconstitute the political forms of class struggle, imparting a more fragmented 
and regionalised character upon struggles. 
This chapter has emphasised how the seemingly technocratic reforms to labour and 
social policy are integral aspects of the wider project of neoliberal restructuring that 
aims towards social depoliticisation through the removal of institutional mediations to 
the abstract domination of capitalist social relations. Currently, the thesis turns to 
concretise the examination of restructuring as developed in the last two chapters, 
through a critique of restructuring in the specific historical setting of Chile. The latter 
provides an optimal case-study owing to the profundity of neoclassical inspired - and 
World Bank inspiring - reforms over the course of almost three decades. Indeed, not 
only are the general tenets of restructuring as a form of social discipline by facilitating 
the operation of the abstract social disciplines of capitalist social relations evident, but 
also the sub-trends of labour flexibilisation and neoliberal social policy reform are 
manifested in a particularly blunt manner. Indeed, the Chilean labour code, fashioned 
by the Pinochet dictatorship and modified under the post-authoritarian governments, 
closely resembles the posterior model of best-practise subsequently promulgated by the 
World Bank. Likewise, the Bank has explicitly heralded social policy and anti-poverty 
policy trends in Chile. Chile therefore provides an excellent case by which to examine 
69 cf. (e.g.) Cooke and Kothari 2001. 
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the social genesis of these forms of restructuring, their impact upon social relations and 
also the limits to these strategies and the specific struggles that emerged to contest 
them. 
171 
CHAPTER 6: ACCUMULATION, CRISIS AND THE RECOMPOSITION OF 
CAPITAL AND LABOUR IN CHILE, 1973-1988 
The following chapters examine the transformation of development policy in Chile 
over the last three decades within the wider context of the struggle-driven and crisis-
marked trajectory of capitalist development. The present chapter focuses on the wider 
political economy of accumulation processes in Chile focusing on the period of the 
Pinochet dictatorship, 1973-1989. It argues that the forms of social restructuring 
instigated by the Pinochet regime represented a radical response to the growing crisis 
that peaked during the three-year presidency of socialist president Salvador Allende, 
1970-3. By highlighting the evolving forms of state intervention and their effects upon 
the trajectory of capital accumulation and the course of social struggles, the chapter 
provides a foundation for a focused examination of labour and social policy 
transformation. In so doing, the chapter addresses the decomposition and reconstitution 
of the Chilean working class and changes in the forms of state mediation of working 
class social reproduction. 
1. State, Class Struggle and Post-War Development 
During the course of the twentieth century, prior to the neoIiberal revolution introduced 
under the Pinochet dictatorship, the Chilean state had become increasingly involved in 
mediating the relations of social reproduction. In the wake of pronounced social 
contlict following the crisis of the nitrate industry and the collapse of Western markets 
for other Chilean minerals owing to the great depression, a new period of Chilean 
capitalist accumulation began to emerge in the 1930s. This accumulation trajectory, 
subsequently labelled import-substitution industrialisation (lSI) and gi ven ideological 
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coherence in the writings of Prebisch and Singer amongst others, was notable for 
changes in the pattern of accumulation and for growing state regulation of a range of 
social relations. Up to this period, Chilean incorporation into the circuits of global 
capital had come primarily through mineral and agricultural exports, owned by foreign 
interests and the rural landed class respectively. Growing integration of this kind 
stimulated a partial and geographically focused development of capitalist social 
relations from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a process partially based on the 
existence of a relatively large untied labour force that existed as a leftover from frontier 
wars and that was supplemented by a surplus rural population. 1 A proletarian class 
expanded most rapidly in the mining and docking sectors, although vicious trade cycles 
attributable to fluctuating global demand for nitrates, wheat and copper periodically 
caused the mass decomposition of this emergent working class with considerable social 
devastation. From the 1920s onwards, however, Chilean accumulation became 
characterised by the escalating formation of indigenous consumer goods industries 
geared towards growing domestic markets. The latter were owned by an incipient 
national bourgeoisie and abetted by state credits, subsidies and technical support. The 
World Bank, moreover, gave its first ever developing country loan to Chile in 1948 and 
made a further nine in the following ten years, all orientated towards infrastructural 
projects. 2 
Although sometimes characterised as "inward-orientated development", accumulation 
of the import-substitution type depended heavily on global capital circuits. Mineral 
export revenues, especially copper. were critical for sustaining capital accumulation as 
foreign exchange revenues provided for oil and technological imports that serviced the 
I Roddick 1989: 188. 
2 cf. World Bank group, "Chile Projects and Programs", at wW\\'. \\'oridbank.orgJ 
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domestic goods sector, whilst export taxes provided a significant and growing source of 
state income. In this way, Chilean accumulation and the material basis for state 
intervention in the reproduction of the working class became heavily dependent on the 
course of global accumulation in the post-war boom period. 
Accumulation within the import-substituting form served to speed the transformation of 
Chilean social structures. By organising and subsidising the formation of domestic 
industries the state helped to nurture a domestic industrial bourgeoisie and urban 
middle class. 3 Conversely, the traditional landowning oligarchies suffered a marked 
decline in both economic standing and political power. Agriculture, as a share of GDP, 
fell from 14.9 percent to 10.1 percent whilst industry increased by one third between 
1940 and 1960 to 22.2 percent.4 However, a necessary corollary to the expansion of 
the industrial sector was the growth and consolidation of an urban working class. As 
peasants and agrarian workers left the rural sphere for employment in the rapidly 
expanding urban centres, the emergence of a proletariat removed from traditional forms 
of social domination exerted in the countryside constituted a potential threat to the 
bourgeoisie. Likewise, concentrated groups of workers also expanded in the northern 
and central mining areas. Organised labour developed rapidly (refer to table 6: 1) and 
retained ample autonomy from the state, unlike in other Latin American countries 
where relative independence was sacrificed for corporatist institutionalisation. At the 
same time, radical political parties - particularly the Communist and Socialist parties -
grew in size and in spite of a general inability to overcome factionalism at the national 
level they exerted considerable influence on the political system.5 
.1 
Roxborough et a I. 1977. 
4 F ' ortm 1985: 205 
~ cr. Monteon 1998: 190-204; also Roddick 1989; Vitale 1990. 
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Table 6:1 - Urban Unionisation in Chile, 1932-73.6 
Year No. Unions Union Members Percent Un ionised 
1932 421 54,801 (n/d) 
1940 629 91,940 18.7 
1952 1,982 282,383 19.3 
1960 1,892 272,141 14.3 
1970 4,001 436,974 19.4 
1973 5,632 704,499 30.5 
Changing social dynamics encouraged the emergence of new state forms. In response 
to growing social pressures, the Chilean state attempted to regulate the relations 
between capital and labour via interventionist methods in the realm of distribution that 
became progressively institutionalised. The latter grew to include indexed wage 
increases, subsidised basic goods and the development of a social policy system that 
both subsidised and regulated various aspects of middle and working class 
reproduction. Through these various forms of intervention, the state attempted to 
harness the working classes to capitalist development, check the growth of subversive 
ideologies, and provide the social and industrial calm necessary for sustained 
accumulation. Simultaneously, supplementing the purchasing power of the Chilean 
middle and working classes helped to consolidate outlets for domestically produced 
consumer goods. 
These institutionalised forms of social mediation, however, imparted complex effects 
on the relations between state, capital and labour, the course of social and political 
struggles, and also upon the relationship between different branches of production. On 
the one hand, by subsidising basic foodstuffs consumed by the urban working class the 
state took an active role in reducing the price of labour power in the urban centres. 
This partial subsidy to industrial capitals, however, had the consequence of suppressing 
6 F' Igures from Roberts 1998: 90, 
17) 
profits in the agrarian sphere and further antagonising the landed classes. Concurrently, 
by mediating the level of wages through indexed salary increases, the state became 
directly involved in regulating the distributional conflict between capital and labour 
with the necessary corollary that the state increasingly became a primary locus for the 
struggles of the working class. This was particularly apparent in the growing state 
participation in the economy through ownership of an assortment of key enterprises 
wherein the state took on a direct relationship with the working class. Various social 
groups pressured the state for material compromises and these repeatedly became 
manifested in the institutionalised form of social policies such as the granting of 
assorted levels of social security to different elements of the middle and working 
classes. 
As such, the concrete development of state social policies in this period was uneven as 
the consolidation of institutionalised forms largely depended upon the trajectory of 
particular social struggles and the ability of primarily class-based social movements to 
effectively voice their demands. Accordingly, the assorted systems governing 
pensions, heaIthcare and education became notoriously fragmented as different sections 
of the middle and working classes variously succeeded in pressuring the state to grant 
or extend coverage to their particular occupational group. By the 1970s the social 
policy system, despite its heavy centralisation, constituted a legislative and bureaucratic 
labyrinth with hundreds of programmes and institutions.7 Although a certain degree of 
universality was reached relative to other countries in the region - Huber estimates that 
seventy percent of the working population had some form of state sponsored social 
security and Titelman suggests that ninety percent of the population had access to the 
health system - there were notorious inequalities in both coverage and provision of 
7 
Mesa-Lago 1989: 109. 
services.8 One notable consequence was the extremely partial coverage of social 
groups who fell outside of the urban-industrial realm. 
The interventionist form of the state, however, developed major contradictions related 
to the trajectory of accumulation and class struggle within the lSI mode of capitalist 
development. Economic downturns served to increase the respective distributional 
claims of capital and labour upon the state. During the periodic slumps the former 
sought to stifle the wage claims of workers whilst the latter expected the state to protect 
wages and provide greater social security in conditions of rising unemployment. Such 
crises were repeatedly marked by the state discarding its populist veneer and attempting 
to renew the conditions for accumulation by suppressing real wages. 9 However, the 
tensions inherent in the lSI mode of accumulation became particularly acute in the later 
1960s as the post-War boom that had underscored global capitalist expansion for two 
decades began to falter and forms of social struggle picked up momentum. By the end 
of that decade, signs of crisis within the Chilean political economy became increasingly 
apparent in the stagnation of the import substitution industrialisation development 
trajectory alongside growing instances of social mobilisation. With copper providing 
almost seventy-five percent of Chilean export-earnings in the post-war period, capital 
accumulation in Chile had been consistently vulnerable to the vicissitudes of world 
market prices for this commodity, especially its relative price compared to oil. In the 
mid-1960s the price of copper began a slow but notable descent. Although copper 
exports continued to buoy macroeconomic indicators they nonetheless provided a 
decreasing source of revenue for the state. Considerable cause for concern, however, 
was to be found in a growing inflationary trend and a failure of dynamism in industrial 
8 H . uber 1996: 148; Tltelman 2001: 266. 
l) For various accounts refer to Roxborough et al 1977: 36; Stallings 1978; Vitale 1990; Salazar and Pinto 
1999. 
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sectors orientated towards the domestic market operating under the protection of high 
tariff walls. lo 
Christian Democrat president Eduardo Frei (1964-69) responded to the manifestations 
of crisis by deepening forms of state intervention through amplified credits to industry, 
infrastructural investments, agrarian reform and new social programmes designed to 
incorporate and foment domestic demand amongst urban subaltern groups that were not 
directly involved in capitalist production relations but were located in informal 
sectors. I I Frei's stated intention was to pursue socially progressive reform within a 
'neo-capitalist' model of development that would combine state intervention in key 
industries (particularly mining) with substantial foreign investment. In an attempt to 
facilitate the expansion of capital on an augmented scale the state followed an 
expanSIOnary policy, drawing heavily on foreign credit to finance increased 
intervention in Chilean social relations. The strategy was buoyed by considerable US 
financing through President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress initiative that sought to 
stave off revolution in Latin America by promoting moderate social change. 
Nevertheless, Frei' s strategy was unable to surmount growing political fissures and 
economic stagnation. Extending social programmes to the urban subalterns and 
introducing agrarian reform in marginalized rural areas did not result in the growing 
dynamism of either consumption or agrarian production as hoped, but did provide a 
further drain on the social surplus. 
Conversely, the mobilisation of these groups by the state also proved insufficient to 
counter-balance the political power of the established union movement. Owing to the 
10 Stallings 1978; Fortin 1985. 
II With regard to Frei's policy towards the urban marginal sectors and the theories of marginallsation 
used to support this endeavour, cf. Kay 1989: 97-100. 
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success of the latter in securing rising wages following a massive upsurge in strike 
activity in 1965-6, capital was faced with growing difficulties in maintaining profit 
rates. 12 Inflation was rising and business interests clamoured for an end to the 
mounting redistributive component of the Chilean political economy and a cap on wage 
increases. The failure of the economy to respond to Frei's expansionary initiatives 
meant that resources became increasingly restricted precisely at a moment when social 
mobilisation augmented pressure for greater material compromises. Under these 
constraints and amidst growing social polarisation the interventionist state-form started 
to break apart. Notably, support for the Socialist and Communist parties grew 
considerably, comprising over one-third of the electorate, whilst the bourgeoisie 
became increasingly confrontational towards Frei' s reformist tendencies. 
The regime responded in 1968 with a shift to the right, reducing social expenditure and 
employing the security forces to crack down on the more explicit forms of popular 
mobilisation. 13 However, the polarising trends unleashed by the crisis of accumulation, 
and the resulting dissolution of Frei' s political middle ground, were sharply manifested 
itself in the general elections of 1970. Socialist candidate Salvador Allende won a 
narrow victory with 36.6 percent of the vote, as compared to the Conservative 
candidate who received 35.2. Allende's programme of nationalisation and increasing 
state intervention in distributional issues, however, represented a further development, 
rather than a break, with the trajectory of capital accumulation up to that point. 
Furthermore, it proved unable to overcome the growing crisis. Predicated upon price 
controls and general wage hikes, the demand-driven growth strategy initially served to 
Increase production in domestic consumer industries although the inflation rate also 
I~ Stallings 1978: 105. 
13 S II' ta lOgs 1978: 113. 
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began an ommous nse. Concurrently, the nationalisation of key industries _ 
particularly that of copper - at first provided the regime with a reasonably vibrant state 
sector. However, the tendency to respond to growing industrial conflicts by 
nationalising the enterprise in question brought many smaller and less profitable 
industries into the state's purview. Moreover, the political uncertainty surrounding the 
regime and the trend towards nationalisation made capitals located in the domestic 
consumption sector extremely reluctant to invest, even to cover the renewal of 
machinery necessary for the production process. 14 
In sum, whilst Allende's government acted under the banner of moving towards a 
socialist future, the immediate effects of restructuring were to deepen the state's 
economic role and expand redistributionist aspects within a capitalist framework. The 
upshot of these actions was to further undermine the basis for capital accumulation, 
prompting the unleashing of even greater crisis tendencies. Although in 1973 the 
Allende government prepared to moderate some of its reforms, other elements of the 
state-system began to mobilise in a contrary fashion. 15 The bourgeoisie and allies 
perceived, in Guillermo O'Donnell's words, "a great threat to the survival of the basic 
capitalist parameters of society". 16 They sought to return the state to within the limits 
of its capitalist form and therein reaffirm the basis for renewed capital accumulation. 
With the crisis of accumulation deepening and the US government openly supporting 
the growing anti-Allende forces, the military emerged from the barracks on September 
11 th 1973 and unleashed a bloody yet successful coup. 
14 F ' OrlIn 1985: 150. 
15 The Allende reaime had been cut off from World Bank and IMF credit owing to the political pressure 
o 
of the US. 
16 0 'D onneIl 1979: 295. 
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2. Crisis, Authoritarianism and Social Restructuring 
In many respects, the crisis of accumulation in the early 1970s shattered some of the 
fetishised forms of appearance of capitalist society. Growing social polarization and 
forms of class-based mobilisation served to unite economic and political struggles, with 
struggle manifested in class-based movements that targeted the state. The iron rule of 
property was shaken through state expropriation of a growing number of industries and 
the deepened agrarian reform process. By 1973, companies within the state's "area of 
social property" represented 39 percent of GDP, as opposed to 14.2 percent in 1965. 17 
However, the limits to a socialist strategy that viewed the capture of the capitalist state 
as its primary object of struggle had also been manifested, with the state running up 
against the conditions of its own existence in the form of profound economic, social 
and political crisis. As the crisis deepened, control of the coercive apparatus by state 
managers closely linked to the bourgeoisie and committed to re-establishing the 
parameters of capitalist social relations proved decisive. The new authoritarian regime 
looked to develop a strategy by which to renew the conditions for the expanded 
reproduction of capital, which necessarily involved fashioning a new relationship 
between capital and labour. It concurrently sought to re-establish the fragmented social 
forms of capitalism and therein reassert an unbending separation of politics and 
economics, remove the state as the central object of social struggle and atomise the 
collective subjectivities forged in the previous decades of struggle. Nonetheless, 
beyond exercising their control of the means of coercion, the new authoritarian state 
managers were initially uncertain of how to achieve these aims. As developed below, 
in the context of deepening crisis the authoritarian regime would become incrementally 
17 F ' 
ernandez 2000: 105. 
181 
drawn towards a course of action that would re-assert the power of money, as a tangible 
fonn of abstract capitalist domination, into all aspects of social life. 
Over the first few years of the dictatorship, this strategy to re-impose the abstract 
discipline of capitalist social relations coalesced into a neoliberal approach to policy 
making. In this manner, the gradual internalisation of neoliberal ideology by the 
military regime was not predicated solely on its supposed economic functionality. On 
the contrary, despite avid propagation by an influential clique of economists working at 
the Universidad Cat6lica, monetarist policies were initially ignored by the regime and 
there existed considerable doubt that these throwback ideas to an earlier stage of 
capitalism could be effective. At this historical juncture, long before neoliberalism had 
assumed the global hegemonic mantle that it presently enjoys, Keynesian assumptions 
regarding the necessity of state intervention to mitigate crisis were prevalent and the 
idea of a minimalist state seemed bizarre and suspect. Nevertheless, as analysed in the 
previous chapters, the forms of restructuring that would later earn the neoliberal tag are 
not merely economic in nature, but rather comprise a wider societal transformation that 
necessarily encompasses economic, political and ideological dimensions. This was 
specifically recognised by the Pinochet regime, which in reaction to the crisis 
pronounced that it wanted to give Chile: 
[AJ new institutional basis .. , to rebuild the country morally, 
institutionally and materially. 18 
Chilean neoliberalism, therefore, was not selected as an economic doctrine according to 
the rational principles of the state managers, but emerged in an uneven fashion as a 
18 C' . 39 Ited In Taylor 1997: . 
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drastic response to the social crisis that had reached a pinnacle in the Allende years. 
Withdrawing the state from historically developed roles - such as price controls, wage 
agreements, welfare policies, industrial policy - and reinserting the primacy of the 
market not only seemed to offer a possible solution to the economic manifestation of 
crisis by controlling inflation and restructuring the productive apparatus, but also 
presented a mechanism of societal depoliticisation by obliterating the circumstances in 
which politics had become a means for attaining social and economic ends and the state 
had become the primary locus for social struggle. 
The first actions of the incoming authoritarian regIme were aimed at solving the 
political crisis and clearing the way for the forthcoming restructuring of Chilean 
society. To this end, the military concentrated on its coercive expertise and engaged in 
a policy of fierce repression that served to annihilate the political forces that had 
challenged the foundations of Chilean capitalism. The primary achievement of 
repression was the decapitation of organised labour, the destruction of autonomous and 
politically active union movements, and the generalised suppression of political 
opposition.1 9 Moreover, political violence was supplemented by an oppressive labour 
policy that involved the prohibition of strikes, the dissolution of unions, suppression of 
wages and a reform of labour legislation that relaxed regulations and allowed a 
dramatic decrease in employer social security and tax benefits to workers. The assault 
on organised labour and the rights of the Chilean labouring class would provide the 
necessary political climate in which to dramatically lower the conditions for the social 
reproduction of the working class. 2o 
19 Petras and Leiva 1994: 21. 
20 Notably, violent political oppression did not dissuade the World Bank from re-establishing a close 
relationship with the Chilean state, with seven loans for infrastructural projects made in the three years 
following the coup, and a total of thirty made in the period of the dictatorship. 
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Through repreSSIOn, the authoritarian regIme extinguished the immediate political 
dimension of the crisis. Nonetheless, the economic and social crisis remained and 
would elicit increasingly radical solutions. Notwithstanding the severity of the 
economic circumstances inherited from the Allende period, the first year and a half of 
the military regime witnessed a relatively gradualist approach to macroeconomic 
management that moved concertedly away from the structuralist emphasis of the 
previous two administrations yet avoided stabilisation through austerity. Crisis was 
attributed to the expansion of consumptive state expenditure alongside wage hikes that 
undermined the profitability of capitalist enterprise whilst reinforcing market 
distortions. Under the banner of reasserting the primacy of the market, the new regime 
lowered the price and wage controls implemented in the Frei and Allende periods, 
thereby reducing subsidies to working class consumption without allowing a 
compensatory rise in wages, and began to selectively reduce import tariffs. Social 
expenditure was also cut by over twenty percent, with senous implications for the 
quality of social services. 21 
Nonetheless, continued triple digit inflation, persistent economIC stagnation and a 
marked fall in the value of copper on depressed global markets pressured the military 
regime to adopt a more radical approach. Under the increasingly direct leadership of 
General Augusto Pinochet the military regime began to follow the prescription of a 
group of neo-classicist economists based at the Universidad Cat6lica in Santiago. 
These were the "Chicago Boys", so-called owing to their training by Chicago-schooled 
monetarists, who had played a key role in providing business interests and the Chilean 
21 Torche 2000: 557. Taylor 2003 provides a comprehensive critique of social policy in the Pinochet era. 
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Right with an alternative economic and social platform during the Allende period.22 
Their orthodox monetarist formula for societal transformation established a clear plan 
for setting Chilean capitalism back on its feet through a dramatic reversal of the state's 
relationship with society. As noted above, the regime initially shied from 
implementing the full shock therapy called for by the Chicago Boys owing to the 
anticipation of economic recession, social destabilisation and protest from across the 
social spectrum, including segments of the industrial bourgeoisie opposed to a dramatic 
reduction of protective tariffs. However, the relentless nature of the crisis and the 
growing influence of large conglomerates with a heavy concentration of liquid assets 
that could increasingly re-orientate production towards international markets opened 
the way for more drastic methods. 
Consequently, in 1975 the full fury of an austerity programme was unleashed with 
remaining price controls abolished, wages left to deteriorate under hyperinflationary 
conditions, a dramatic reduction in both tariffs and public expenditure, and a mass 
shedding of jobs in the public sector. By prompting the mass destruction and 
centralisation of capital, the regime's austerity programme of 1975 immediately thrust a 
significant proportion of the labour force into the reserve labour army. Even by the 
regime's generous understanding of what constitutes employment, over fifteen percent 
of the workforce was unemployed by 1975.23 Notably, the Chilean state itself was a 
principal subject in this decomposition. In 1974, before the mass-privatisations that 
would follow in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the state controlled twenty of the largest 
twenty-five Chilean companies, including the largest ten. 24 Consequently, public sector 
employment accounted for an extensive component of total employment, with 870,000 
~2 A detai led account of the development of the Chicago-school of monetarism in Chile is Valdes 1995. 
2.1 Dfaz (1993: 1) offers a breakdown of the military government's unemployment categorisations. 
2~ Ritter 1992: 13. 
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out of a total employment of shghtly fewer than 3 million in 1973.25 However, in the 
two years of 1974 and 1975 the state implemented uncompromising measures to reduce 
the fiscal deficit and to raise the profitability of state controlled industries. One-third of 
public employees lost their jobs, meaning that some two hundred and sixty-five 
thousand public sector employees were forced into the ranks of the reserve army.26 An 
expulsion of labour of this magnitude would have been politically inconceivable 
without the centralisation and prolific application of the means of coercion by the 
authoritarian regime. Public sector unions were amongst the strongest in Chile and 
faced intense repression in the post-1973 era and a ban on all local union activity. 
Concurrently, the sheer rapidity of the downsizing of the public sphere would also 
serve to damage the long term strength of these unions, represented in a reduction of 
the levels of unionisation across the board, as developed below. 
State industries were not alone in pursuing drastic restructuring that involved the mass 
ejection of hving labour from the production process. With both state and private 
industrial sectors in profound crisis, many of the branches of industrial production that 
had been steadily growing since the introduction of lSI-style pohcies in the 1930s 
underwent severe contraction. This trend was accentuated by the steady reduction of 
tariffs by the Pinochet regime between 1974 and the early 1980s, which introduced 
stem foreign competition in formerly protected domestic markets. Chilean industrial 
producers, whose productivity was below the global average, were faced with a 
dramatic intensification of the crisis. The necessary outcome of this process was the 
destruction of fixed capital, rapid deindustrialisation, and the large-scale expUlsion of 
labour from key industrial sectors where firms either folded or introduced new forms of 
'\ 
. Coloma and Rojas 2000: 519. 
26 Larrafn and Vergara 2000: 76. 
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mechanisation. In total, over one-quarter of the industrial sector workforce was 
jettisoned between 1974 and 1981.27 
Together these measures precipitated a profound contraction of demand, spelling the 
demise of many small and medium firms in the consumer goods and service sectors, 
and a deep recession with per capita GDP contracting by a staggering 14.4 percent. 
Manufacturing production would not recover to its 1972 levels until 1987.28 
Unemployment climbed above fifteen percent (refer to table 6:2) and real wages 
collapsed, with the share of wages in the national product declining from 62.8 percent 
in 1972 to 41.1 percent in 1976, a shift from one of the highest in Latin America to one 
of the lowest. 29 These dramatic increases in the size of the reserve army and the rate of 
exploitation constituted fundamental pillars in the long-term recovery of Chilean 
capitalism. As such, although the austerity package did not restore an immediate 
macro-economic equilibrium as intended, it nonetheless laid the basis for the greater 
transformation of Chilean society along the lines of the emerging neoliberal consensus 
within the military regime. 3o 
Table 6:2 - Unemployment 1970-1982 (percentage of economically active 
population):31 
Year Open 
Unemployment 
1970 5.9 
1975 15.7 
1976 16.6 
1977 13.3 
1978 13.8 
1979 13.5 
27 F' 19ures drawn from Foxley 1986: 40-1. 
28 A . gosm 2000: 107. 
21) 
Petras and Leiva 1994: 26. 
Emergency Unemployment + 
Employment Emergency 
Employment 
0 5.9 
1.9 17.6 
5.3 21.9 
5.6 18.9 
4.2 18.0 
3.8 17.3 
30 For details on the failure of monetarist policies between 1973-82 to establish the equilibriums expected 
by their exponents, cf. Fortin 1985. 
31 
From Mizala and Romaguera 2001: n4. 
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1980 11.7 5.2 16.9 
1981 10.4 4.7 15.1 
1982 19.6 6.5 26.1 
A second key aspect of the Chicago Boys' monetarist strategy was a profound 
alteration in the manner of articulation between domestic accumulation and global 
capital. The structuralist doctrine of national-developmentalism, in its quest for 
domestic industrial expansion, sanctified a form of development in which the 
weaknesses of domestic production were to be overcome through state mechanisms. 
The latter sought both to protect domestically located productive capitals by means of 
tariff barriers and to take a leading role in stimulating investment through a variety of 
measures, ranging from tax relief to direct ownership. The neoliberal solution was 
more radical. The Chicago Boy analysis of the stagnation and crisis of the Chilean 
economy centred around the rigidities that had developed within the economy owing to 
the limited mobility of capital. They related the latter to the stasis of capital in 
relatively ossified productive forms that entailed not only sizeable outlays on fixed 
capital but also an inflexible relation with the labour-force governed by the historically 
developed mediation of the state. Hence, the essence of the neoliberal solution was a 
shift in state policy in order to prioritise capital in its money-form rather than capital as 
production.32 An emphasis on liquidity was expected to enable capital to overcome the 
barriers to valorisation by escaping currently unprofitable engagements and 
concentrating in those sectors that offered more lucrative returns. Capital in mobile 
money-form would be able to seek a new and profitable relationship with labour, freed 
from established spatial and political constraints. 
l' 
. For a wider discussion cf. Clarke 1988; Gamble 2001. 
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A new dominance of capital in money-form was forged through the Pinochet regime's 
deregulation of both trade and finance. The implications were felt across Chilean 
society as liberalisation went hand in hand with a profound reorganisation of the social 
relations of production. In the financial sphere, alongside privatising banks and freeing 
internal interest rates, the regime removed restrictions and provided incentives for 
foreign capital to flow into domestic enterprises and financial markets. High interest 
rates were expected both to curb the inflationary spiral and attract inflows of foreign 
capital, although one serious consequence was a rapid overvaluation of the peso. 
Additionally, from 1977 the regime enabled domestic banks to borrow directly from 
international financial markets. A further corollary was the newfound ability of 
domestic banks to borrow at international rates and re-lend domestically at hugely 
inflated levels, making incredible profits and therein helping consolidate the 
increasingly important position of the financial sector (refer to table 6:3).33 
Table 6:3 - Distribution of payments to capital by main sectors.34 
Years Agriculture (%) Industry (%) Trade (%) Banking (%) 
1960-1970 10.5 30.0 22.4 1.0 
1981 7.3 20.9 27.8 18.0 
Concurrent to these changes in the financial sector, liberalisation allowed large 
economic groups that had access to international finance to use this credit to purchase 
or establish industries in the new export sectors and also to procure state industries that 
the regime was privatising at greatly subsidised prices. As such, this period witnessed 
an incredible concentration and centralisation of capital, expressed in the emergence of 
the "'grupos econ6micos". The latter were large conglomerates rooted in the financial 
33 Fortin 1985; Soederberg 2002b. 
34 F' 86 Igures from Fortin 1985: 1 . 
189 
sector and with vast yet constantly changing portfolios of investments. 35 When placed 
alongside the re-entry of foreign firms into the mining sector, this concentration of 
capital led to the domination of all key sectors of the Chilean economy by a handful of 
domestic economic groups and multinationals (refer to table 6:4). 
Table 6:4 - Concentration in the Export Sector by 1988.36 
Industry Number of Large Firms Industry Share 
Mining 7 97.1 
Agriculture 8 80.6 
Forest Products 5 78.4 
Fish Products 6 51.1 
Food 6 67.3 
Wine and Beverage 2 70.2 
Wood 7 78.6 
Paper, Cellulose 2 90.0 
Chemical Products 2 71.4 
With respect to trade, by June 1979 the maximum tariff had been reduced to just ten 
percent. This reinforced a reorientation of capital away from consumption goods 
production for the domestic market and towards newly emergent export industries, 
particularly primary produce such as fruit, fish, wine, lumber and metals. Intrinsic to 
this process was a mass decomposition and recomposition of the labour force. Ejected 
from the crisis-stricken industrial and state sectors, labour was only partially reabsorbed 
by the informal sector, the export processing industries and the service sector. 
Concurrently, a state-sponsored reversal of the land reform process served to transfer 
ten'ain away from the recipient peasantry, who retained only 31.1 % of land grants, and 
was either sold to emerging large-scale agro-capitalist enterprises (33.8%) or returned 
to former landlords (28.4%).37 Moreover, given the inability of those who retained 
their land grants to farm at a profit after the removal of agrarian tariffs and subsidies, 
J5 Hugo Fazio (2000) has provided the most systematic details on the grupos econ6micos. For other 
perspectives refer to Fortin 1985; Petras and Leiva 1994; Martinez and Diaz 1996. 
J6 F' 9 Igures from Petras and Leiva 19 4: 36. 
37 R' Itter 1992: 13; Green 1995. 
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many peasants were forced to sell their plots. As Marcus Kurtz has detailed, only 6.5 
percent of land sales were to another refonn parcel holder, resulting in a substantial 
concentration of land in agro-capitalist hands.38 Similarly, Cristobal Kay notes that by 
the end of this counter-refonn, only five percent of Chile's peasantry had managed to 
secure a family fann. 39 Reversing the agrarian refonn process in this manner served to 
increase urban migratory processes, thereby escalating the century-long trend towards 
initial primiti ve accumulation and expansion of the urban reserve labour army.40 
The cumulative effects of these processes was that between 1970 and 1978 secondary 
employment in general - comprising employment in the manufacturing, construction 
and utilities sectors - decreased from 37.8 percent of total employment to 24.4 
percent. 41 Although the primary export sectors of the Chilean economy began to 
slowly increase their dollar importance in Chilean production - with, for example, 
exports of lumber and fishmeal increasing by over forty percent between 1974 and 
198142 - these sectors did not constitute labour intensive branches of production and 
therein could not offer a significant outlet for the reserve labour anny. As a result, both 
unemployment and underemployment escalated dramatically, with unemployment 
reaching 16.6 percent of the labour force in 1976 and a further 5.3 percent of the labour 
force reliant on state emergency employment programmes (refer to table 6:2). These 
figures compare to an average unemployment rate of six percent during the post-war 
era .. 
n To the extent that a limited recomposition of labour occurred during the first 
crisis period, it was centred on the tertiary sector through the expansion of commerce 
38 
Kurtz 1999: 281. 
39 Kay, cited in Kurtz 1999: 282. 
40 R' lesco 1999. 
41 D' laz 1997: 167. 
42 Agosfn 2000: 107. 
43 H . 08 oJman and Ramsden 1993: I . 
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and services. Alejandro Foxely attributed half of the jobs formed in the recovery 
period of the late-1970s to these two sectors,44 leading to a situation in which tertiary 
sector jobs accounted for 64 percent of employment by the early 1980s, as opposed to 
46 percent in 1973.45 However, tertiary employment during this period has been shown 
to be largely spurious in nature, thereby merely acting as a refuge from open 
unemployment for a portion of the reserve labour army. Specifically, the expansion of 
employment in the tertiary sector was centred on a growth in small informal commerce, 
various private sector services, and public services provided through the large-scale 
emergency work programmes initiated and expanded by the regime. 46 
Far from solving the problems of Chilean capitalist development, the prioritisation of 
capital as money proved to be a significant cause of the succeeding crisis. By the late 
1970s monetarist policies had reduced but not tamed inflation. Concurrently, GDP 
growth levels above eight percent marked something of a recovery, notwithstanding 
that in 1979 per capita GDP remained only 95.5% of the 1971 figure. 47 Underlying this 
surge in economic activity was the entry of some US$6593.6 million of foreign credit 
from international financial markets between 1975 and 1979, a massive sum, equal to 
five years of copper exports. However, despite the proclamation of an "economic 
miracle" by the advocates of neoliberalism, the largely illusory joy was quickly 
dispelled. Although new forms of integration into the global chains of finance and 
commodity circulation certainly brought substantial reward to the large economic 
conglomerates that were able to partake in rentier activities and increase production of 
primary exports, Chile's balance of trade rapidly and profoundly worsened in the late 
44 
Foxely 1986: 42. 
45 Diaz 1993: 14. 
46 M ' 
artmez and Dfaz 1995: 120. 
47 F ' ortln 1985: 156. 
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1970s as the growth of imports far exceeded that of exports. The steady overvaluation 
of the Chilean peso bolstered this process and further undermined the profitability of 
domestically located productive capital, therein accentuating the ejection of labour 
from domestic production. Concurrently, much of the investment associated with this 
boom was ploughed into unproductive and short-term ventures. 
Far from freeing capital to establish the exploitation of Chilean labour on a new and 
profitable footing, many capitalists took advantage of the deregulations to avoid any 
relationship with labour at all. In this manner, a speculative bubble had quickly built 
up around sectors such as real estate. In order to compete against the unhindered entry 
of foreign consumer goods, surviving domestic industries borrowed heavily at high 
rates in an unsuccessful attempt to regain their market position by improving 
production technologies. Moreover, as the sustained inflow of international capital 
caused an appreciation of the peso vis-a.-vis the dollar, even the dynamic new export 
industries experienced stagnation and a contraction in profits.48 To compound matters, 
the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a drop of commodity prices on the world 
market and a mammoth hike in international interest rates, reaching eleven per cent in 
1982. Under these conditions short-term foreign investments in Chile were rapidly 
liquidated, the debts of Chilean capitals soon became unmanageable, and the Chilean 
economy plunged into deep recession. In sum, the inability of capital to incorporate 
labour within the production process displays the relatively fictitious nature of the late-
1970s "economic miracle" that was based principally on large inflows of capital into 
non-productive and speculative sectors, concurrent to a dramatic rise in the role of 
finance. The crisis that the Pinochet regime believed it had resolved through societal 
restructuring emerged again on a larger scale. 
4R Ritter 1992: 17. 
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3. The Debt Crisis and the Decomposition of the Working Class 
When the full force of the debt crisis rocked Chile the military regime was in disarray 
and reacted with a nai"ve hope that the markets would self-correct. However, as 
production fell by 16.7 percent, investment by over 40 percent, and official 
unemployment topped 26 percent, it became clear that the economy faced collapse 
without sustained state intervention. As such, facing a profound crisis of accumulation, 
the regime was propelled into action despite the neoliberal rhetoric of non-
interventionism. Intervention took three immediate forms: the takeover of collapsing 
firms by the state, the socialisation of $7.7 billion of private external debt incurred by 
Chilean capitals, and the dramatic expansion of the emergency work programmes that 
offered less-than subsistence wages to a significant proportion of unemployed workers. 
Subsidies offered to capitals in the two years of 1982 to 1983 - including full 
takeovers, assumption of debts, subsidised dollars and debt renegotiation - came to a 
total of 16.1 and 17.3 percent of GDP respectively.49 In desperation, the regime also 
signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1983, followed by a structural adjustment 
loan from the World Bank in 1985. These settlements served to bolster the regime's 
commitment to neoliberal policies by making a renewed commitment to neoliberal 
fundamentals the prerequisite for receiving financial assistance. As such, the regime 
not only committed to upholding the foreign debts of all state companies and major 
domestic debtors, but also to reverse the emergency import tariffs implemented in 
1982, cut state expenditure, remove the final vestiges of wage indexing, and initiate 
another wave of privatisations. 
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Attempting to re-establish macroeconomIC stability, however, did little alleviate the 
impact of crisis on the working class. The socialisation of the debts of the financial 
sector and the major economic groups did not impede capitals located in industrial 
sectors from once again either liquidating or ejecting living labour from the production 
process In an attempt to regain profitability. Consequently, the years 1982-3 
represented the worst point of crisis, reflected in the massi ve destruction of fixed 
capital and a new wave of labour expulsion from the productive process. This resulted 
in an additional expansion of the reserve army, contracting still further the price of 
labour-power, and imposing a greater degree of immiseration upon the working class. 
Employment in the secondary sector, as a percentage of total employment, dropped 
once more, from 24.4 percent in 1978 to 21.8 percent in 1986, with manufacturing 
falling from 19 percent to 15.6 percent.50 As visible from table 6:5, unemployment 
reached new highs with open unemployment almost doubling to just under 20 percent 
in 1982, a figure that excludes the 6.5 percent of the labour force participating in the 
regime's emergency work programmes. 
The bulk of the immiseration process fell most heavily on the industrial working class. 
Poverty amongst households whose primary wage earner worked in industry and 
construction rose from 8 percent in 1971 to 47 percent by 1987.51 In this manner, 
poverty ceased to be a status prevalent only in the rural and urban marginal sections, 
but became a universalised phenomenon amongst the working class. Whereas 
employment in industry or construction had previously offered formalised and secure 
work conditions and relatively high wages, crisis and restructuring obliterated these 
circumstances. Likewise, for workers in the commercial and service sector, poverty 
50 Dfaz 1997: 167. 
51 
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rates accelerated from 11 percent in 1971 to 42 percent in 1987.52 Only the working 
class employed within mining escaped the process of immiseration. In sum, from the 
1982 crisis until the close of the decade, just under one-half of the population occupied 
a position below the poverty line, and therein was unable to purchase the necessary 
goods for an adequate level of subsistence. Notably, this re-manifestation of crisis 
provided the conditions under which real wages underwent a second drastic decline. 
Eventual economic recovery in the later 1980s would not translate into rising wages 
but, on the contrary, a continued suppression of the price of labour-power marked the 
. d d 53 entlre eca e. 
Table 6:5 - Unemployment 1981-1991.54 
Year Open Emergency 
Unemployment Employment 
1970 5.9 0 
1981 10.4 4.7 
1982 19.6 6.5 
1983 18.7 12.6 
1984 16.3 8.3 
1985 13.8 6.9 
1986 12.1 5.2 
1987 10.9 2.9 
1988 9.7 0.8 
1989 7.9 0 
1990 7.8 0 
1991 8.2 0 
Unemployment + 
Emergency 
Employment 
5.9 
15.1 
26.1 
31.3 
24.6 
21.7 
17.3 
13.8 
10.5 
7.9 
7.8 
8.2 
With the mass ejection of workers into the ranks of the unemployed, the increasing 
pauperisation of the masses, and the emergent political organisation of community 
groups, the authoritarian regime faced a growing threat of social disintegration and 
political opposition. Under such conditions, it felt compelled to respond. Three major 
12 Leon and Martinez 1998: 30!. 
53 Stallings 2001: 52. 
54 From Mizala and Romaguera 2001: 214. 
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elements of this initial intervention can be highlighted and are addressed in tum below: 
firstly, the initiation of the emergency employment schemes; secondly, focused 
nutritional assistance for mothers and children; and thirdly, a more tightly focused 
social expenditure. New initiatives of this nature, however, did not entail a cessation of 
the regime's fierce quantitative welfare retrenchment in the traditional areas of social 
security, housing, education and health. What they did indicate was the tentative 
beginnings of a qualitati ve reshaping of various forms of welfare provision that would 
target expenditure towards a newly constructed category of the extremely poor. 
Although cautious in its initial application, this transformation in the form of state 
mediation of working class social reproduction would subsequently become one of the 
basic modes assumed by anti-poverty policy in Chile for the succeeding three decades. 
By introducing social mapping techniques that differentiated the working class 
according to income and vulnerability, expenditure could be focalised towards the 
extreme poor, thereby sustaining the social reproduction of the poorest sections of the 
working class in conditions of generalised pauperisation and expenditure retrenchment. 
In short, the regime anticipated a change in the form of social policy in order to sustain 
the reproduction of capitalist social relations whilst maintaining a drastic reduction in 
the content of social policy through a precipitous decline in the social wage. 
The most immediate and direct form of state intervention directed towards sustaining 
the social reproduction of the working class was the introduction of large-scale 
emergency employment schemes.55 As indicated by table 6:5, the emergency 
employment programmes provided work for a significant portion of the vastly 
expanded reserve army that had been ejected from the circuits of capital. In broad 
55 The World Bank cited these programmes approvingly as effective strategies to counter unemployment; 
World Bank 1990: 119. 
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terms, the purposes of these programmes were to manage the vast reserve labour army, 
and thereby mitigate some of the social and politically destabilising effects of mass 
unemployment, whilst concurrently upholding the disciplinary aspects of the wage-
form. At a time when up to 31 percent of the working population could find no 
employment through a relationship with capital or through informal labour, the regime 
attempted to reproduce the immediate capital-labour relationship through the surrogate 
auspices of the state. 
The programmes themselves were organised in a heavily authoritarian manner, with the 
reserve army being sustained at extremely low wages and the threat of immediate 
unemployment blocking any form of negotiation over salaries or conditions.56 
Described by observers as "the ultimate humiliation of the worker" ,57 enrolees were set 
to work on manual labour tasks, often linked to building infrastructure for the armed 
forces and the business sector. Carlos Fortin suggests that in 1981 the average 
remuneration for workers in the Minimum Employment Programme was equivalent to 
32.1 % of the minimum wage, whereas Carol Graham places the sum at a lower level, 
corresponding to one-quarter of the minimum wage.58 Concurrently, extreme pressure 
remained upon those enrolled to continue seeking employment in formal labour 
markets where subsistence salaries were attainable despite the depreciation in both 
wages and working conditions. In conditions of low wages and poor conditions, 
worker discipline was low and resistance was occasionally manifested in acts of 
dramatic sabotage, such as the attempted burning of a partially constructed 
amphitheatre in 1986. Nonetheless, maintaining the framework of the wage form and 
the working day for a significant portion of the vast reserve army served an important 
56 t' G c. raham 1991: 16. 
57 C' d He in Graham 1991: 17. 
58 Fortfn 1985: 182; Graham 1991: 13. 
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political purpose for the regime and for capital alike, even if the ability to impose 
discipline was repeatedly frustrated by participant resistance. At a more general level, 
the emergency employment schemes served to keep a substantial proportion of 
unemployed workers off the streets and provided a relatively cheap manner in which to 
prop up the social reproduction of the working class. 
4. The Second Wave of Adjustment 
In the medium-term response to the crisis, the regime began to deepen many of the 
existing reforms through amplified degrees of state intervention and, therein, enhance 
and consolidate the processes of social transformation. The recognition that the state 
would have to playa greater role in fomenting the conditions for accumulation has 
often been labelled as a shift from orthodox monetarism to "pragmatic neoliberalism".59 
Dramatically increased state intervention involved heavy expenditures, with average 
government spending as a proportion of GDP standing at 25.1 percent between 1983-
88, a figure 1.5 percent higher than in the 1967-72 populist period.6o Such 
expenditures, however, represented very different forms of intervention than those of 
the populist period of Frei and Allende. By socialising the debts of the private sector, 
moderately augmenting its activities In financial regulation, increasing its 
infrastructural investment, and selling public companies at below market rates, the state 
took a greater role in providing the supply-side conditions for capital accumulation. 
Following the economic debacle of the 1982-4 period, the regime and international 
advocates of its neoconservative policies proclaimed a second 'economic miracle' 
59 Cf. Silva 1996. 
60 MartInez and Dfaz 1996: 66. 
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encompassing the period between 1985-1989. This miracle was announced on the back 
of sustained GDP growth rates, with an average rate of growth of 6.7 over this period, 
or 4.9 in per capita terms. This expansion was credited to the regime's adoption of this 
deepened neoliberal strategy buffered with increased state mediation. This must be 
understood, however, in the context of a less miraculous combination of making up the 
massive idle capacity created by the severe drop in production during the recession 
period, added to the existence of a large labour reserve army and suppressed wages. 61 
Additionally, economic activity was centred upon the further development of the 'new 
growth poles' in the Chilean export economy, a boom in the unproductive sector of the 
economy (services and finance), and high international prices for copper. 62 If the 
period 1982 to 1989 is taken as a whole the performance is considerably less 
impressive with aggregate GDP growth being 2.6 percent annually, and per capita GDP 
at 0.9 percent. 
Four main pillars of the transformed policy approach can be discerned. First, the 
authoritarian regime began a concerted programme of devaluing the Chilean peso, 
precipitating an 80 percent reduction in the real exchange rate by 1988.63 The intention 
was twofold, to boost the competitiveness of Chilean exports on the world market 
whilst concurrently improving the conditions for foreign investment in Chile. 
Exchange-rate manipulation, however, was only one of the means by which the state 
sought to fortify Chile as a profitable site for global capital investment. Other measures 
that sought to remove existing restraints on profitability included the further abolition 
of taxes on wealth and capital gains, and the withdrawal of restrictions on foreign profit 
61 
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63 Schurman 1996: 94. 
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remittances.64 This policy programme benefited both foreign and indigenous capitals, a 
factor reinforced by the passing of law DL 600 that specifically guaranteed the equal 
treatment of foreign and domestic capital. By the mid-1980s, foreign direct investment 
began to flood into the Chilean export sectors, particularly the copper mining sector in 
which foreign companies reclaimed a position unseen since the early 1960s. 
Conspicuously, however, the regIme retained control of CodeIco, the extremely 
profitable state-owned copper company created in the Allende period and which 
provided a major source of fiscal revenues of which ten percent were channelled 
directly to the armed forces. 
Second, the recomposition of capital in export-orientated productive sectors continued, 
with a deepening specialisation in agricultural and raw material exports. State 
industrial policy, to the extent that it existed, involved arranging credit and 
informational services to the export sector, and particularly to large producers working 
with economies of scale in the relatively infant agro-export sectors.65 The majority of 
economic expansion that occurred in the 1984-1989 period was precisely in these new 
"dynamic poles" of Chilean production. Whilst in the 1960s the value of exports 
amounted to 13 percent of GDP, this had risen to 20.7 percent in the 1974-1981 period 
and underwent a further large jump to 29.6 percent in the 1985-1989 period.66 As 
indicated previously in table 6:4, the bulk of this expansion was performed under the 
aegis of the large economic groups who dominated the new-export sectors, although 
smaller capitals existed in some of the more peripheral activities that needed relatively 
little capital investment. In this way, the emerging recovery and subsequent productive 
boom based on primary exports in the later-1980s slowly began to reincorporate the 
M Moguillansky 2001: 178. 
6sSchurman 1996: 86; Kurtz200l: 15-17. 
66 Stallings 2001: 46. 
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vastly expanded reserve labour anny back into the circuits of capital. This re-
absorption was notable in a growth of urbanised labour forces involved in primary 
production, specifically fruit-picking, forestry, fishing and mining. Whilst traditional 
forms of agriculture were declining, the growth of agro-industry created a large sector 
of urbanised workers involved in forestry and fruit picking, particularly in the Bfo-Bfo 
and central valley areas respectively. Notably, as discussed below, in many respects 
the jobs created in the new export industries have proved the most under-regulated and 
precanous. 
In addition, new employment expanded in the unproductive sectors of the economy, 
with commerce and services rising as a percentage of employment in both formalised 
and informal forms. As a notable example of formal sector service extension, financial 
services rapidly expanded, growing from 2.4 percent of employment in 1970 to 4.8 
percent in 1986 and 6.8 percent by 1994.67 Despite this partial recomposition of the 
working class, however, it should be noted that a large reserve army existed throughout 
the decade, a corollary of the rationalisation of industrial capital brought about through 
crisis and the new concentration of capital in capital-intensive branches of production. 
Consequently, with the abundance of unemployed labourers and the restricted 
bargaining powers of unions, wage recovery was heavily stifled and in 1987 real wages 
remained at only 86 percent of their 1970 leve1.68 Likewise, the conditions of labour 
were also poor. Longer working hours were imposed across all branches of production, 
and were combined with minimal protection as workers experienced precarious 
employment tenure, especially given the regime's sanctioning of lax dismissal rules in 
conjunction with the proliferation of subcontracting practice in the export sector. 
67 D' laz 1997: 166. 
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Working conditions deteriorated to levels that, as Rachel Schurman indicates, were 
reminiscent of the industrial revolution. Twelve to fourteen hour days were common 
throughout the export sector, resulting in the proliferation of occupationally related 
. k 69 SIC nesses. In sum, a second dramatic rise in the rate of exploitation was a 
fundamental aspect of the post-debt crisis restructuring, and provided the basis on 
which Chilean capitalism could regain its profitability. 
The third aspect of the dictatorship's post-crisis restructuring concerned the dramatic 
reformulation of social policies. The reformulation of social policy, as one further 
moment of the extraction of the state from historically developed economic and social 
activities, comprised renewed large-scale privatisation alongside the imposition of strict 
fiscal discipline that incorporated a substantial reduction in social expenditure. Firstly, 
the dictatorship desired to transform social policy in a manner that would negate the 
historically developed forms of class struggle of the previous decades through a 
profound atomisation of social relations. This was to be achieved through processes of 
decentralisation and privatisation that would effect a recasting of the relations involved 
in social service provision. No longer would social services be conditioned on the 
mobilisation and articulation of various collective social subjects that levied demands 
on the central state apparatus. Rather, such relations were to be recomposed where 
possible as market relationships between individuals and firms. 
In harnessing the ideological manifestations of commodity fetishism, with the market 
constituted as the realm of freedom and equality in which the contradictions of 
bourgeois society appear erased, the authoritarian state sought to impose a framework 
of radical individualisation upon the relationships between state and society. In this 
69 
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manner, introducing the market into the sphere of welfare was presented under the 
veneer of increasing the efficiency of service provision to the benefit of all welfare 
'consumers'. The latter were now to be free to choose between those providers that 
offered the best services at the lowest prices. In short, the retreat of the state from 
service provision was juxtaposed with a correlate shift from a commitment to providing 
basic services as social rights to an emphasis on the freedom of choice of the user. 
Concurrently, the element of competition and the response of enterprises to public 
desires as indicated by market forces were suggested to create an optimal allocation of 
resources throughout welfare provision.7o Moreover, where the state was still involved 
in provision, processes of decentralisation were implemented in order to segment 
collective articulation into the localised realm of municipal governments that had been 
stacked with functionaries hand-picked by the Pinochet regime. Social service 
decentralisation was not only envisaged as a manner in which to fragment the 
subjectivities of service recipients, but also to disarticulate the national power of unions 
involved in the provision of services including, for example, the powerful teachers' 
union that had been a principal backer of the prior Allende regime. 
Secondly, under the justification of removing the pernicious effects of state intervention 
and concurrently increasing the element of user choice (and therein promoting 
competition between service providers), the regime encouraged private sector provision 
of key social services on a for-profit basis. This included a compulsory privatisation of 
social security and the creation of dual systems of health and education in which private 
enterprises would compete with each other and the state to provide services to paying 
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customers. 71 In many respects, this process offered a significant opportunity, 
subsidised by the state, for the emergent economic groups to increase their investment 
opportunities. Whilst the privatisation of the pension system offered the most 
significant profit making opportunities, particularly as it was protected by the guarantee 
of state intervention in the event of crisis, the prospect of providing profitable high-end 
medical care and private education also attracted capital. The nature of the 
privatisation processes deliberately offered investors the opportunity to adopt the most 
profitable aspects of service provision whilst leaving the state to provide a general 
safety net for the majority of the population. 72 
The necessary corollary of the privatising process, therefore, would be twofold. Firstly, 
the rapid privatisation of a broad range of state services induced a concentration of 
service providers. These were primarily drawn from the large economic groups who, 
enjoying privileged access to finance, were the best placed to capitalise on the new 
opportunities for profitable investment. Secondly, this created highly differentiated 
dual structures of service provision that displayed a pronounced stratification of the 
quantity and quality of services attainable in relation to the purchasing power of the 
individual. Unsurprisingly, privatised services would become the preserve of primarily 
the rich and upper middle classes, with the state maintaining a minimal form of 
intervention in the reproduction of the working class. 
Finally, with the shift from lSI to an export-orientated model predicated on primary 
goods with little value added during the production process (i.e. copper, fruit, wine, fish 
products and lumber), the regime sought a qualitative change in the form and content of 
71 It is beyond the remit of this chapter to offer a detailed examination of these particular reforms: cf. 
Taylor 2003 for an extensive critique. 
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social policy to articulate better with the changing fonn of the social relations of 
production. There are two dimensions to these tendencies. First, many of the fonns of 
social policy that had developed over the preceding four decades appeared not only as 
drains on social surplus but also as barriers to the free functioning of labour markets, 
thereby restraining a more flexible exploitation of labour. Secondly, the economic 
basis of the fonner structuralist emphasis on demand-driven accumulation - as 
advanced most strongly in the populist elements of the Frei and Allende regimes -
dissipated owing to the re-concentration of capital in export-oriented branches of 
production. It is correct to argue that, at an abstract level, capital has a contradictory 
relation to the reproduction of the working class.73 On the one hand, capital has a 
strong interest in minimising the social wage given that it presents an ultimate drain on 
surplus. Concurrently, however, capital also desires the expansion of the consumption 
and labouring potentials of the working class, particularly if accumulation is running up 
against the barrier of a limited market. 
These insights, however, need qualification not only in respect to whether accumulation 
is in an expansionary or crisis phase, but also according to the international division of 
capital and labour that spatially differentiates the distinct moments of the circuits of 
capital. Within the Chilean national state, the substantial reorientation of production 
towards global primary commodity markets created a situation in which the realisation 
of value embedded in Chilean commodities would occur to a greater extent in 
exogenous spatial locales. As such, for the large Chilean export capitals, the limit of 
the market would not be encountered in the domestic sphere but rather on global 
markets. Resultantly, the fomentation of internal demand was of little priority for the 
major economic groups whose accumulation strategies had been extensively 
7J 
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intemationali sed. Those capitals that retained their predication on domestic 
consumption were generally medium and small producers who, given their minimal 
political strength and their more marginal role in the accumulation process, would 
continue to struggle ineffectually for measures to boost domestic consumption 
throughout the dictatorship period and beyond. 
The fourth and final aspect of the dictatorship's restructuring involved the 
consolidation of the political domination of labour through a rigid new labour-code 
promulgated in 1979. The latter aimed at suppressing all forms of effective collective 
action in the realm of production and therefore provided a resolutely pro-capital means 
of regulating labour relations and resolving industrial conflict. By affecting both the 
conditions of the valorisation process and the distributive struggle between capital and 
labour over the price of labour-power, this measure was the primary medium by which 
the state intervened in the realm of production. 
Surrounding the decision to pursue this form of intervention were real tensions within 
the authoritarian regime. A significant divide opened between a corporatist-orientated 
element, located predominantly within the army, and the neoliberal current, represented 
principally by the technocratic advisors to the regime and key allies within the military 
junta. The former advocated the adoption of a populist position towards the working 
class, incorporating the labour movement into authoritarian state structures, and 
retaining a significant regulatory role over capital-labour relations. Such a position 
remained the rhetorical position of the regime until 1978 despite the state practice of 
almost unmitigated political repression. Alternatively, the technocrats were inclined to 
free all controls over wages and allow "market forces" to determine the level of wages. 
In response, the regime pragmatically decided to follow provisionally the indexation 
~07 
policy, portraying the decision as a fair and neutral policy towards wages that avoided 
the "special interests" of both capital and labour. This strategy avoided precipitating a 
greater breakdown in the level of wages and therefore partially stymied the growing 
crisis of the reproduction of the working class within capital. It also, however, created 
a large differential in the value of wages between those covered by the wage policy in 
the formal sector and the growing numbers that had been forced into informal 
employment. 
By 1979, however, growmg labour disquiet pushed the regIme towards a more 
comprehensive institutionalisation of labour relations. The Plan Laboral came into 
effect from 1979 through a series of legislative acts, and was modified consistently 
until the mid-1980s as the regime attempted to counter certain unanticipated 
implications and worker strategies that restricted the operation of the labour code as 
envisaged. 74 Following six years of generalised labour repression that left the previous 
mode of politically structured industrial relations in a state of limbo, the new code 
represented a defining moment in the institutionalisation of a new relationship between 
state, capital and labour. It occupied a key place in the dictatorship's strategy of 
institutionalising the new balance of class forces within Chilean society, and therein 
attempting to obliterate the established pattern of capital-labour relations forged since 
before the post-war period. Not only would it remain the touchtone of industrial 
relations for the rest of the dictatorship but also, as developed in the succeeding 
chapters, it would become the site of major struggle in the post-authoritarian period as 
various working class movements challenged the regressive aspects of this 
institutionalised form of labour relations. 
74 Cortazar 1997: ~.f~-~: Mizala and Romaguera 2000: 205-7; Barrera and Valenzuela 1986: 253-9. 
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The Plan Laboral re-instated the right to unionise whilst simultaneously eliminating any 
forms of compulsory unionisation such as those that had previously existed in the 
industrial sector. Moreover, the new code imposed relatively low quotas for union 
formation, a strategy intended to foment the creation of multiple, competing unions 
within each firm. Concurrently, funds for union activity would have to be drawn solely 
from contributions with no financial support from company profits. These edicts 
thereby re-established the right to unionise for the first time since the regime's 
suspension of union activity in 1973. However, several important exclusions were 
made, most significantly the prohibition of unionisation of public servants and 
temporary workers. Such exclusions forbade, respectively, the formation of unions in 
what had been previously a pro-Allende stronghold (public servants such as teachers), 
and also in one of the new dynamic poles of the export sector (fruit exports). With the 
latter reliant on large seasonal intakes of temporary cheap labour, the flexible 
exploitation of labour was viewed as imperative. Concurrently, unionisation for 
purposes of collective agreements was to proceed solely at the level of the individual 
plant. Inter-firm or inter-sectoral forms of unionisation were forbidden and federations 
could be established only to engage in mutual aid, education and cultural 
enlightenment. Finally, all union activity could be scrutinised by the labour 
inspectorate, and any suspicion of irregular activity permitted the inspectorate to halt 
unions from drawing upon their bank resources. 
Collective bargaining was re-established for plant-level UnIons, although within 
nan"owly defined limits that severely constrained the power that labour is normally able 
to derive from interrupting the production process. First and foremost, collective 
bargaining was restlicted to solely the wage question, could only happen twice per year 
at times set by the regime, and was not allowed to impinge on the conditions of work. 
~09 
This served to consolidate authoritarianism within the workplace, allowing capital to 
flexibly manage the labour process without politically imposed restrictions. Even 
granted its restriction to the wage question, however, collective bargaining is of 
minimal use to the workforce if it possesses no tools to exert pressure upon employers. 
In this respect, the regime curbed the right to strike by confining all strikes to a 
maximum limit of sixty days. For the duration of the strike, finns were entitled to hire 
non-unionised labour to cover the lost labour-power. Moreover, should a strike involve 
more than fifty percent of the workforce, employers could implement a lockout. If 
agreement had not been reached by sixty days, workers were expected to accept the last 
offer made by employers or be considered as resigned from employment. Finally, the 
code also granted employers one further instrument by which to effect disciplinary 
measures within the firm and to undermine collective action. Dismissal without reason 
was established in order to allow the finn flexibility over the size of its labour force in 
reaction to changing market conditions, but also to root out suspected subversive 
individuals if needed. One month's pay for each year of service was the stipulated 
compensation, although the regime imposed a maximum recognition of five years' 
service, therein greatly increasing the insecurity of workers in the absence of any 
generalised unemployment insurance. 
The new labour code was an integral part of the dictatorship's strategy of frustrating 
collective resistance to the power of capital and therein more sharply imposing the 
disciplinary power of money and market forces. By stripping labour of the ability to 
intervene collectively with any degree of effectiveness in the wage struggle, the state 
sought to remove collectively imposed restrictions upon the treatment of labour-power 
as a pure commodity. On the one hand, the regime established the basis upon which 
struggles over wages would be decisively stacked in the favour of capital. Therein, the 
political conditions would be established so that, when combined with the 1982 
recession, a second massive reduction in the standard of living of the working class 
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could be imposed. Indeed, once the new labour code had been established, the regime 
relaxed its previous wage indexation policy and, in the context of the 1982 crisis, 
abandoned it completely. Resultantly, wages were subjected to full market discipline in 
conditions of a vastly expanded reserve labour army. On the other hand, the new code 
also weakened the power of labour to impose regulations concerning the uses of labour 
power within the firm. Factors ranging from the length and intensity of the working 
day to the various tasks required of workers abruptly became out of the limits of 
collecti ve bargaining. In this manner, the importance of the authoritarian state in 
fostering the political conditions for an intensified exploitation of labour cannot be 
understated. 
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CHAPTER 7: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
IN THE CONCERTACION ERA 
1. The Collapse of the Dictatorship and the Limits of the Post-Authoritarian State 
The cataclysmic drop in social conditions following the 1982 debacle fuelled existing 
political discontent. Struggle was given an immediate impetus by the labour 
movement, which had been looking for ways to protest the repressive hue of the 
regime's new labour code since its implementation in 1979. However, fearful of the 
repression that had been levelled against strikes in the preceding period, it decided to 
call for generalised street protests as an alternative form of struggle that would avoid 
recriminations in the sphere of production and possibly generate a large enough 
movement to dampen the prospect of coercive suppression by the military. The 
strategy proved relatively successful. In spite of the spectre of coercion, numerous 
highly visible public protests in major cities were undertaken, therein helping to forge 
tentative links between the labour movement and other opposition forces. Nonetheless, 
the early protests remained sporadic, driven by this eclectic mixture of labour groups 
and social movements, including shantytown dwellers (pohladores) and clandestine 
political organisations. As argued by Alejandro Fernandez, the mobilisations did not 
constitute a single centralised movement, but were the point of convergence of several 
sectoral mobilisations with different degrees of organisation, spontaneity and 
combativeness. l It was only with the dislocation caused by the second crisis in 1982, 
added to the emergence and consolidation of contending oppositional leaderships, that a 
sustained protest movement emerged with added vigour between 1983 and 1986. 
IF' ernandez 1993: 68. 
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The first of a new and larger wave of protest erupted in May 1983 and regular 
demonstrations subsequently became a constant feature of the political panorama until 
the defeat of the dictatorship at the close of the decade. Although the labour movement 
and the urban poor remained the primary social base of the protest movement, 
opposition transcended class lines to include sections of the middle classes and 
bourgeoisie.2 The latter had largely been locked out of decision-making processes 
since the mid-1970s, a situation deemed intolerable when combined with the heavy 
losses incurred during the debt-crisis period. 3 In terms of leadership, in the years 
following 1984 a more consolidated directorship began to coalesce around a group of 
politicians connected to the old political parties. This led to the emergence of a 
formidable political opposition cadre in 1984 called the Alianza Democnitica 
(Democratic Alliance). The Alianza Democnitica was able to prosper over other 
political groupings, particularly the more radical Movimiento Democnitico Popular 
(Popular Democratic Movement), owing to its willingness to insert into authoritarian 
political structures, endorse liberal capitalism, and to court business support. Its two 
primary constituent forces, the old Christian Democrat and Socialist parties, had both 
undergone processes of reconstruction within the political environment of the 
dictatorship. Each placed the resurrection of a formal democratic state at the centre of 
their political practice and by the late 1980s both parties had announced strong support 
for an export-orientated development policy predicated on neoliberal macro-economic 
management. 4 
Ideological renovation was most profound in the Socialist party and created a deep 
rupture between the parties and movements of the left. On the one hand, the Socialist 
~ De la Maza 1999: 378. Also, cf. Salman 1994; Oxhorn 1995; Roberts 1997 . 
.1 cf. Silva 1996. 
4 
Roberts 1997: 163. 
213 
party reinvented socialism as a process of institutional change aimed at attaining and 
deepening democracy through the provision of greater civil and social rights within a 
liberal framework. This shift thereby facilitated their common cause with the Christian 
Democrats and provided the ideological framework for the moderate opposition to the 
dictatorship. In contrast, the Communist party and smaller radical groups remained 
committed to an insurrectionary counter dictatorship line and more radical notions of 
social transformation. 
Given this background, the Alianza Democnitica began to focus their political strategy 
on institutional openings provided for in the dictatorship's constitutional amendments 
of 1980.5 The latter, promulgated at a juncture wherein the insecure political 
foundations of the dictatorship had forced the regime to attempt to sanctify its position 
institutionally, provided for a referendum in 1988 that offered a choice between a 
further eight years of Pinochet's "protected democracy" or a return to civilian rule. 
Approaching the date of the plebiscite, the regime arrogantly yet sincerely believed that 
comprehensive victory would reinforce its political legitimacy by displaying wide 
popular backing for the project of subordinating society to the discipline of capital. 
The regime, however, placed too much faith in the ideological fortitude of its 
"economic miracle" and its "experiment in freedom", and therein greatly 
underestimated the strength of the opposition. Despite major advantages in terms of 
intimidation and media control, the dictatorship was shocked to find itself voted out of 
power by 54 to 46 percent. Acquiescence to the result within important sections of 
both the armed forces and business sector, and international pressure from the US State 
Department amongst others, ensured that the referendum was respected. In 1989 
national elections were held and resulted in a comfortable victory for a centre-left 
S cf. Fernandez 1993. 
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coalition led by the Christian Democrat and Socialist parties called the Concertacion, 
the leaders of which had played major roles within the Alianza Democratica. 
Notwithstanding defeat at the plebiscite and poles, however, the institutional 
framework still provided the regime with a year's grace period in which to prepare for 
the transition. 
As the climax of considerable political mobilisation, the fall of the Pinochet 
dictatorship in 1989 seemingly ushered in a new epoch for Chilean politics. Indeed, the 
social basis of the incoming Concertacion regime was precisely the popular 
mobilisation that had emerged to combat the dictatorship and that had subsequently 
delivered a clear electoral victory to the coalition. Although there was widespread 
recognition of the limited character of the victory over the authoritarian state, 
expectations remained high that the first Concertacion president, Patricio Aylwin, 
would harness marginalized social forces in a political movement directed against the 
perceived excesses of the dictatorship's authoritarian neoliberal technocracy. For their 
part, the Concertacion leaders announced a prospective programme of labour law 
reform, tax code revisions, increased social expenditure, new social programmes, a 
review of human rights violations, and constitutional reform. 6 Political practice, it was 
anticipated, would centre on democratising society and the state. 7 In essence, this 
would prove to be a liberal form of social democratisation by which the regime would 
extend civil and social rights to the working class and subaltern sectors. Nevertheless, 
a combination of structural and contingent factors would decisively condition the 
Concertacion's possibilities of action, leading to a situation in which the new regime 
would maintain and even deepen the pivotal tenets of the restructuring undertaken in 
6 Silva 2002: 3.+4. 
7 
Barton 2002: 367; also cf. Haagh 2002a: 209-211. 
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the dictatorship period whilst failing to deliver the expected degree of civil and social 
democratisation. To explain this disjuncture, the following section examines three 
factors in turn: the balance of social forces; the institutional form of the post-
authoritarian state; and the internationalisation of the circuits of capital. 
Firstly, the balance of social forces within the Chilean social formation was, and 
remains, extremely uneven. In a context of manifold political weaknesses amongst 
organised labour and progressive social movements, the more conservative wing of the 
Concertacion, rooted within the Christian Democrat party, was able to assert its 
predominance and adopt a heavily elitist ("cupular") style of politics that has served to 
insulate its political cadre from more radical voices within the grassroots of the 
coalition parties. 8 On the one hand, organised labour suffered almost two decades of 
systematic repression that, despite its figurehead role in the anti-dictatorship struggle, 
profoundly debilitated its political capacities. At a grassroots level, the union 
movement had been impeded by the preservation of the authoritarian 
institutionalisation of state-capital-labour relations and the subsequent sanction of anti-
union practices enshrined by this legislation. One major impact of the code was the 
formation of multiple small unions within enterprises, and a distinct lack of affiliation 
to labour bodies organised above the level of the enterprise, with only 44.2 percent of 
unions belonging to the national labour federation (CUT). 9 Moreover, owing to 
processes of deindustrialisation and privatisation, the movement was left devoid of its 
traditional heartlands in the industrial and public sectors and had to readjust to a more 
fractured membership, with smaller and weaker participating unions covering more 
diverse economic sectors. 
g cf. Taylor 1998. 
q Ruiz-Tagle 1993: 146. 
216 
Concurrently, at a national level, the political momentum of the anti-dictatorship 
movement had embedded a leadership drawn primarily from the Concertacion parties 
and strongly in favour of the new regime's moderation. Indeed, the initial reaction of 
the CUT was one of complicity with the Concertacion line, accepting the strategy of 
economic opening and cooperation with capital over production in return for a greater 
emphasis on investment in workers through training, education, health, pensions and 
job security. The leaders who presided over the transition period articulated a strategy 
that involved the suppression of labour's demands in order to help guarantee the 
stability of the democratic transition. Moreover, whilst frustration with the realities of 
the post-transition compromise would gradually induce a radicalisation of the CUT and 
eventual rupture with the politics of conciliation, the legacy of acute structural and 
political weaknesses compromised its ability to influence the Concertacion effectively. 
Indeed, one of the most telling signs of the weakness of the labour movement has been 
its inability to pressure the state into a more fundamental reform of the Labour Code, a 
factor discussed below. 
Similarly, whilst various social movements played an important role in the struggle 
against the dictatorship, political oppression and the effects of extreme economic 
marginalisation perpetuated weaknesses and factionalism within these small groups. In 
terms of their political impetus, many threw their limited weight behind the 
Concet1acion's electoral movement in the mid-1980s and became less visible after the 
victory of the latter. As indicated in Philip Oxhom' s detailed study of popular 
movements in the anti-dictatorship struggle, most had set their aims on re-establishing 
the procedural guarantees that would protect them from the routine abuses of 
dictatorship, and that would ensure a political process that was not immune from 
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popular pressure. IO Once the unifying principal of the struggle for democracy had 
dissipated, most social movements either disappeared or retreated onto issue-specific 
and geographically localised campaigns. Another trend that manifested itself as the 
decade progressed was the transformation or displacement of social movements by 
foreign supported and generally apolitical NGOs. Joe Foweraker suggests that 
remaining grassroots movements have been considerably marginalized by this process. 
Where they have chosen to interact with the state, they have been commonly 
subordinated as instruments of state policy and unable to effect notable policy change 
above the project level. Alternatively, where they have avoided interaction, they have 
often been reduced to marginalisation and ineffectiveness. I I 
In contrast to labour and grassroots movements, the organised bodies of capital 
emerged strengthened from the authoritarian epoch and, in the post-transition period, 
have proven well structured, highly mobilised, and presciently aware of the political 
strength stemming from concentrated ownership of the means of production. I2 
Capitalists, and particularly the large economic groups, have enjoyed mUltiple channels 
through which to assert political pressure. In terms of specific bodies, capitals located 
in each branch of production are represented by individual sectoral business unions, 
and a powerful overarching business union called the Confederaci6n de Producci6n y 
Comercio (CPC) represents the interest of large capital at a national level. To this must 
be added consistent representation by the political parties of the right, particularly 
through the close links forged between the CPC and the Uni6n Democnitica 
Independient (UDI). Given its organisational strength, capitalist organisations have 
enjoyed an active and privileged relationship with the government throughout the 
10 
Ox horn 1995: 17l. 
II 
Foweraker 2001: 847. 
I~ Silva 1998. 
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Concertaci6n period, and particularly under the administration of the Christian 
Democrat president Eduardo Frei-Tagle (1994-2000). All important policy initiatives, 
including fiscal and labour reforms, were negotiated through a dialogue between the 
Concertaci6n and the CPC. 
Second, despite the victory of the anti-dictatorship forces in the 1988 plebiscite, the 
military regime had not been overwhelmed by popular mobilisation. Rather, it suffered 
defeat within the parameters of a political framework that it had established. Crucially, 
this provided for it to retain provisional hold on all key aspects of institutional and 
coercive power during the transition. Presiding over the transition in this manner, the 
authoritarian regime enjoyed an extremely powerful position from which to influence 
the institutional form of the post-authoritarian state. In the period between the 
plebiscite defeat and the elections of 1989, the military regime and civilian 
representatives negotiated the constitutional framework for the transition of power. 
Within this process the outgoing authoritarian regime ensured that there existed 
mUltiple institutional safeguards (known as 'authoritarian enclaves') to Impose 
moderation upon the incoming elected government. These included the appointment of 
nine designated senators - including one from each branch of the armed forces and the 
national police - that would ensure that the political right enjoyed a majority in the 
Senate, and an electoral system that served to create an over-representation of the 
parties of the right. 13 
Such particularities of the post-transition state-form have greatly abetted the 
reconciliation of the Concertaci6n with a neoliberal trajectory by imposing political 
limits on the possibilities of government policy and also by serving as a convenient 
IJ For further details on these authoritarian enclaves refer to Portales 2000, Siavelis 2000. Taylor 1998. 
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device by which the Concertaci6n has been able to justify its moderation to the popular 
constituency. Nonetheless, the argument that the perseverance of authoritarian political 
structures alone can substantially account for policy continuities in the Concertaci6n 
era, made most forcibly by Petras and Leiva, cannot be sustained. 14 As the decade 
progressed, many of these institutional idiosyncrasies began to diminish in importance 
or, indeed, to operate in a manner that favoured the Concertaci6n. Concertaci6n 
President Ricardo Lagos stated in 2001 that the newfound willingness of the political 
right to reform the political process derives from the constitution currently being "on 
our side", yet this has occurred alongside little significant change in policy trajectory. 15 
Thirdly, drawing from the earlier theoretical chapters, it is expressly important to 
highlight that the Chilean state is intrinsically a capitalist state, predicated upon 
capitalist social relations, in both their national and global moments, and pressured to 
work within parameters imposed by such relations. As such, the possibilities and limits 
to state action are conditioned by the ubiquitous pressures to guarantee the expanded 
reproduction of social capital (or capital-in-general) upon which the material 
reproduction of society in its capitalist form - the state included - depends. In this 
manner, the Concertaci6n regime, like the dictatorship that preceded it, has sought to 
secure and further capital accumulation through the attempted subordination of self and 
society to the discipline of money as the most abstract form of capitalist social 
relations. Since broad integration with global capital circuits has necessarily created a 
substantial dependence of accumulation within the national social formation upon the 
global movement of money and commodities, subordination to the discipline of money 
has increasingly assumed the form of the discipline to world money expressing the 
14 
Petras and Leiva 1994. 
I) Financial Times, "Chile's Leader Takes Careful Path to Reform", London, 1 October 2001. 
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movement of value at a global level. It is within this context that the retention and 
deepening of neoliberal-style policies have remained an integral part of a strategy that 
aims to reassert continuously the validity of accumulation within the Chilean national-
state vis-a-vis the parameters imposed by the trajectory of global accumulation. 
For example, one of the principal forms in which the discipline of capital is exercised 
upon the actions of the contemporary Chilean state is through the constant necessity to 
retain flows of world money anchored within Chilean capital circuits. Owing to the 
accelerated processes of integration with global capital circuits, capital valorisation 
within Chile relies in no small measure upon the constant input of foreign capital, both 
as investment and as credit (e.g. PDI and short-term portfolio capital respectively). 
This constant influx of capital is necessary to service high-levels of private sector debt 
and to implement the technological advances necessary for sustained productivity 
increases to keep Chilean products competitive on global markets. Concurrently, a 
significant decline in capital inflows or accelerated capital outflows threaten to plunge 
the Chilean economy into serious crisis, as was acutely realised in 1998. 
In this respect, the intrinsic mobility of capital in its money form means that to attract 
and retain capital within the Chilean social formation places a strong degree of 
financial coercion upon the state to provide the most stable and profitable investment 
environment possible. In the contemporary global political economy, this concern with 
sustaining the conditions for capital accumulation implies a relative commitment to 
capital-friendly policies, as taxonomised by the IMP, World Bank, credit-rating 
agencies and other international financial actors. With the integration of indigenous 
capital with transnational circuits, however, pressure in no way emanates solely from 
external bodies. Domestic political pressures alongside the mundane mo\'ement of 
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macroeconomic variables also place considerable pressure upon the state to reproduce 
the conditions for the comparative advantage of Chilean products on global markets, 
through the management of trade policy and exchange rates alongside interventions in 
diverse social relations, including labour markets, production relations, and the material 
reproduction of key social actors. Given that the political project of neoliberalism aims 
to uphold the viability of Chilean capitalist accumulation through precisely this form of 
subordination of both state and society to the discipline of capital as a global social 
relation, there is a strong material basis to the Concertaci6n' s dedication to the 
neoliberal project. 
Within these parameters, the three successive Concertaci6n governments, headed by 
Patricio Aylwin 1990-1994, Eduardo Frei-Tagle 1994-2000; Ricardo Lagos 2000-2006 
respectively, have remained remarkably faithful to the basic tenets of a neoliberal 
approach to policy making. Before formally coming to power, the Concertaci6n 
pledged to recognise the sanctity of private property, institutionalise the dictatorship's 
economic model, and make no dramatic changes to the country's social structure. 
Explicitly, it promised to exercise fiscal prudence and refrain from the populist 
excursions of past Christian Democrat and Socialist governments in order to maintain 
the pro-business climate of the Pinochet years. 16 This did not entail a carbon copy of 
Pinochetista style politics. Unlike the Pinochet regime, which relied upon the 
systematically employment of coercion to fortify its position, the Concertaci6n operates 
in a formally democratised state apparatus that, for all its authoritarian idiosyncrasies. 
necessitates the establishment and maintenance of a strong electoral base. Political 
struggle within the electoral arena would add a further mediating link between state and 
society, and the legitimacy of successive Concertaci6n governments rested in no small 
16 cf. Portales 2000; Munoz Goma and Caled6n 1996. 
part upon their pledge to strive for social justice within the neoliberal model. In 
practice, whilst the Concertaci6n has maintained neoliberal and technocratic solutions 
to socio-economic issues in an attempt to promote the expanded reproduction of social 
capital, this has occurred alongside a moderate expansion of social programmes. The 
banner under which they christened this strategy was "growth with equity", a 
designation chosen to emphasise the confidence in the free market, export-orientated 
strategy and its amalgamation with a more progressive social policy agenda that would 
reincorporate those groups marginalized under the dictatorship's restructuring 
programme. Hence, whilst remaining true to the spirit of neoliberal macroeconomics 
introduced by the dictatorship, the Concertaci6n ideologues argued that innovative 
social policies could be used, primarily, to correct the market failures that restricted the 
benefits of economic growth from reaching all parts of the population and, in a less 
pronounced manner, to initiate a virtuous circle of increased human capital leading to 
sustainable and more equitable economic expansion. It is on this ideological basis, 
moreover, that the reformed neoliberalism of the Concertaci6n has been a source of 
inspiration for the spirit and content of World Bank policies throughout the 1990s and 
beyond. 
The argument of the current and following chapter, however, is that "growth with 
equity" represents not an idealist endeavour to refashion a socially just society, but 
rather a sophisticated political strategy that is grounded upon an appeal for the 
acceptance of politics within limits. All reform, argued the Concertaci6n, would 
involve change within a fourfold conjuncture of limits: namely, the limits of the 
stability of the democratic transition, the limits of the sanctity of private property, the 
limits of fiscal prudence, and, ultimately, the limits of the continuing success of 
Sustained accumulation. The contradictory heart of this strategy was expressly 
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manifested in the tension between the furtherance of intemationalisation and export 
competitiveness heavily dependent upon the maintenance of a relatively cheap and 
flexible workforce to work in a highly transnationalised, low-skilled export and service 
economy, as opposed to a commitment to the collective organisation of labour in order 
to challenge the prevailing conditions of production and distributional arrangements. In 
these circumstances, the "growth with equity strategy" soon developed into an attempt 
to mitigate the institutional confinement of production relations in the form crafted 
under the dictatorship by incorporating social aspirations primarily into the realm of 
social policy. On the one hand, this strategy would maintain the core conditions of the 
current trajectory of capital accumulation. On the other, it offered a strategy of 
translating and containing political struggle into an area where the state anticipated the 
ability to exercise greater control. 
To propose such an interpretation is not to suggest a crude instrumentality in the 
Concertaci6n's actions. On the contrary, the strategy emerged and evolved through the 
political struggles of various coalition factions within the circumscribed political-
economic environment. From this perspective, therefore, "growth with equity" 
constituted an evolving attempt to reconcile the tensions in the Concertaci6n's political 
position as a coalition whose electoral support and grassroots activism was based upon 
a pledge to ameliorate the conditions of social reproduction of the working class, with 
the three conditioning factors highlighted above: i.e. the material constraints of 
ensUling the expanded reproduction of capital in Chile, the institutional constraints of 
the post-transition state form, and the political balance of social forces. In this way, far 
from a static core of policy prescription, "growth with equity" would undergo processes 
of moderate change during three phases that loosely correspond to the three successi \'e 
presidencies. The Aylwin presidency would mark the rapid ascription of limits to the 
"growth with equity" strategy, as the outcome of struggles between the Concertaci6n 
and the political forces of capital and the right undercut many of the more progressive 
aspects of the reform package. Moreover, such circumstances heightened disjunctures 
and conflict within the Concertaci6n coalition itself. 17 The remainder of the Aylwin 
period and the majority of the Frei-Tagle regime witnessed a consolidation of "growth 
with equity" within the context of sustained economic expansion that eased temporarily 
some social tensions. Nevertheless, the dramatic conclusion of the economic boom in 
1998 put an end to the fragile social and political peace. Towards the culmination of 
the Frei-Tagle administration in 1999, the Concertaci6n encountered growing social 
and political tensions, and these would be manifested in a moderate shift leftwards 
within the Concertaci6n coalition prior to the 2000 elections, reflected in the choice of 
Ricardo Lagos, a member of the Socialist Party, as the Concertaci6n' s presidential 
candidate for the 2000 elections. 
As detailed in the following chapter, the succeeding Lagos presidency has reacted in a 
patchwork and contradictory manner to the challenge of maintaining social and 
political discipline alongside aiding the ailing accumulation trajectory. Renewed social 
and political polarisation in the current era has placed the greatest strains yet on the 
Concertaci6n and the paradigm of "growth with equity". Such strains, despite being 
pushed by the course of political struggle, are not merely contingent, but rest upon the 
contradictions at the heart of social reproduction under capitalist social relations and 
their current articulation within the Chilean national social form. To elaborate this 
argument, the present and following chapter detail the major trends in capital 
accumulation and state intervention in social reproduction during the period 1990-2000. 
17 P fl' ortales (2000) provides an excellent account of these con IctS. 
Immediately, however, the following section examines the Concertaci6n's handling of 
the paramount political issue of reforming the Pinochet era labour code. 
2. State and Labour Reform in the 1990s. 
The opemng to this chapter presented the argument that a pivotal aspect of the 
Concertaci6n's political strategy was that the nature of the political transition allied to 
the political-economic conjuncture heavily conditioned the political possibilities of 
refonning the institutional form of state-capital-labour relations. This may seem 
paradoxical given the strong ties between the labour movement and the political cadre 
of the anti-dictatorship movement. These political linkages seemed to promise 
considerable possibilities for reform following the plebiscite defeat of the dictatorship 
in 1988. However, the explicit and implicit limits to the new state form became 
reflected in a politics of limits, particularly in regard to the labour issue. The main 
question for the Concertaci6n policy elite concerned the degree to which organised 
labour would be permitted to strengthen its organisational capacity within the context 
of the inherited mode of labour regulation. Any prospects for a substantial fortification 
of the latter would be moderated still further within the course of political struggle, and 
these outcomes have been shaped within the conjuncture of the Concertaci6n's 
unwillingness to prejudice the material basis of the accumulation strategy, the ongoing 
political weakness of the organised labour movement, and the active struggles of the 
Chilean capitalist class to ensure moderation. 
The defining positions within the ensumg debate were clear. As detailed in the 
previous chapter, cheap and flexible labour with few rights to collective action has been 
central to the recovery and expansion of Chilean capitalist accumulation since the 1982 
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debt crisis. Moreover, the subordination of labour through political repression and 
material immiseration in the dictatorship period had been consolidated in a series of 
amendments to the labour code that denied basic rights to the working population. 
Accordingly, in the post-dictatorship period, various unions, social movement activists 
and many within the governing parties have stipulated that changes to the labour code 
to strengthen worker rights and fortify the power of organised labour were central 
aspects of any attempt to challenge the deep inequities of contemporary Chile. 
Contrarily, capitalist interests strongly opposed any substantive changes to the labour 
code arguing that, by impinging on labour market flexibility, reforms to the labour code 
would undermine the foundations of domestic accumulation to the detriment of all 
Chileans. In this manner, the issue of labour reform was constituted as a defining issue 
in the post-dictatorship Chilean political panorama and remained an issue of intense 
political conflict for the ensuing decade. 
In their election campaign of 1989 the Concertaci6n pledged to: 
[lJntroduce profound changes in the juridical position of 
organised labour in order that this provides workers with 
fundamental rights and allows the strengthening of labour 
organisations; so that the latter can transform themselves into an 
efficient tool for wage earner interests and become a substantial 
influence in the social life of the country". 18 
The Concertaci6n's proclaimed rationale was that, if the state was to observe the 
general tenets of a market orientated approach and therein refrain from sustained 
IS Cited in Hernandez Riquelme 1999: 93. 
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intervention in the economic sphere, a greater degree of labour organisation had to be 
pennitted in order that workers could protect their own interests in the sphere of 
production. This would be necessary because the state was to allow labour relations to 
assume the form of negotiations between two freely contracting social actors. As the 
Aylwin regime suggested: 
It is the involved social agents, through balanced, free and 
democratic relations, that will set the conditions of work. The 
state has the role of guaranteeing that the system functions and to 
generate permanent and stable rules so that the actors proceed 
adequately ... the state is not a third actor in labour relations. 19 
With organised labour strengthened, the argument proceeded, unions could increase 
their bargaining prowess and thereby ensure a more equitable distribution of the 
increased revenues that economic growth would bring. Under pressure from the labour 
movement, it was with recourse to such justifications that the Aylwin government 
undertook a first attempt at labour legislation following its assumption of power in 
1990. 
Nonetheless, the Concertaci6n regIme met with the determined resistance of the 
bourgeoisie in the organised form of the Confederaci6n de Producci6n y Comercio 
(CPC) that represented an agglomeration of capitalist interests, and particularly from 
the Sociedad de Fomento y Fabril (SOFOFA), the industrialists' business union. 
Activists from these groups involved in the government sponsored dialogue claimed 
that any reforms that significantly bolstered the strength of labour, and particularly 
19 . 
CIted in Ruiz-Tagle 1993: 1-+2. 
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those that hindered the ability of capital to eject labour from the production process, 
threatened to undermine the industrial stability that lay at the heart of the economic 
boom that had been ongoing since the mid-1980s. Applying neoclassical labour market 
theory, they vigorously defended a position that claimed that the interest of the 
common good was best served by a regulatory code that assured the utmost flexibility. 
The latter, they claimed, would ensure the optimal allocation of labour and provide the 
fullest levels of employment and wages. 
Under pressure from both capital and labour, and working within the confines of the 
post-transition institutional framework, the Aylwin regime carefully engineered a 
compromise solution by altering some of the content of labour legislation to offer more 
defensive rights to workers, whilst maintaining the basic form of capital-labour 
relations established by Pinochet. As such, the primary aim of the Aylwin regime's 
changes to the existing labour code was to establish a "labour institutionality" that 
would ensure long-term stability owing to the self-adherence of the major social actors 
through co-operation between capital and labour within the structure of the adjusted 
labour code. "Institutionality", therefore, constituted an attempt to form an industrial 
pact by providing a framework whereby organised labour acknowledged private 
ownership and investment as legitimate bases of the Chilean economy and recognised 
the need for stability and the suppression of ideology in negotiations. Within this logic, 
confrontation between organised labour and capital and the state in order to realise 
worker needs was deemed obsolete. Conversely, the private sector would accede to the 
necessity of moderately raising the minimum wage and, at a more general level, accept 
an augmented tax burden to allow for increases in pensions and social welfare to attain 
a more equitable division of the social product.2o In this fashion, the general hue of 
production relations could be left untouched whilst the burden of material compromise 
would be passed into the realm of social policy. It was on these grounds that, during 
the process of renovating the labour code, and despite the concerns raised by the private 
sector, the government remained adamant that reform would not fetter the flexibility of 
the labour market. 
Furthermore, at the same time as negotiations over the labour code reform were 
ongoing in the first two years of the democratic regime, growing antagonism between 
government and the labour movement became marked with the break out of strikes in 
copper, steel, coal, public health and state education sectors. Although these industrial 
actions were manifested primarily within the state sector, framed within a paradigm of 
grievances accumulated from the dictatorship period, and relatively long-lasting; the 
state remained firmly opposed to the strikes and they attained few of their material 
demands. To justify their rejection, the Aylwin regime claimed that, first and foremost, 
accession to the strikers' demands would affect its ability to maintain control over 
infiation. 21 Subservience to the discipline of money and the refusal to set a precedent 
of acquiescence to the direct demands of labour were clearly determining priorities for 
the new Concertaci6n regime and the defeat of the labour movement in these strikes did 
not bode well for the substantive content of the labour reform. 
Consequently, beyond the rhetoric of an abstract pact for industrial peace, the reforms 
led to few substantive changes in the relationship between enterprises and their workers 
or, at a more abstract level, between state, capital and labour. Firstly, under the 1980 
~o 
Munoz Goma and Caled6n 1996: 198. 
'1 
. Epstein 1993: 60. 
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code, employers had been granted the right to dismiss workers without giving reasons. 
The Aylwin government's new code stipulated that a reason for dismissal had to be 
provided. If a sacked employee believed the reason to be unfair, then he or she could 
attempt to pursue the issue within labour tribunals and, if successful, would receive 
compensation. Compensation for unfair dismissal, in tum, was increased under the 
provisions of the reformed code. Nevertheless, the legislation was rendered ineffective 
as employers were allowed to use the all-encompassing phrase "necesidad de fa 
empresa" [need of the company] as the reason for dismissal, thus maintaining highly 
arbitrary practises of hiring and sacking. Moreover, as a recent government report 
confirms at length, employers still routinely sack workers who have sought to create 
unions, either using the above loophole to justify the sackings or simply stalling or 
refusing to pay the fines if they are imposed by the overworked labour commission.22 
Unsurprisingly, the International Labour Organisation has repeatedly decried such 
activities throughout the decade; profoundly deploring the anti-union conduct of firms 
in Chile and highlighting many cases of union persecution.23 
Secondly, the right to strike was re-established, but with the proviso remaining that the 
firm is permitted to hire replacement labour (rompehuelgas) to replace strikers for the 
duration of the action. Similarly, the founding of numerous competitive unions within 
a firm was reaffirmed, the results of which have been to continue the movement 
towards smaller, less powerful unions that are in competition with each other within 
particular corporations. Fourthly, whilst the new code granted unions increased rights 
to form regional or national federations, no collective bargaining has been allowed to 
proceed above the level of the individual union vis-a-vis the firm in question. This 
22 P . + 
reInlorme 2001. 
23 EI Mostrador. "OrT acoge denuncia contra Chile por pnicticas antisindicales", 1 July 2001. Santiago 
de Chile. 
sustained a heavily reduced status for the national bodies of organised labour such as 
the primary national union organisation, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT). 
National federations of this ilk, although receiving fonnal recognition by the 
Concertacion, are reduced to acting as political pressure groups vis-a-vis the state. 
They can endeavour to establish national agreements regarding payor labour rights but 
these will not stand unless there is multilateral agreement between themselves and 
capitals in a particular sector over the tenns of such agreements, a possibility that has 
not occurred owing to the intransigence of capital. Given the leading role played by 
organised labour in the anti-dictatorship movement, the CUT and other labour groups 
were dismayed by the institutionalisation of a marginalized role. Frustration within the 
labour movement over this situation led to a growing radicalisation and combativeness, 
with the Communist Party becoming the leading political force within the CUT and a 
more antagonistic relationship with the state emerging. 
Finally, given the Concertacion's insistence on consensual agreements between capital 
and labour at the level of the finn, it also maintained the institutional grounds for forms 
of self-regulating labour relations called "convenios". Occurring primarily within the 
sectors of the fonnal economy where labour organisation was historically strongest, the 
technique of convenio has given added strength to employers seeking a more flexible 
relation with the workforce. A convenio signifies a situation where employer and 
employees give mutual consent within a non-regulated dialogue to a binding agreement 
on labour regulations and practise that falls outside of the institutionalised code. It 
creates an isolated relationship between employer and small groups of workers and 
forbids collective action and striking. Research indicates that convenios are nearly 
always formed on the suggestion of the employer and, often, their signing can involve 
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coercion or can fonn a prior condition for workers to gain employment.24 The principal 
results of convenios are to satisfy the employers' desire to diminish the possibility of 
industrial conflict and insulate workforce regulation from external interference whilst 
maintaining the tenor of the productive relationship with labour forged under the 
dictatorship. 
The new labour code therefore served to sanctify the continued processes of labour 
flexibilisation that had been introduced by the Pinochet regime. As elaborated in 
chapter five, the "flexibilisation of labour" is best understood as a process of removing 
the historically forged restrictions upon the treatment by capital of labour-power as a 
commodity. Flexible labour relations help to reduce barriers to accumulation by 
reducing the influence of state and union power over hiring and firing practises, the 
content of contracts, and supra-wage social benefits. By turning the relationship 
between employer and employee into an increasingly individualised relationship, one 
that is relatively free from collective control manifested either through state provision 
or bodies of organised labour, the power of capital over the tenure, nature and 
conditions of work can be amplified. Flexibility can therefore aid in the suppression of 
wages and increasing the hours and intensity of work by minimising collective 
bargaining, all trends that have been witnessed in Latin America over the last two 
decades, have fonned a key aspect of Chilean capital's reactions to global slowdown in 
the latter half of the 1990s.25 Flexibility also augments the ability of capitals rapidly to 
downscale assets or switch investments to maximise profit-making opportunities owing 
to reduced job security. In this manner, the flexible exploitation of labour can 
constitute an integral element of competitive advantage in the world market. 
~4 Henrfquez Riquelme 1999: 104 . 
• 5 l'f. Weeks 1999. 
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The consequences of the tepid nature of the labour reform also had manifold 
implications for the strategy of the labour movement at a national level. In this 
respect, the lack of a strong reaffirmation of the legal rights of the working population 
severely frustrated the formation of a strong national labour movement, both in terms of 
the number of union affiliates and the strength of the main national federations. In 
terms of union membership, organised labour numerically remains little above 
dictatorship levels. After a brief spurt of union growth in the first two years of 
Concertacion, which followed the momentum gained by the labour movement during 
the immediate pre-transition period, union membership and the incidence of collective 
negotiation has tailed off considerably. This depreciation is related to the anti-union 
tactics of employers, the practise of convenio, and a general cynicism towards the 
effectiveness of unions within the current framework. 
Table 7:1 - Evolution of Unionisation, 1988-1996.26 
Year Number Percentage Percentage Rate of Number of Average 
of umon unionisation unionisation collective umons number of 
affiliates of salaried of occupied negotiation umon 
workforce workforce members 
1988 446,194 15.8 10.5 10.0 6,446 69 
1990 606,812 19.8 13.4 13.4 8,861 69 
1992 724,065 21.9 15.1 15.1 10,576 69 
1994 661,966 19.3 14.0 14.0 12,109 55 
1996 655,579 17.7 11.8 11.8 13,528 49 
Considering that the Concertacion ideologues had placed the creation of a stronger 
labour movement that exercised greater potential for collective negotiation at the centre 
of their schema to achieve greater social equity, failure to support organised labour 
seliously undermines their proposed strategy. Those within the CUT have consistently 
sought the imposition at a national level of a higher minimum wage, a stricter coupling 
26 
De la Maza 1999. 
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of productivity increases to wage rises, and other generalised wage agreements. 
Nevertheless, at no stage over the 1990s did the CUT benefit from the political impetus 
to achieve these aims. Moreover, stronger unions at the level of the enterprise could 
have reduced such employer strategies as imposing convenios, arbitrary or politically 
motivated firing practises, and exploitative subcontracting techniques. In this manner, 
the effects of the tenacious repression of organised labour undertaken by the 
dictatorship have not been overcome, leaving the political strength of the union 
movement weak throughout the decade and compromising its ability to pressure the 
Concertaci6n. The tangible results of this conjuncture with respect to the trajectory of 
capital accumulation and the social reproduction of the working class are examined in 
the following chapter. First, however, the current chapter examines what has been 
presented as the core of the growth with equity strategy - renewed expenditure and 
novel initiatives in the realm of social policy. 
3. Growth with Equity and the 'Model' Reformulation of Social Policy 
The Concertaci6n's approach to social policy has been presented as a key dimension of 
the growth with equity strategy. As examined in the previous section, the new 
government did not fundamentally reshape the juridical forms that regulated the capital 
relation, thereby preserving the dictatorship's flexibilized legal mould for the sale and 
expenditure of labour. The political legitimacy of the Concertaci6n governments 
within the unevenly emerging liberal-democratic structures, however, would be in no 
small measure staked upon their promise to promote a more equitable form of 
neoliberal development. On assuming power, President Aylwin emphatically 
pronounced that: 
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Chile needs positive state action to move towards equity ... A 
moral imperative demands that Chile moves increasingly towards 
. I· . 27 SOClQ Justlce. 
The initial hallmark of the Concertaci6n's 'Growth with Equity' strategy in this respect 
was a tax increase on corporate profits - agreed with the Confederaci6n de Producci6n 
y Commercio (CPC) union of business leaders - to increase the resources devoted to the 
existing health and education systems and also to initiate several new programmes 
aimed at transferring resources to low-income sections of the populace, including the 
flagship FOSIS anti-poverty programme. This was part of the government's social 
reconciliation strategy, whereby they pledged to seek consensual arrangements between 
major social groups including business and labour groups over all key issues. The 
initial goal of this 'Framework Arrangement' was to provide the basis for tax and 
labour reforms through a series of meetings between the main bodies of organised 
business and labour, the CPC and CUT respectively. Whilst a consensus was reached 
over the tax reform, the previous section noted how disagreements plagued the 
negotiations over labour reform owing to the fundamental issues raised over the nature 
of production relations. 
Ultimately, the issue of labour reform provoked irreconcilable tensions between 
organised business and labour and, with the regime leaning to the side of business, it 
prefigured the ultimate demise of the attempted consensus strategy. Nonetheless, the 
Concertaci6n's pledge for a greater intervention in the distribution of the social product 
in order to divert more resources into social policies so as to ameliorate the sharp 
inequities produced by the two decades of restructuring remained. This intervention, 
2) Cited in Barton 2002: 369. 
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they warned, would be both gradual and would have to remain within the bounds set 
within the bounds of fiscal responsibility in order to maintain macro-economic 
balances. Concertaci6n ideologues were adamant that their new regime would not 
b t " I' t " 28 succum 0 popu IS pressures . 
Figure 7:1: Public Social Spending per Capita, 1989-2000 (in 2000 pesos).29 
I[]SOCial Expenditure I 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Caveats aside, the Concertaci6n indeed diverted increased taxation revenues towards 
social expenditure and also used part of these revenues to introduce a novel anti-
poverty programme called FOSIS. Not only did increased expenditures mark a 
significant break from the dictatorship's repeated retrenchments, but also the style of 
social policy reform in the Concertaci6n period would gain attention in international 
circles and, particularly from the World Bank. The return to a liberal democratic form 
of government in Chile, despite its perversion through authoritarian enclaves, offered 
the Bank and other observers an opportunity to show how the successes of the Chilean 
restructuring could be maintained and even built upon within a democratic political 
frame. In this respect Chile has been widely heralded as an affirmative example of the 
benefits entailed in conforming to the general parameters of an ideal-type neoliberal 
approach to social policy. This process had begun in the 1980s, and the strongest 
instance of the explicit propagation of a Chilean "model" remains the privatised 
pension system, which is the most widely cited "blueprint" for social security reform at 
's 
. Weyland 1999. 
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a global level and the basis for the World Bank's current prescription.3o Likewise, 
Nicholas Bruce argues that the Chilean health care refonns were also presented as a 
model worthy of emulation during the first wave of structural adjustment in Latin 
America in the 1980s, and this is reinforced by the heralding of Chile's health care 
reforms in the World Development Report of 1990?1 
More subtle, however, is the general recognition that the parameters of social policy 
reform closely approximate the World Bank's model, particularly as the 1990s have 
progressed. As noted in chapter five, Susana Sottoli recently suggested that the four 
pillars of neoliberal social policy transfonnation in contemporary Latin America, as 
promoted by the World Bank, are: compensation for the social costs of macro-
economic restructuring, selectivity and localisation of spending, privatisation of service 
provision, and decentralisation of remaining state responsibilities.32 The latter three 
features have been central features of the Chilean refonnulation of social policy since 
the mid-1970s, and an emphasis on social compensation has been a further feature of 
the Concertacion's legitimation strategies, fonning the central axis of 'growth with 
equity'. Once again, the latter closely mirrors the concerns and prescriptions to be 
found in the most recent World Bank "World Development Reports".33 
In this sense, Chile represents perhaps the closest approximation of the type of 
neoliberal reformulation of social policy currently promulgated by the leading 
international financial institutions, a factor reinforced by the consistent recourse to 
Chilean examples in the World Bank's annual World Development Reports from the 
30 Mesa Lago 2002. Also cf. the articles at http://www.pensionreform.orglchileanmodel.htm 
31 
Bruce 2000;World Bank 1990: 85. 
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. Sottoli 2000; also cf. Laurell 2000. 
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early 1990s to the present. For example, the breadth and pervasiveness of the Chilean 
model concept is well illustrated by a plethora of World Bank research documents that 
point to Chilean models in such diverse realms as community internet provision, water 
resource management, electricity provision, and fighting corruption in pharmaceutical 
purchasing.34 Moreover, the FOSIS anti-poverty programme provided a clear template 
for future World Bank development practise in terms of its decentralised and 
participatory design. Consequently, in an era where the formation of national social 
policy in the global South is being progressively shaped by the Bank's comprehensive 
approach to structural reform, it is important to both examine the reasons for this 
elevation to "model" status, the wider role of social policy reform within the trajectory 
of accumulation in Chile, and the subsequent limits to this aspect of the growth with 
equity strategy. 
4. The Concertaci6n and Social Policy 
In response to the social pressures that underlay the collapse of the dictatorship, the 
Concertacion staked a significant portion of its political legitimacy upon a commitment 
to comprehensively increase social expenditure. Between 1989 and 2000 public social 
expenditure was almost doubled and the increases have been targeted in a fairly 
effective manner towards the lower-earning quintiles of the population. It should be 
noted, however, that these increases follow years of expenditure reduction by the 
military government and that public services in the late 1980s were generally 
recognised to be bordering on a state of crisis. Furthermore, although expenditures 
have been increased with positive ramifications throughout the social services, there 
.14 http://wblnOO 18. worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsflB y+Country%2Fch ile+i nf+pubs'JOpen View 
239 
remain acute structural problems owing to the internalised dual system of private and 
public service provision. 
Sustained increases in social expenditure have been at the heart of what the 
Concertaci6n has labelled its neoliberal development trajectory that gives due 
consideration to social issues. A 'responsible' social strategy of this nature is 
contrasted to the older forms of Chilean populism as it rigidly grounds the expansion of 
social expenditure within the constraints of embedded neoliberal macro-economic 
management. Increased social expenditure in this manner is often cited as an example 
of how the state retains considerable room for manoeuvre within the confines of 
globalisation even in the realm of welfare provision, an area that is often presented as 
an anachronism in face of increasing global competitiveness.35 Nonetheless, such 
optimism needs to be partially qualified by an understanding of the concrete conditions 
that allowed the aforementioned development. 
In this respect, the decade-long expenditure increases were tightly correlated to the 
primary material export boom that lay behind the posting of an average GDP growth 
rate of almost eight percent between 1990 and 1997. This period of expansion, as 
examined in the following chapter, was predicated on massive inflows of foreign 
capital, high prices for Chilean primary exports, and the continued suppression of 
labour through pervasive flexibilisation processes. Whilst recession at the end of the 
decade brought the average rate of expansion for 1989-2000 down to 6.3 percent, this 
figure for economic expansion is greater than that of total state expenditure (S.5 
percent) within which social spending was increased at a greater rate, the average 
annual increase being 7.1 percent. In short, the growth of social expenditure within the 
1\ 
.. e.g. Teeple 1995. 
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threshold of fiscal responsibility is heavily dependent upon a continued trajectory of 
sustained accumulation. The latter, in tum rests upon the maintenance of labour in a 
highly flexibilized and precarious position, one that accentuates vast discrepancies in 
income and leaves a substantial majority of the population below or within one 
minimum wage of the poverty line. 
I 7 2 I d fS 0 IE dOt 1974 2000 ( arty average, 1970=100)36 Tab e o 0 n exo oem xpen lure - lye o • 
1974-1981 1982-1984 1985-1989 1990-2000 
78.3 97.2 86.4 115.6 
Placed within the larger structural conjuncture, which must be traced back to the 
recasting of these sectors under the Pinochet regime, it is possible to comprehend why, 
despite the sizeable increases in public spending, it was still common at the tum of the 
millennium for analysts to talk of manifest problems within the social sector. Despite 
the reforms to social security, pension prevision remains the major component of state 
social spending, amounting in 1998 to 40.8% of public social spending, a figure that 
corresponds to 6.11 % of GDP (refer to table 7:3). It is pertinent to note, therefore, that 
the largest increase in absolute state social spending went towards raising the value of 
the state emergency pension, and therein to compensate those that were marginalized 
from the private system by raising the value of the state pension above the subsistence 
line, although not above the poverty threshold. 37 Similarly, the most dramatic increases 
were in health and education, whose annual resources were increased by 135.4 percent 
and one 165 percent respectively between 1990 and 2000. This augmentation, 
however, is tempered when it is recognised that the base rate for comparison was that 
of the dictatorship that, as detailed above, had drastically cut all types of social 
expenditure and particularly that of health and education. 
36 F' 19ures from Stallings 2001: 51. 
.17.\ comprehensive critique of the privatisation of the pension system can be found in Taylor 2003. 
T bl 7 3 Pubr SOl E dO b S 19 38 a e ° . IC oCla xpen Iture ty ector, 89-2000. ° . 
Average Annual Cumulative Increase % of total Public Social 
Increase (%) (%) Expenditure (1998) 
Health 8.1 135.4 17.9 
Housing 3.9 52.7 7.4 
Social Security 5.7 84.8 40.8 
Education 9.3 165.0 24.5 
Monetary 5.9 87.3 4.0 
Subsidies 
Others39 11.7 238.7 5.5 
Total 7.1 112.4 100.0 
To this end, the chapter will briefly outline the continuing transition of education and 
health provision during the 1990s, examining the effects of the increases in social 
expenditure within the largely unmodified framework of service provision inherited 
from the dictatorship. Subsequently, the chapter ends by looking at the lynchpin of the 
Concertaci6n's anti-poverty policy, the FOSIS programme.40 
a) Education and Health Reforms 
In contrast to the dictatorship, the Concertaci6n repeatedly championed the role of 
education as an integral aspect of improving the country's productive structure and in 
providing for greater equality between citizens. However, despite the overall increases 
in state education funding, the most important structural refonn undertaken by the 
Concertaci6n has been to allow privately owned yet state subsidised schools to charge a 
supplementary 'co-payment' for each attending student.41 Whilst this reform has 
allowed these private yet state subsidised entities to increase their resources and 
pedagogic quality, it has been at the cost of increasing the polarisation of the various 
38 MIDEPLAN 2001b; MIDEPLAN 1998. 
)9 Others includes social inversion targeted a priority groups and executed through institutions such as 
FOSIS. 
40 The issue of the Concertaci6n's housing policy is not considered here. Refer to Ducci 2000 for a 
thorough review. 
41 Raczynski 1999. 
sectors of education provision. In short, the Concertaci6n's refonns have taken the 
commodification of education a step further than that accomplished under the 
dictatorship. Whilst in theory, any school is allowed to levy a co-payment, the 
tendency has been for a polarisation of schools according to spatial differentiations 
primarily along class lines. Those schools that have been able to levy greater extra 
charges are those that are located in middle or upper class areas and service a clientele 
that is able to afford the increased costs. With greater resources, these schools are then 
able to ride a virtuous circle of increased student attraction, leading to greater revenues. 
Conversely, schools in primarily working class neighbourhoods are commonly state 
schools or privatised schools that suffer from a lack of resources and risk becoming 
"waste-basket" schools.42 For these schools, the circle is a vicious one, and a common 
way of maintaining the school within the competitive environment of the semi-
privatised system has been to borrow money. Jaime Gajardo suggests that, in order to 
keep schools solvent, certain municipal education authorities have been forced to 
borrow money leading to 45,000 million pesos of municipal debt.43 As Gustavo Rayo 
and Gonzalo de la Maza indicate: 
Poor municipalities face serzous difficulties in maintaining 
significant social programmes, not only because of structural 
financial restrictions, but also for the deficit in programme 
financing inherited from the previous decade.44 
Consequently, in reinforcing the dualised education system, sharp distinctions in 
quality between private and public education continue to penneate the entire spectrum 
4' 
. Haagh 2002e: 28; Helg0 2002. 
4, Gajardo 2002. 
44 Rayo and de la Maza 1998: 431 (author's translation). 
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of educational provision, therein consolidating rather than undermining the educational 
stratification of Chilean society. Such polarisation is clearly displayed in the following 
tables. Not only does table 7:4 reveal that the percentage of students receiving the 
various levels of education remains highly stratified according to income, but the table 
7:5 demonstrates that the quality of education varies greatly according to the same 
income factor. Under the dual system the class dimension of educational achievement 
is reinforced as lower-class children attend lesser quality schools whereas the children 
of the richest families monopolise the highest achieving schools. 
T bl 74 P ta fEd f IC b I Q' I 9 4S a e : - ercen 1ge 0 uca lona overage • y ncome ulnti e, 1 96 . 
Education (child age) Quintile I Quintile II Quintile III Quintile IV Quintile V 
Pre-School (2-5) 22,3 26,8 30,0 36,8 48,4 
Primary (5-13) 96,5 98,4 98,0 99,4 99,7 
Secondary (14-17) 75,3 81,0 89,3 95,3 97,2 
Further (18+) 8,5 15,1 21,5 34,7 59,7 
Table 7:5 - Percentage of Income Quintile in Schools Ranked in Quintiles 
Acc d' t S 'St t M th f T t (M t l't R' 1996).46 or mg 0 uccess In ae a ema ICS es s e ro~o 1 an eglOn, 
Per Capita Quintiles of School Performance 
Income Quintile (ranked according to Simce Results) 
I II III IV V 
I 32,9 27,3 22,0 14,0 3,8 
II 23,2 22,3 24,9 20,2 9,4 
III 18,9 20,6 20,2 23,1 17,2 
IV 8,7 14,1 18,3 31,0 28,0 
V 3,7 8,3 10,8 16,2 61,0 
In contrast to the suggestion that a quality education would be available to all Chileans 
by introducing market incentives and the element of choice into the reformed education 
system, it is clear that considerable inequalities exist in the provision of education. 
These both reflect and reproduce the general polarisation of Chilean society. Some 
authors suggest that the failures of semi-privati sed education relate to failures of 
information resulting from the unfamiliarity of low-income parents with the new 
45 FNPSP. 2000. 
46 
From FNPSP 2000. 
system, and therein their inability to make rational decisions in relation to the education 
of their children.47 However, to posit such an argument over twenty years since its 
introduction and in disregard of the manifest structural problems associated with the 
dual system is hardly sustainable. Other studies strongly indicate that the higher 
achieving schools deliberately seek to discourage less educated, working class parents 
from enrolling their children in the belief that this might lower standards and 
compromise profit maximisation.48 In short, the element of choice and quality within 
the education system remains significantly reliant on income. This necessarily entails 
that those that have gained most from the improvements in educational provision are 
precisely those who are able to pay for their children to attend the better schools, a 
factor that throws considerable doubt on the government's claim of the role of 
education as a great equaliser. 
Similar problems also remain in the health system owing to the structural contradictions 
introduced by the dictatorship'S privatisation processes. Having pledged in the 
transition period to reinvigorate the deteriorated health system, the new government set 
out to solve some of the problems of health provision through sustained increases in the 
resources destined to the public sector (FONASA). However, the overall structure of 
the health system has been left predominantly unchanged and increased expenditure has 
proved unable to mitigate the systemic failures. The major problem is that dualised 
healthcare provision has created a strong structural bias against the state system. 
Entrance into the private health-care system is structured upon class, gender and age 
lines. Older women and men, and particularly women who fall in the age range 
deemed statistically probable to become pregnant are faced with prohibitively increased 
47 
e.g. Beyer 2000. 
48 
Carnoy and McEwan 2000: 14. 
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premiums or, in some cases, are just rejected by the private companies (ISAPREs). On 
the other hand, middle age high-income (and low risk) males are prime ISAPRE 
material. The fiscal implication of this is that, despite incorporating only a minority of 
the population into private healthcare, the elevated economic position of ISAPRE 
members means that ISAPREs absorb the majority of total health-insurance 
contributions. In this way, the profit-making private health funds are able to siphon off 
the population statistically less likely to need health services alongside the greater part 
of mandatory contributions, whilst the state sector with less resources must provide for 
the majority of the population including those sections most likely to require sustained 
health services. 
To compound this situation, observers note that many ISAPRE system members prefer 
to use the public health system for most non-serious medical treatment in order to 
protect their 'no-claim bonuses'. Also, many of the lower-income entrants to the 
ISAPRE system enjoy only partial coverage and once again must revert to the public 
system for the more costly forms of medical attention (Cid, 2001: 5). As such, the 
public system operates as a pressure valve that absorbs many costs of the private 
system and therein -despite the costs in terms of equity and effectiveness - serves to 
augment the profitability of that sector. By 2000, ISAPRES accounted for 23 percent 
of the population yet this section of the population provided for two-thirds of the total 
mandatory health-programme contributions. Even when the Concertaci6n's direct 
funding of the public health sector is taken into account, the ISAPRE system still 
monopolises 46 percent of total health resources. 49 Unsurprisingly, the standard of care 
within the private system is still considered to be vastly superior and, moreover, the 
49 C. Id Pedraza 2001: 6. 
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higher salaries paid within this sector continues to attract the better-qualified medical 
staff. 
Whilst such extreme structural biases may seem irrational outcomes, they are actually 
the entirely logical result of the neoliberal dualisation of health provision that the 
Concertaci6n has not fundamentally challenged. Public-private partnership in 
healthcare provision, contrary to its proclaimed benefits in terms of efficient private 
sector involvement, downsizing of state action and an increasing freedom of choice for 
users, continues to prejudice the health care of the majority and place an increasing 
burden on the state in order that a small percentage of the population may indeed enjoy 
the benefits of high quality health care. This is not to dismiss the effects of the 
Concertaci6n's expansion of healthcare spending. It is evident that the introduction of 
more resources has aided the public system's partial recovery from the calamitous 
effects of the dictatorship's retrenchment. Nevertheless, even in September of 2002, 
The Economist judged that despite the threefold increase in health expenditure since 
1990, the public system had not overcome two decades of under-investment and 
suffered from considerable overstretch.50 The results of the Concertacion's increased 
funding, therefore, have been well below what had been hoped for in terms of 
improvements in the quantity and quality of services offered by the public sector. 51 
b) FOSIS and Anti-Poverty 
The Fondo de Solidaridad y Inversion Social (FOSIS) was the lynchpin of a series of 
measures introduced by the Concertacion that had the objective of transferring 
50 The Economist, "A New Prescription", September 14th 2002, London. 
51 R 
aczynski. 1999: 139. 
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resources to the poorest sections of Chilean society. Established in 1990, it came into 
full operation in 1991 under the direction of the Ministry for Planning and Cooperation 
(MIDEPLAN). The first notable aspect of FOSIS is that, despite its claim to be the 
"child of democracy", it was actually designed according to the experience of 
community organised survival strategies and non-governmental organisations that had 
been formed during the dictatorship in order to cope with the effects of the crisis in 
terms of mass unemployment and impoverishment. The guiding principles of FOSIS 
were those common to social funds seen elsewhere in Latin America, i.e. targeting, de-
centralisation, cost-efficiency, complementing but not duplicating traditional social 
policies, and involving the public sector, private sector, NOOs, and communities in 
h· 52 partners IpS. Certain aspects of FOSIS's general design, however, were more 
specific to the Chilean venture. 
Firstly, FOSIS operates on the tenet that poverty should be tackled through integrating 
the income generation strategies of the poor to the mainstream of the Chilean economy. 
In this respect, FOSIS projects are not aimed at merely redistributing resources in the 
form of direct cash transfers, but rather look to foment the productive and social 
capabilities of the poor, preferably through community based and participatory 
projects.53 This mirrored a conception that many amongst the very lowest deciles of 
income earning are self-employed or involved in certain informal activities with little 
integration with the formal economy owing to a lack of infrastructure of skills. The 
latter goal was intended to dovetail with the regime's desire to integrate what it 
)2 As discussed in chapter five; also cf. Tendler 2000 and Sotolli 2000. . 
)1 The type of projects that FOSIS money is directed towards are fourfold: 1) capacity generatlon 
assumes 30.17(' of the budget, with 8.5% of that aimed exclusively at rural areas; 2) supporting micro-
enterprises takes 22.9%; 3) FOSIS has a Youth Program division that accounts for 13.3l,7( of budgeting in 
order to facilitate training schemes (Chile Jovell); and 4) 19.3% of the budget is allocated to support 
groups that are considered vulnerable, such as neighbourhood women's groups. The remaining 13.5% is 
spent on management and overheads. including the wages of the four hundred staff involved in FOSIS. 
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considered marginal communities with the rest of Chilean society. Secondly, FOSIS 
was not to be a temporary measure but rather was estimated to become a permanent 
fixture in the government's poverty alleviation strategy. Thirdly, FOSIS was not to be 
solely reliant on state funding but the projects should seek to mobilise funds from other 
sources, principally the recipient communities themselves and the network of NOOs 
established in the dictatorship period. Finally, the primary method for selecting both 
the projects to be financed and the intermediaries to undertake them is through public 
bidding, i.e. FOSIS operates through a competition system in which communities 
and/or individuals and NOOs put forward their projects and those adjudged to be the 
best are awarded the resources. 
There is a small but detailed literature on the technical problems with FOSIS in a 
problem-solving vein.54 Whilst fixing technical problems within FOSIS is clearly an 
important concern for those involved in the programme, the following paragraphs 
highlight two key dimensions of a wider critique of FOSIS as an "anti-poverty" 
strategy. It is undeniable that, over the decade of the 1990s, the resources provided by 
FOSIS programmes have indeed helped many individuals and communities mired 
below the extreme poverty line in Chile improve their material circumstances.55 
However, when more abstract concerns are raised concerning both the form of FOSIS 
as a means of regulating poverty, it can be seen how FOSIS fits within the wider 
neoliberal paradigm of disciplinary societal restructuring and, therefore, is one moment 
of a political strategy aimed to promote social discipline in order to sustain the 
conditions for expanded accumulation. 
\4 Barrientos 1999 provides an account of many of these debates; also cf. Parker et al. 1999. 
55 The FOSIS website, at www.fosis.c1includes plentiful accounts of successful projects. 
Firstly, at a technical level, it is important to note the limits of the FOSIS as an 'anti-
poverty' programme. Despite this label, FOSIS is not designed or intended to impact 
upon the wage poverty that, even after a decade of economic growth, afflicts over 
twenty percent of Chilean workers. In contrast, FOSIS is actually targeted at the 
population living in conditions of indigence (extreme poverty) that are generally 
marginalized from what could be called "formal" economic structures.56 In this sense, 
similar to other smaller initiatives by the Chilean state, FOSIS is best conceptualised 
not as an anti-poverty programme but as a programme that aims to raise the extreme 
poor up to the level of poor. It attempts, therefore, to provide the means through which 
the most isolated and marginalized communities can rejoin the category of employable 
wage labour and reinsert themselves in the hyper-flexibilised Chilean labour markets. 
In this manner, the forms of social provision provided by FOSIS are in no way a form 
of decommodification in the manner suggested by authors such as G¢sta Esping-
Andersen: namely, a mediation between individual and market that reduces the 
dependence of the former on the latter.57 In contrast, FOSIS aims to provide the 
physical and human infrastructure to remove barriers from market participation as a 
means of development. As such, FOSIS, like the current World Bank development 
prescription examined in chapters five and nine, aims precisely to link marginalized 
popUlations more fully into capitalist social relations and, simultaneously, the 
integration of the extreme poor more closely into the abstract disciplines of market 
relations - particularly that of capitalist work. The contradictory dimension of this 
56 The distinction between non-poverty, poverty and indigence is inherently subjective and open to 
statistical manipulation (cf. Szekely 2001). However, in this respect the chapter follows the designations 
llf the Chilean government, with the poverty-line defined as a household income level necessary to be 
able to satisfy the basic needs of the household. Indigence is a situation whereby basic nutritional needs 
cannot be satisfied (cf. Chacon 1999: 183). In this respect. FOSIS cannot be satisfactorily considered an 
anti-poverty programme according to the government's own categories. 
57 'E 
c/. sping-Anderson 1990. 
process, however, is the inability of capitalist social relations to guarantee the social 
reproduction of the working class and, specifically, the tendencies to create a fractured 
working class from which a significant portion is constantly marginalized from the 
work relation. Whilst in the early 1990s, the dramatic expansion of accumulation and 
rapid labour market growth appeared to negate such considerations, the return to crisis 
and a sudden expansion of the reserve labour army in the later 1990s - as discussed in 
the following chapter - has highlighted clear limits to the FOSIS strategy. 
In spite of its 'anti-poverty' label, therefore, FOSIS is more accurately understood as 
part of a framework of institutions intended to regulate poverty. As confirmed in 
interviews with the state social development ministry, the only "anti-poverty" 
programme per se is the government's macro-economic policy. 58 Indeed, the levels of 
funding through FOSIS are limited and account for fewer than five percent of the social 
spending budget (refer to table 7:3 above). These limited material resources mitigate 
the possibility of FOSIS programmes having a large-scale impact that could influence 
the greater structural trends of inequality and impoverishment (both relative and 
absolute).59 In fact, following the period of rapid economic growth in the 1990 to 1996 
period, the percentage of the targeted population in conditions of indigence has 
remained static, with even a small increase in the late 1990s, therein confirming the 
limited material ability of the state to ameliorate the poverty associated with the 
structuring of the working class under capitalist social relations. 
Secondly, on a political level, the form of the FOSIS programme selection process, 
which obliges potential recipient communities to compete for resources by subjecting 
.\X Interview with MIDEPLAN directorate, May 2002. . 
59 More cynical critics suggest that its primary function is to provide a series of showcase projects; ct. 
Petras and Leiva 1994. 
their project proposals to a regional competition, involves a strong disciplinary 
mechanism. The process of allocating resources starts at the centralised level, with the 
programme directors in MIDEPLAN distributing the available funds proportionally to 
the regions they feel are most in need of programmes. They then indicate to the 
regional authorities what they feel are the specific communities within these regions 
that should be targeted. Subsequently, the regional government establishes a working 
committee that includes municipal authorities and other public service groups who 
disseminate the information concerning the sums of FOSIS money available to the 
communities. The latter then are encouraged to design projects within the threshold of 
the stipulated aims of the FOSIS programme. Subsequently, these proposals are 
submitted to the working committee, which selects the 'winning' proposals at an open 
meeting. This process of successive decentralisation was considered as essential to 
responding to the specific needs of the poor in particular locales and to facilitating their 
greater participation within the formulation, design and undertaking of projects.60 In 
this respect, FOSIS is once again an important forerunner of World Bank participatory 
development projects that aim to make sizeable gains in efficiency and legitimacy as 
compared to centrally created programmes. Moreover, once the projects to be funded 
are established, bidding between service providers (private firms or NGO) for contracts 
can take place if a specific provider was not stipulated in the project blueprints. 
The competition form of FOSIS anti-poverty delivery clearly undercuts any notion of 
universal welfare or social rights. For example, close to a third of the FOSIS budget is 
directed towards "capacity building" to enable poor communities to implement projects 
to improve their local living infrastructure. That communities have to compete to 
receive funds for make basic infrastructural improvements, including the installation of 
60 
Raczynski 2000; Barrientos 1999; Angell et al. 2001. 
street paving, lighting and drainage, runs against the political articulation of the popular 
movements that emerged in the dictatorship period, which claimed the universal right 
for communities to receive these basic services.61 Activists and analysts have 
suggested that because communities now have to compete against each other for access 
to FOSIS resources to undertake basic infrastructure initiatives trans-movement and 
community solidarity has been fragmented, therein undercutting the basic proposition 
of the popular social movements fashioned in the 1980s that all communities had rights 
to these services/amenities.62 In this respect, FOSIS can be suggested to have 
contributed to the reformulation of community social movements, a process that Ton 
Salman highlights as characterised by "disintegration, withdrawal from the public 
realm, and individualistic strategies for integration.63 
Similarly, if the unbending acceptance of the limits to politics within capitalist social 
relations could be successfully imposed, the Concertacion saw the possibility of 
transforming the swathes of grassroots movements that combined political opposition 
to the dictatorship with communal self-help into willing technical facilitators of social 
programmes such as FOSIS. The institutional form of FOSIS required both communal 
social movements and wider non-governmental organisations to play the leading role in 
project design and, often, implementation.64 As Joe Foweraker has ably demonstrated, 
social movements have been largely displaced by or transformed into generally 
apolitical NOOs that are often financially and technologically dependent upon, and 
therefore increasingly influenced by, specific foreign agencies. The original aims of 
grassroots movements to act as a significant motor of social change, therefore, have 
61 On the 'pobladores', see Salman 1994, Oxhorn 1995. 
62 
Taylor 1998: 210; Rayo and de la Maza 1998. 
6) S I a man 1994: 85. 
64 Barrientos 1999. Parker et al. 1999 theorise this as a process of "bui lding social capital". cf. Fi ne 
200la for a trenchant critique of the weak theoretical basis of this concept. 
been considerably marginalized by this process. Where they have chosen to interact 
with the state, they have been commonly subordinated as instruments of state policy 
with limited political influence beyond the technical issues of project implementation. 
Concurrently, where avoiding interaction has often led to marginalisation and 
ff ' 65 ine ectlveness. 
In this manner, when considered in its wider socio-political context, the character of 
FOSIS as one moment of a larger disciplinary social restructuring project becomes 
more evident. This is not to suggest that FOSIS is a static instrument employed to 
secure the legitimation of the Chilean status quo, although it does have a significant 
ideological role as evidenced by the amount of publicity given to the project. On the 
contrary, the creation of FOSIS accords primarily to the extent of popular mobilisation 
of the popular sectors in the dictatorship period and the desire both to build upon this 
mobilisation as well as set institutional limits to its potential directions. Resultantly, as 
a form of regulating poverty, FOSIS marks a considerable improvement in both 
technical content and substantive process from the authoritarian programmes that 
characterised the dictatorship period. As Gustavo Rayo and Gonzalo de la Maza 
indicate, beyond their material aims, social funds such as FOSIS: 
Operate as a linkage and structure of dialogue between state and 
. I 66 grassroots socra movements. 
In this manner, social funds, like all other institutionalised forms of state-relations, are 
an object of struggle and open to continual challenge and pressures for reform from 
6S 
Foweraker 2001: 845-9. 
66 R ' I') ayo and de la Maza 1998: 431 (author s trans atlOn . 
actors on both sides of the relationship. Nonetheless, gIven the institutional fonn 
created within the confines of the immediate post-authoritarian period, FOSIS closely 
reflects the Concertaci6n's strategy of diverting the social expectations of the 
population into the realm of social policy where it envisaged being able to exercise a 
greater control. Although FOSIS indeed necessitates a specific degree of social 
mobilisation from recipient communities, the form of this mobilisation is one of intra-
community competition and requires communities to focus on perfonning technical 
tasks to further their insertion into the market mainstream. It therefore displays 
significant tensions between, on the one hand, social mobilisation and the attempt to 
depoliticise~ and, on the other, community expectations of empowennent to material 
betterment and the peculiar character of capitalist development.67 These important 
themes are re-addressed in the conclusion when we return to the World Bank and its 
reinvention of social development at the tum of the millennium that borrows heavily 
from programmes such as FOSIS. 
67 With regard to the Chilean experience, however, more independently undertaken case studies are 
d 'd k t' ct'se cf (e u ) RJ)'o and de la l'.1aZ,1 nee ed to chart how the tensions have tende to wor ou In pra I , ' 'e' 
1998, 
CHAPTER 8: CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE 
POST-DICTATORSHIP PERIOD 
The present chapter concludes the examination of capitalist development in Chile by 
bringing together the major lines of analysis present in this thesis to explain the 
trajectory of accumulation in Chile in the 1990s. In so doing, it provides an account of 
Chilean capitalist development over the 1990s that differs greatly from those, such as 
the IMF and World Bank, that stress the impact of Chile's adherence to correct policies 
within a 'good governance' framework.! The chapter not only offers a considerably 
different explanation of the productive boom that occurred between 1990 and 1997 by 
emphasising the particular (global) social relations that underscored the expanded 
reproduction of capital; but it also highlights and explains the many contradictory social 
tendencies that are generally ignored by neoliberal advocates, including inequality and 
unemployment trends, labour flexibilisation, the prevalence of wage poverty and the 
limits to social policies. To this end, the chapter charts the principal macro-economic 
policy directions of the Concertacion and examines the trajectory of Chilean 
accumulation during the 1990s. It therefore highlights the nature of the economic 
boom that occurred between 1990 and 1997 and the subsequent crisis, erupting between 
1998 and the end of the decade. Within this, close attention is paid to the relationship 
between capital and labour vis-a.-vis employment, wages and conditions of work during 
the boom and bust cycle, therein linking with the discussion of the previous chapter. 
This permits an examination of how the political limits imposed on the collective 
organisation of labour were reflected in the course of capital accumulation and how, by 
the end of the decade, they had become a primary object of struggle for a newly 
combative worker's movement. Given the proximity between Chilean labour and 
I . 
d. (e.g.) ladresic and Zahler 2000: 12; Aninat 2000. 
social policies and World Bank best practice models, this section provides a more 
concrete critique of these institutional reforms. 
1. State, Capital Accumulation and 'Growth with Equity' 
Given the robust conditions for capital accumulation present in the final years of the 
dictatorship, the Concertaci6n acceded to power at a relatively auspicious moment. Not 
only had the restructuring processes - abetted by heavy state intervention - recreated 
the conditions for strong accumulation predicated upon high levels of exploitation and 
the centralisation of indigenous capital; changing world market conditions 
simultaneously altered the pattern of capital investment on a global scale and conspired 
to tum Chile into a favoured site for international financial investment. With a 
generalised crisis of overaccumulation manifesting itself in the capitalist core through 
an abundance of capital without sufficient profitable investment opportunities, the 
1990s were marked by a renewed proliferation of financial flows to preferred locations 
in the global South.2 Within this context Chile appeared as a particularly favourable 
option owing to political stability, a well-disciplined labour force, a government that 
offered benefits to foreign capital operating within its borders, and a wide range of 
investment opportunities afforded by Chile's uniquely rich natural resources. As such, 
Chile experienced huge inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the early and mid-
1990s (refer to figure 8: 1), investment that particularly targeted the dynamic and 
profitable sectors of the Chilean export economy. Some fifty-seven percent of foreign 
investment went directly into the primary sector, with copper extraction leading the 
way.3 Concurrently, financial flows of a more short-term and speculative nature also 
, Lemco and MacDonald 2001: 86. 
3 . 
Morgutllansky 2001: 187. 
increased, although remaining below the levels of PDI. Such was the mass of capital 
flowing into Chile that the Aylwin government, faced with a rapidly appreciating 
exchange rate that threatened the viability of Chilean exports, felt compelled to 
implement a minor capital control (the Unremunerated Reserve Requirement, URR) to 
moderate the entry of foreign capital. 4 
Figure 8:1 - External Financing - Net Direct Investment in millions of dollars.5 
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Both FDI and portfolio inflows were encouraged by the actions of the Concertacion, 
which actively fomented the attractiveness of Chile as a site for global capital. Given 
that export expansion linked to foreign direct investment had been the engine of 
accumulation during the final years of the dictatorship, accentuating the integration of 
domestic accumulation processes within international capital circuits was a primary 
goal of the Concertacion. Trade policy constituted a significant tool in this regard. 
Consequently, the first two Concertacion governments of Aylwin and Frei successively 
cut remaining import tariffs to below the levels of the Pinochet regime, resulting in a 
flat rate of 7 percent by 2002, and have sought and completed the signing of several 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. This process has served to make Chile the 
most open country in Latin American in terms of the movement of goods. Although 
differing in their precise terms, free trade agreements now cover relations with the 
4 
cf. Soederberg 2002b. 
5 
From CEPAL 1999: 502-3. 
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NAFfA countries, the MERCOSUR and the European Union. Both of the post-1994 
governments have pushed for full entry into the NAFfA and, whilst this aim remains 
currently unfulfilled, the most recent agreement in 2002 has been a further bilateral 
trade pact with the United States.6 
Reducing tariffs and promoting free trade agreements has served two primary purposes 
in Chilean accumulation strategies. On the one hand, successive agreements with 
various countries and trading blocks during the decade have permitted the expansion of 
markets for Chilean exports, particularly in respect of the European Union and NAFf A 
block that maintained punitive duties on many of Chile's key exports, such as wine and 
salmon. Contrary to a previous concentration of exports to North America and Europe, 
by the mid-1990s Chile export destinations were substantially diversified, and East 
Asia consumed a greater quantity than either the NAFT A or EU blocks. With legally 
binding trade agreements, the Concertacion regime sought to ensure a varied set of 
international options for the realisation of value within Chilean products. Secondly, the 
inverse side of the free trade agenda was the opening of Chilean markets to foreign 
products, particularly consumption commodities. Whilst the domestic agricultural 
sphere and consumer goods sectors would have to contend with competition from more 
efficient foreign producers,7 the overall effect of integration with these global capital 
circuits would be a reduction in the price of consumption items and, therein, a lowering 
of the value of labour-power within the national ambit thereby increasing the rate of 
surplus value production. 
6 Stiglitz 2003: 1. 
) It should be noted that all Concertaci6n governments have employed additional variable duties on 
several agricultural products, including wheat and vegetable oil, which continue to protect some 
domestic producers. 
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Concurrent to this deepening of the free-trade policy, the Concertaci6n has continued to 
court foreign capital by using the state apparatus to help secure the conditions for 
profitable investment. A renewed commitment to fiscal restraint, heralded by 
neoclassical economics as a sine qua non of business confidence, has been a primary 
aim of successi ve Concertaci6n governments. For example, the current Lagos 
administration, suspected as the least likely of the Concertaci6n administrations to 
confonn to fiscal discipline owing to its socialist heritage, has adopted a strategy of 
strictly linking government budget levels to macroeconomic indicators in order to 
submit to the discipline of monetary movements. 8 Tight fiscality in this manner, 
alongside the imposition of market discipline on wages, brought inflation down to 
extremely low levels relative to historical levels. Between 1992 and 2001 the weighted 
average annual rate of inflation was maintained at an extremely low 3.72 percent.9 
Likewise, the Concertaci6n has also attempted to mediate the downward pressures on 
the real exchange rate in order to benefit the exporting sector, despite the cost of 
incurring a significant current account deficit, which reached 6.3 percent of GDP in 
1998.10 
Outside of macro-economic management, the Concertaci6n continued the process of 
privatisation initiated by the authoritarian regime. However, whilst it has been noted 
that the latter provided a significant subsidy to capital by underselling public 
companies, the Concertaci6n has operated a policy of open, competitive bidding. Over 
the course of the decade a combination of the privatisation of state-owned companies 
and the leasing out of state service provision to the private sector earned the state some 
R 
CEPAL 2001b: 135. 
9 H . enta~e Foundation 2003: 140. 10, L 
bcubar 1999a: 18. 
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$2.5 billion. II The privatisation of water treatment, telecommunications, electricity, 
transport, and infrastructure creation and maintenance, are prime examples. Proceeding 
beyond the privatisation of state owned productive enterprises and social services, the 
Concertacion approach has involved opening new areas and forms of investment to 
domestic and foreign capitals, including techniques of semi-privatisation through 
conceSSIOnary and associational forms of public-private partnership.12 Notably, 
partnership in this sense has fomented a particular increase in openmg new copper 
deposits to exploitation through joint extraction by the state copper industry and foreign 
companies. New forms of semi-privatisation have also contributed to the attractiveness 
of fresh sites for foreign investment. For example, transnational capital in the 
construction sector has grown from minimal levels at the end of the 1980s to a situation 
in which fifty percent of investment is foreign and, moreover, where companies backed 
by foreign capitals take some seventy-two percent of public-works contracts. 13 These 
initiatives increased the prospects of foreign investment and offered the state 
considerable, albeit short-term, income. However, a second strong motivation behind 
the new privatising wave was to jettison public companies that were performing 
inefficiently and in which the government preferred to avoid undertaking restructuring. 
Given the unavoidable confrontations with labour that restructuring would entail, the 
state preferred to avoid direct political ramifications. Specific examples are the 
privatisation of major water treatment companies, such as Essel and Essal, both of 
which were subjected to harsh rationalisation following private takeover, as discussed 
below. 
II A · nInat 2000: 2. 
I' 
. Hachette '::000: 125. 
I] F . 
azto 2000: 36. 
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Outside of the financial sector, the five hundred finns that comprise the Chilean 
corporate sector retained their heavily concentrated ownership characteristics. In 
addition to the influx of foreign capital into mining, electricity and telecommunications, 
the IMP notes that the forty large economic groups that consolidated in the late 1980s 
hold the vast majority of the equity of these incorporated finns.14 Not only has 
governmental privatisation opened new areas for foreign investment, but also 
continuing processes of tax incentives and deregulation throughout the decade helped 
promote foreign investment. An exemplary example is the booming copper sector, 
where FDI investment at the beginning of the 1990s was profoundly superior to all 
other sectors of the economy, partially owing to the initiation of several "mega-
projects" that explored rich new reserves through the deployment of new technology. 
Moreover, the attractiveness of investment in copper extraction was also influenced by 
the high price of copper alongside significant tax breaks offered to transnational 
capital. 15 In offering significant tax deductions to foreign capital entering mineral 
extraction sectors, the regime even placed the relative profitability of the state-owned 
copper sector at a sustained relative disadvantage. Tax breaks, however, have not been 
the only incentive offered by state intervention. Foreign firms, faced with declining 
rates of profit owing to global copper overproduction since the mid-1990s, have taken 
advantage of governmental de-regulation to begin exporting unrefined copper in bulk to 
South East Asia. 16 The motivation behind this strategy is quite simply to take 
advantage of cheaper processing through lower Asian labour costs that more than 
compensate for increased transportation expenditure. The removal of some of the most 
labour-intensive aspects of the mining process, a trend facilitated by governmental de-
14 
IMF 2002a: 81. 
15 
Lagos 1999: 32. 
16 
Lagos 1999: 30. 
262 
regulation, has contributed towards the ejection of living labour from the Chilean 
mining sector, as discussed below. 
2. Employment, Wages and the Changing Composition of Capital 
A conjuncture of factors during the period 1990 to 1997, including the heightened level 
of exploitation, 17 escalating foreign investment and favourable global markets, created 
the conditions for the largest economic boom experienced in Chile. Growth in gross 
capital formation between 1990 and 1996 averaged 8.3 percent 18, and GDP grew by 7.8 
percent over the same seven-year span (refer to table 8:2). Whereas economic 
expansion in the late 1980s involved the re-absorption into production of the cheap and 
disciplined reserve labour army alongside the re-utilisation of unused capacity, the 
early 1990s were marked by heavy investment in technology in conditions of 
increasingly tight labour markets. These processes thereby served to alter the organic 
composition of capital, although at a time when the absolute mass of capital was still 
undergoing rapid expansion. Resulting from these two processes, several trends can be 
discerned. On the one hand, processes of sustained technological improvements would 
dramatically increase productivity in key branches of production, culminating in 
tendencies towards overproduction and the partial replenishment of the reserve labour 
army. On the other, the increased demand for labour resulted in rising wages, 
threatening the competitiveness of Chilean exports on global markets. These points are 
addressed in tum, before examining the emergence of crisis in more detail in the final 
section. 
17 Notably, average weekly work hours would remain high, with a 48 hour working week still the 
;l\erage in 1996, and with over 35 percent of the population working above this norm; MIDEPLAN 
1998: 35. 
18 
Escobar 1999b: 24. 
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'fa 8 1 Ch'l ble . - lean growt lpercent , -1999. . GDP h( ) 1990 19 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP 3.7 8.0 12.3 7.0 5.7 10.6 7.4 7.4 3.4 -1.1 
GDP per capita 1.5 6.2 10.4 5.2 4.0 8.9 5.9 5.9 2.0 -2.4 
To begin with, the large inflows of foreign capital and the availability of domestic 
credit were used to implement technological improvements that increased productivity 
alongside increasing the mass of capital. Productivity increases were considerable. 
Whereas in the 1984-89 period productivity per worker grew by 1.4 percent annually, 
the 1990-5 period saw this ratio increase threefold to 4.3 percent.20 Productivity 
transformation in this manner was most prolific in the core regions of the export 
sectors, particularly mining but also agro-export, and lumber and seafood processing. 
Likewise, financial services and, to a lesser degree, commerce and transport also 
witnessed large increases in productivity over the 1990-96 period. 21 Given that the 
introduction of productivity-increasing technology can often lead to an expulsion of 
living labour from the production process, the continued increases in employment 
between 1990 and 1996 were related to the continued expansion of the mass of capital 
that served to reincorporate the reserve army created during the crisis and restructuring 
period, including the growth of servicing firms that tended to various needs of the 
primary production sector. However, from 1997 onwards, the expanded reproduction 
of capital in Chile encountered problems of overproduction coupled to deteriorating 
global circumstances. A depreciation in the mass of capital owing to capital flight and 
the continuing introduction of new technologies and rationalisation strategies rapidly 
pushed unemployment rates upwards. The latter hit ten percent at a national level in 
2000 and has remained around this figure into 2003 despite the reintroduction of 
emergency work programmes for the first time since the 1980s. The latter have been 
19 
CEPAL 2001a: 492. 
20 
Rosales 1998: 219. 
~I 
Ossand6n 2002; Rosales 1998: 218. 
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introduced by the Concertaci6n and provide direct employment for 100,000 people 
anytime unemployment exceeds nine percent. 22 
Figure 8:2: National Unemployment Rate (percent of economically active 
population).23 
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Unemployment, although manifesting sizeable variations within the course of a gi ven 
year owing to the seasonal nature of work in the agro-export sector, subsided from the 
high of 29 percent in the early 1980s to 6.4 percent in 1994, thereby returning to a level 
just above its historical average of around six percent in the post-war period. 24 Similar 
to trends of the late 1980s, a considerable portion of the new employment resulted from 
the expansion of light manufacturing, concentrated on low value-added transformations 
of primary extracts, and construction. Owing to increases in employment in these two 
areas, primary employment had increased from under twenty-two percent of total urban 
employment in 1986 to twenty-seven percent by 1994. It should be noted that, 
although the share of manufacturing in GDP grew at a sustained rate during the boom 
period, this did not represent the initiation of a second "phase" of the export-promotion 
industrialisation strategy, as proclaimed by the Concertaci6n governments since 1991. 
Achievement of the latter was suggested to necessitate a strong diversification of 
exports into non-traditional goods involving labour-intensive production with higher 
22 CEPAL 2001b: 140. 
2, Banco Central de Chile. http://si2.bcentraI.cIfbasededatoseconomicos/900base.asp?usuidioma=e 
accessed May 2003. 
24 Stallings 2001: 51. 
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value added. 25 Additionally, such a transition was projected to require a relatively 
strong role for the state, both through an industrial policy that would provide incenti ves 
for the creation of new industry, and in the reproduction of an educated and disciplined 
labour force. In basing production on higher levels of human capital and technology, 
and therein by increasing exports of finished products, it was believed that Chilean 
accumulation could overcome its strong dependence on finite primary exports and 
initiate a virtuous circle of investment in workers leading to stronger exports. 
Nonetheless, the promised transition has been muted. On the one hand, the 1990s saw 
an increasing number of vertically linked industries involved in the light processing of 
Chilean raw materials. As discussed below, these industries were neither labour 
intensive and have often involved particularly flexibilized forms of labour relations, 
with marginal productivity gains over the decade that belie the idea of a transition to 
high value added production reliant on increasingly skilled labour.26 On the other, in 
certain instances, such as that of copper as discussed above, the Concertaci6n has 
responded to deteriorating global conditions for products by certifying the export of 
increasingly unprocessed primary materials in order to maintain investment. Given 
these circumstances, the impact of "second phase" export-promotion industrialisation 
has not been to recreate a version of the East Asian NICs and its influence on Chilean 
export character has been less important than initial expectations. In 1997 brute raw 
materials still constituted 44 percent of exports; moderately processed raw materials, 
such as fishmeal, processed frozen fish, wood chips, pulp and planks, accounted for 26 
percent; and fully manufactured goods constituted only 10 percent. 27 
25 S . 
eInen 1996: 153. 
26 
2 Ossand6n 2002: 12. 
7 Casti 110 1997: .j..j.. 
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In this manner, characteristic of the 1990s export boom was the continued proliferation 
of small and medium firms that, through subcontracting, provided services and 
decentralised product processing to the immediate primary extraction industries. 
Concurrent to the expansion of primary extraction and secondary processing, the other 
principal growth area in terms of employment was the producer-services sector. Micro-
enterprises, employing fewer than five workers, accounted for 40.6 percent of total 
employment in 1996, and this figure rises to 46 percent if enterprises of five to nine 
workers are included. 28 Informalised work relations predominated within these 
enterprises, with only 30 percent of micro-enterprise workers having a fixed contract. 
As such, high levels of precarious employment characterise this sector, entailing that 
workers confront unstable employment relations with a short-term horizon owing to 
substantial risk of ejection.29 This is a situation compounded by the technique of 
vertical disintegration of large export-orientated firms, with the latter increasingly 
engaged in subcontracting practices that enable an indirect relationship with a 
workforce through the mediation of these small firms. As detailed below, 
subcontracting aids in the consolidation of a heavily flexibilized relationship with 
labour by facilitating the relatively unproblematic ejection of living labour from the 
production process according to the dictates of the enterprise. 
In spite of the unstable conditions of employment prevalent in many branches of 
production and the maintenance of heavily restrictive labour legislation, the significant 
increase in the demand for labour nonetheless helped to push wages upwards in a 
Sustained manner. In 1992 real wages recovered to their pre-debt crisis level and then 
rose consistently by around four percent annually in the boom years of the mid 1990s, 
)8 
. Escobar 1999b: 30, 31. 
:Q 
Gonzalez 1999: 99. 
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slowing only with the global crisis of 1997-1998 (refer to table 8:1). Concurrently, 
labour shortages in peak months in certain export industries forced some employers to 
offer improved conditions of labour in order to attract the necessary quantity of casual 
workers.3D The process of rising wages was also bolstered by the political decision of 
the Concertaci6n consistently to make small raises in the level of the minimum wage, 
although the impact of the latter political decision has been far less dramatic than the 
accusations of organised business would suggest. Only in 1997 did the minimum wage 
regain its 1982 level, and still lagged below that of 1970.31 
T bl 8 2 I d f I (1970 100) 32 a e . - n ex 0 rea wa ges = . . 
Year 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Index 83.8 89.1 92.4 10l.3 110.3 119.0 124.0 128.0 
The effect of rising wages can be examined in two manners: firstly, according to their 
impact on capital-labour relations and the international competitiveness of Chilean 
exports; and secondly in terms of the stratification of the working class. With respect 
to the former, the large exporting conglomerates have made clear their discomfort with 
the rate of wage increase, a sentiment that intensified after the contraction of profit 
rates first began to manifest itself prior to the Asian Crisis. Wage increases of four 
percent annually between 1990 and 1998 translated into rising costs of production of 
commodities whose global value was decreasing owing to overproduction. 33 Unable to 
contest the highly market-driven trends in domestic wages, capital has pursued a mix of 
political and economic strategies in an attempt to compensate. 
30 Schurman 2001: 20; Barrett et al. 2002: 1957 . 
.11 
Coloma and Rojas 2000: 511. 
32 F . 
31 aZlo 2001: 217. . ,., 
. Notably, however. real wage increases slowed to an average of 1.65 percent an~ually bet\\een _000 
and 2003 following the slackening of labour markets in the post-1998 CrtSlS penod; Banco de Chtle 
2003a: online. 
Firstly, on the political front, the wage issue is one factor underlying the increasingly 
confrontational position adopted by organised business vis-a-vis proposed changes to 
the labour code, as detailed in the succeeding sections. Secondly, replacement of living 
labour by machinery continues, with Chilean firms going into increasing levels of debt 
to achieve this. Rachel Schurman identified such processes as endemic in the seafood 
processing industries throughout the decade, and Barrett et al. suggests that 
mechanisation of salmon feeding since 1998 has cut the labourers involved in this 
branch of production by forty percent. 34 Thirdly, the tension between the steady 
diminution of comparative advantages on international markets and rising domestic 
labour costs has also prompted increased investment by large Chilean firms in other 
parts of Latin America, rising from insignificant amounts to US$4.3 billion a year in 
1996.35 Indigenous capitals have thereby fled rising labour costs by moving money 
capital to encounter cheaper labour in alternative spatial locales. Indeed, in response to 
rising labour costs and escalating overproduction in key Chilean industries, the large 
economic groups responded by borrowing huge amounts of foreign capital in order to 
continue the process of technological upgrades and to acquire assets in other parts of 
South America. Even the IMP has expressed concern over the soaring level of private 
debt in Chile, which doubled between 1995 and 1999 and now amounts to fifty percent 
of annual GDP (refer to figure 8:3).36 
Figure 8:3: Private External Debt.37 
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Schurman 2001: 26; Barrett et al 2002: 1956. 
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Finally, enterprises have concentrated upon increasing the flexibility of their 
relationship with the labour force, therein finding alternative methods by which to 
compensate for the rise in the price of labour-power. It is perhaps no surprise that 
f1exibilisation practices, as identified in the theoretical chapter as strategies that attempt 
to remove restrictions to the usage of labour-power as a total commodity, have been an 
increasingly common strategy of capital in many branches of production. This trend 
has been particularly explicit in the key export sectors, where subcontracting strategies 
have been pervasively adopted in order to maximise exploitation and to maintain the 
rationalisation of enterprises. The forestry sector is archetypal in this respect. 
Subcontracting practices have become increasingly common and have allowed larger 
economic units to contract out tasks to small firms, sometimes organised at the level of 
the family. This allows the larger firms to cut their labour costs, avoid many regulatory 
aspects of formal sector employment and also to avoid dealing with organised labour, 
hence skirting the responsibilities that they would have to assume were the employees 
hired directly by the company. Concurrently, it also permits an easy shedding of 
unusable labour in times of economic slowdown. As a consequence, the Chilean 
forestry sector has become characterised by levelled practises of subcontracting 
whereby the first level of subcontracted firms continue to pass specialised tasks out to 
their Own subcontractors. 38 In this fashion, pyramids of hierarchicalised subcontracting 
38 
Escobar and L6pez 1996: 102. 
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practises, resting on relations of dependency running from the central contractor down 
each level, fonn an "economic mattress" that cushions the central levels from adverse 
shocks by allowing them to transfer costs further down the structure. Precarious forms 
of employment have created a situation in which the reserve anny in the forestry sector 
is both sizeable and in a state of constant flux. Notably, the provinces where the 
forestry sector is most present are characterised by high levels of unemployment and 
39 poverty. 
Similar trends are also prevalent in the agro-export sector, one of the much-championed 
"dynamic poles" of the new economy. In this sector employment is both highly 
precarious and lowly remunerated. For close to forty percent of the rural labour force -
largely female in its composition40 - work is typically categorised by three modes of 
temporary employment: work paid by piece (e.g. price per volume picked); work paid 
by task; and work paid per harvest. This enables agro-industries to absorb large 
quantities of labour-power in the summer and autumn picking seasons and eject it for 
the winter and spring. Concurrent with the flexibilisation of the labour market, there is 
little labour regulation in tenns of working conditions and levels of pay, and there are 
no social security contributions by employers.41 After completing individual jobs 
workers are perpetually uncertain of future employment and must move between agro-
enterprises within the region in order to find successive contracts. Furthermore, with 
the impermanent and mobile nature of the work, there can be little unionisation, a 
situation reinforced by the Concertacion' s reluctance for the entire decade to undertake 
any initiative, such as trade union legislation, that might endanger the continuing 
39 E 
scobar 19990 
40 COd I 2001: II. 
41 
cf. Fazio and Riesco 1997; Cid 2001. 
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growth of agro-forestry exports.42 The labour legislation enacted by the Lagos 
administration in 2001, as discussed below, finally provides seasonal workers with the 
legal right to fonn unions, although the structural impediments still mean that union 
.' h . I 43 actiVIty In suc sectors IS ow. 
The mining sector, an area of considerable union activity that even the Pinochet regime 
could not repress, has seen a different flexibilisation strategy attempted by capitals. 
This has involved the shedding of labour employed by the main mining enterprise and 
its replacement with subcontracted labour. As the government 'preinforme' to advise 
the 2001 labour legislation discussions indicates, the percentage of subcontracted 
workers has risen dramatically. The percentage of subcontracted employees in the 
mining industry rose from 4.6% to 40% between 1985 and 1996.44 Agacino, Gonzalez 
and Rojas, in their seminal study of the Chilean mining industry in the post-
authoritarian period, demonstrate that this subcontracting practise has resulted in 
"extended working days, illegal introduction of continuous work systems, higher 
vulnerability of the worker, lack of legal protection, temporality of work and income, 
etc".45 Such a strategy has been complemented by the transnational relocation of 
labour intensive stages of the production process with an increasing amount of ores 
extracted in brute form in Chile and transported to South East Asia for refining. The 
latter is a process sanctioned by the Chilean government, which has preferred to keep 
the sector vastly unregulated rather than risk losing investment.46 As such, the 
Increasing capital-intensive nature of mining, alongside the migration of labour-
intensive processes to other parts of the international division of labour, has caused a 
4' 
. Gwynne and Kay 1997: 9. 
4) Interview with aararian union directorship, Santiago April 2002. 
44 b 
Preinforme 2001. 
41 
. Agacino et al. 1998: 216. 
46 
Lagos 1999: 31. 
substantial ejection of living-labour from the production process. Despite huge foreign 
investment and the opening of new 'mega-projects', the number of jobs in the Chilean 
copper industry during the 1990s declined from 104,000 to 92,000.47 Ironically, owing 
to these processes, poverty has also risen amongst those working in the mining sector. 
Whereas the mining sector previously offered some of the highest wages amongst the 
working class, subcontracting and the emergence of a reserve mining labour force 
ejected from the transnational sector yet able to use its skills to mine small, low quality 
ores, has led to a situation in which between 1990 and 1995, the number of miners 
whose households were below the poverty line rose from none to 16 percent.48 
Although the above paragraphs have concentrated on flexibilisation processes in key 
export sectors, these transformations are not exclusive to those areas. For example, the 
above mentioned government preinforme report notes the prevalence of practises 
undertaken by such firms as water-treatment giant Essel which, following privatisation 
in 1999, took advantage of the laxities of the labour code to sack a substantial number 
of employees only for the new owners to rehire them as subcontractors under markedly 
worse conditions. 49 Concurrently, Wormald and Ruiz-Tagle highlight that for 
important tasks within the construction sector - which accounted for the third largest 
increase in employment between 1990 and 199850 - the majority of labour now is 
performed via subcontracting practises to micro-firms, creating a growing tendency 
towards precarious labour in this key employment sector.51 
3. The Asian Crisis and the Spectre of Overproduction, 1997-2001. 
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As we have seen, processes involving the transnationalisation of capital circuits were 
fundamental in the expansion of accumulation between 1990 and 1997. However, the 
inverse moment of this mode of integration into the world market was a reliance on 
fickle and volatile capital flows for sustained investment and credit. Regime 
ideologues were confident that the possibility of crisis owing to this manner of external 
dependence was minimal. They championed the pragmatic use of capital controls and 
the seeming immunity of Chile to the 'Tequila Effect' that spread contagion across 
Latin America following the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis. Nonetheless, significant 
vulnerabilities of Chilean accumulation within the new mode of transnational 
integration were starkly revealed in 1998 following the financial crisis that erupted in 
East Asian and spread to Russia and Brazil. On the one hand, export industries were 
faced with the temporary collapse of Asian markets that had grown to absorb one-third 
of Chilean goods by the mid-1990s. Concurrently, in conditions of spreading financial 
panic, investors balked at the prospect of financial collapse in the global South and 
some US$2.1 billion of capital fled from Chile.52 Together, these factors rapidly 
plunged the economy into recession, with negative growth registered in 1999 for the 
first time since the debt crisis (refer to table 8:2). Somewhat ironically, given the 
Concertaci6n's previous position, the state response was to remove rapidly the existing 
capital control and other remaining impediments to the free movement of capital in 
order to try and encourage capital to return. In circumstances of crisis, installing 
confidence in investors by facilitating their ability to exit under any future adverse 
circumstances took precedence over instruments of financial management. 53 
52 IMF 2000: 99. 
\1 As a postscript, in return for a 2002 free trade agreement signed with the US. the Lagos administ~a~ion 
has legally committed itself to maintaining a fully open capital account, thereby foregoing the pOSSibility 
of implementing any future capital controls; Stiglitz 2003: 2. 
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bl 83 A IGDp· ( Ta e . . nnua Increase percen age. . . 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDPchange 3.2 -0.9 4.4 2.8 1.8 
Much as economists are keen to relate every unforeseen negative occurrence to 
exogenous factors and "external shocks",55 the cnSlS of 1998 and the subsequent 
ongoing stagnation also represented senous contradictions emergent within the 
trajectory of Chilean accumulation. Signs of tension were already visible before the 
crisis hit, as manifested by a fall in the rate of growth of manufactured exports from 32 
percent in 1991 to 8.2 percent in 1997.56 The most important issue is the emergence of 
global overproduction and subsequent heightening competition within the branches of 
primary production upon which Chilean accumulation relies so heavily. This process is 
twofold. On the one hand, the advantageous conditions of production within the 
dynamic export poles combined with favourable opportunities for value-realisation on 
global markets encouraged the rapid formation of a multiplicity of competing capitals 
within export sectors. Likewise, the other dimension of overproduction has been the 
changing composition of the international division of labour. The global propagation 
of export-oriented development strategies has increased opportunities for firms aiming 
at similar western consumption markets to exploit new competitive advantages in 
alternative countries in the global South. As such, during the 1990s, global capital 
moved to exploit market opportunities by investment in these same branches of 
production in other spatial locations within the global division of labour. 
54 Banco de Chile 2003b: online. 
55 For example, in an attempt to reassert the soundness of neoliberal policy prescription de.spite a decade 
nf poor economic performance in the restructured Global South, the World Bank explamed away the 
discrepancy between theory and practice as the result of "large external shocks"; World Bank 2001a: 6"+. 
56 W 
eyland 1999: 81. 
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Unlike the projections of neoclassical theory, increased competition does not lead to the 
smooth elimination of inefficient producers and the return of equilibrium. On the 
contrary, as elaborated in chapter two, each individual capital tends to react to 
increased competition by introducing technological improvements, often funded 
through credit, and by intensifying the exploitation of labour. The tighter the market 
gets, the more pressure upon capitals to reduce production costs and to increase the 
mass of products produced in order to adjust to falling prices, therein further 
accentuating overproduction.57 This process of escalating overproduction is 
particularly clear in the copper industry. In terms of a percentage of world copper 
exports, Chile soared from 26.1 percent in 1990 to 39.6 percent in 1998 owing to the 
expansion of mines and technological enhancement.58 With respect to volume, total 
copper exports more than doubled between 1990 and 1998. This represented an 11.1 
percent average annual increase whereas the US$ value of those exports only increased 
by 6.4 percent yearly, therein highlighting the decreasing price of copper on global 
markets.59 By 1999, moreover, overproduction combined with recession in key 
importing countries meant that copper prices hit their lowest level in forty years and 
have remained stagnant thereafter. 60 Accounting for some forty percent of export 
earnings, crisis in the copper industry threatens particularly grave ramifications for 
accumulation in Chile. Concurrently, however, similar processes were manifesting 
themselves in other sectors. In the fishing sector, for example, six of the eight principal 
marine fishes of commercial value are currently between full and over-exploitation 
owing to overcapitalisation, therein threatening the very reproduction of the industry.61 
57 By expanding production without regard for the limit of the market, as is inherent in th~ social form of 
capitalist production, overproduction is often accentuated until crisis imposes restructurIng through the 
destruction of overextended capitals and the concentration of remaining capital; cf. Clarke 1990b. 
58 
Lagos 1999: 28. 
59 
Lagos 1999: 19. 3l. 
60 IMF 2000: 105. 
61 Aguilar Ibarra et al 2000: 510. 
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In this way, other key export industries such as salmon, cellulose, grapes and wine ha\'e 
been marked by decreasing rates of profit through a combination of Chilean 
overproduction and the arrival of new competitors on the world market.62 
The emergence of this longer-term stagnation, and not any substantial change in 
Concertaci6n policies, is one of the primary reasons that organised business has been 
relatively hostile towards the current Lagos administration and incredibly belligerent in 
its campaign against any substantial changes in the labour code. Notably, business 
interests decried even the decisively pro-business compromise of relatively minor 
amendments in 2001 as a "grave danger to the Chilean economy".63 Inversely, the 
growing crisis of export-orientated accumulation also threatens to undermine the ability 
of the state to make the kinds of material compromises through the "growth with 
equity" formula that formed the lynchpin of its political and social strategy in the 
1990s. The principal question that these trends raise is that of the political 
contradictions that they impart and this theme is addressed in the final section on Chile 
through an examination of the course of political struggle at the tum of the millennium. 
4. Social Struggle, Political Turbulence and the New Labour Reforms 
In spite of the weaknesses of organised labour in Chile and an oft-cited political apathy 
manifested in low election turnouts in the mid-1990s, the existing pattern of labour 
relations and the correlated polarisation of income distribution were not passively 
accepted. Political tension began to escalate in the latter half of the Frei administration 
as the bitter winds of the Asian typhoon whipped Chile and turned the employment 
62 La arra Ecollomia, Santiago de Chile, April 2002. 
63 El Mostrador 2001, Santiago de Chile, April 14th. 
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generating boom of the prevIOus seven years into negative growth, increased 
unemployment and mounting social disquiet. The immediate result was the first 
significant shift of popular support away from the Concertaci6n, as displayed by the 
momentum gathered by Joaquin Lavin's right-wing psuedo-populist campaign for the 
2000 presidential elections. Lavin's campaign was run in an anti-politics, anti-
politician style, presenting himself as an ideal president owing to his "supra-political" 
position. Armed with a massive campaign budget (up to US$30 million), he combined 
economic liberalism with conservative morals in a campaign that promoted overcoming 
the divisions of the past in order to make Chile prosperous again.64 The solutions 
promoted by Lavin were heavily technocratic, offering to bring technical expertise to 
bear on all social issues, yet were infused with a strong Catholicism. 
Acting in political expediency, and in direct response to Lavin's anti-politics overtures, 
president Eduardo Frei Tagle's Concertaci6n administration attempted to recapture 
popular support by reactivating labour code legislation that had been languishing in 
congress for the previous five years. Concertaci6n strategists hoped the initiative 
would give a boost to Concertaci6n candidate Ricardo Lagos' presidential campaign by 
manoeuvring the parties of the right into an overtly anti-worker position and, therein, 
stripping them of their populist mask. The proposal included a motion to strengthen 
unions by strengthening the mechanisms that would allow bargaining to proceed above 
the level of the individual firm. Additionally the proposal would restrain the practise of 
importing replacement, non-unionised, labour in the event of a strike. 65 The attempt, 
however, backfired with business groups quickly mobilising to make a strenuous attack 
on the proposed changes, arguing that it would be bad for business at a time when the 
64 cr. Silva 2001: 33-5. 
65 
Angell and Pollack 2000: 369. 
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course of Chilean accumulation was looking extremely fragile. Ultimately, the 
government encountered considerable problems in forcing even its own senators to vote 
for the measure, and proved unable to win the necessary independent votes in the 
senate. Accordingly, the legislation was not passed. 
Despite this failure, the Concertaci6n were able to secure an extremely narrow election 
victory in December 1999. Ricardo Lagos became the first Chilean president to come 
from the Socialist Party since Salvador Allende, raising the expectations of some labour 
activists that a more sympathetic government had arrived. Moreover, whilst the 
Aylwin and, to a lesser extent, Frei administrations had seen their respective labour 
reforms moderated as they passed through the post-transition institutional system 
designed by the military regime, the balance of institutional power had shifted by 2000 
and some of the constitutional quirks served to benefit the Concertaci6n, including a 
new balance of political power in the senate. As Lagos recently noted in an interview 
with the Financial Times, the government initiatives to make constitutional 
amendments are much closer to realisation simply because the political right has 
realised that the constitution served the Concertaci6n.66 Notwithstanding the hopes of 
many, by the summer of Lagos' first year some labour leaders expressed 
disappointment over a lack of any marked change in the administration's attitude and 
were frustrated with a perceived lack of receptive ears within the government.67 The 
government itself was dealing with continued troubles following the Asian crisis fallout 
and was undertaking closed meetings with business leaders over how to reactivate the 
economy. 
66 Financial Times, "Chile's Leader Takes Careful Path to Reform", London, 1 October 2001. 
67 Interviews conducted with union leaders in Santiago, Chile, June 2000 and April 2002. 
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Intransigence towards the popular constituency, however, was not an option for the new 
administration. Lagos had placed labour reform high on his election manifesto agenda 
and the December 2001 parliamentary elections offered a stem test for the 
Concertaci6n facing the rejuvenated political right. Alongside the spectre of a difficult 
election battle ahead, the emergence of increased labour and social activism alongside 
mounting denunciations of labour abuses by both large and small firms from a 
multitude of domestic and international sources pushed the administration into activity. 
Of particular note are the May 1 st 2001 protests in which some 30,000 workers gathered 
in Santiago calling for, amongst other things, a general strike to pressure the 
government into labour reforms. Furthermore, with the government seeking fast-track 
trade association with NAFT A and free-trade agreements with the European Union, 
there was alarm over opposition from Western governments and labour organisations 
concerning the lack of worker rights in Chile. In particular, Canada demanded change 
as a condition for signing free trade agreements. Lagos himself has been unequivocal 
that reform was necessary in order to attain social peace: 
You have to be competitive and efficient [but] you also have to 
have a society organised in such a way that it does not have 
d · .. 68 pennanent lVlszons. 
The Lagos administration intended to send out a clear message to capitals operating in 
Chile that the worst abuses would have to stop in order to assure social stability and to 
continue the momentum of Chile's integration with western trading blocks. 
68 Financial Times. "Chile's Leader Takes Careful Path to Reform", London, 1 October 2001. 
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Business leaders in the CPC and the political right, however, did not accept the 
government's stance and have bitterly decried the initiative. Arguing along standard 
neoclassical lines, they asserted that reform was not just against the interest of capitals 
but also that of workers because a more rigid labour market would be reflected in fewer 
jobs and lower wages. 69 Such criticisms, however, appeared exaggerated in view of the 
distinctly moderate tenor of the reforms. From the perspective of the Chilean working 
class, the 2001 reforms constitute an improvement to the labour code as they offer 
greater protection against employer abuses by increasing the size of the Direcci6n de 
Trabajo to better process worker complaints and by raising the monetary fines imposed 
upon firms involved in illegal labour practises. Moreover, they require employers to 
create contracts even for part-time workers and extend the coverage of the new code to 
include previously excluded sectors such as notaries, archivists and conservationists. 
Nevertheless, the reforms continue to ignore the primary demands of the labour 
movement that aimed at a fundamental change in the nature of production relations; 
namely, the unimpeded right to strike and collective negotiation. As such, the reforms 
represent a continuation and not a break in the regime's labour policy. 
In more detail, the new amendments were primarily of a defensive nature, operating on 
an individualistic and juridical framework rather than through the support and 
promotion of collective action. They gave individual workers more access to protective 
mechanisms if their rights are abused, but do not provide the institutional grounds for 
effective collective action nor for organised labour to become a serious counterweight 
to the power of employers either at the level of the firm or in the national political 
ambit. The sole positive measure of the reforms in this latter respect was the lowering 
69 EI Mostrador. "Crece tension entre Gobierno y empresarios por reforma laboral", 1 September 2001. 
Santiago de Chile. 
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of the initial quorums necessary for workers to establish umons within a firm. 
Nevertheless, the absence of reform in two particular areas is more conspicuous. On 
the one hand, the continued practise of allowing firms to hire "rompehuelgas" 
(replacement labourers in the event of a strike) severely compromises the potency of 
industrial action. Furthermore, there is little to stop firms insisting on individual 
contracts with workers at the moment of employment, contracts which stipulate that 
striking is not permissible. On the other hand, such factors in tum indicate the 
weaknesses in the right to collective bargaining, with the locus of collective bargaining 
confined entirely to the level of the individual firm. The latter is particularly onerous 
for workers in small firms of fewer than twenty employees who often do not have the 
strength to challenge the individual firm but enjoy no recourse to sectoral or national 
level bargaining. More generally, it frustrates the ability of regional and national level 
labour federations to build stronger organisations and overcome their current political 
margi nali ty. 
Finally, for those in the labour movement and certain members of the Concertaci6n 
parties hoping to use these reforms as a stepping-stone towards more extensive 
measures within the Lagos sexenio, Labour Minister Ricardo Solari had a strong 
rebuttal: 
I believe that at the end of this process we will have a code that 
will close the discussion and enjoy legitimacy.7o 
70 EI Mostrador. "Gobierno presento 15 indicaciones a la reforma laboraJ", 5 September 2001. Santiago 
de Chile. 
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Nevertheless, the deliberate boycott of both labour and business leaders from the 
ceremony marking the passing of the new laws suggested that the issue is far from 
resolved. Militancy within the CUT continued to gain strength, and culminated in the 
successful undertaking of Chile's first mass workers' protest in seventeen years on 
August 13, 2003. The action took the form of a general strike in the public sector, with 
teachers, health workers and transport workers being the largest groups to participate. 
Specifically aimed at protesting the poor conditions and low wages throughout the 
public sector and highlighting the continuing abuses of worker rights under the existing 
labour code, the CUT claimed that eighty percent of business activity had been stopped 
. h . I 71 III t e capIta. Although the Lagos administration claimed that the strike was an 
unproductive anachronism, many within the Socialist party expressed sympathy 
towards the strike, suggesting that the growing social tension could unravel the 
increasingly tenuous Concertaci6n coalition. 
5. The Social Geography of Growth With Equity 
Given the Concertaci6n' s role in reaffirming the larger restructuring project of the 
dictatorship by continuing to integrate state and society into the global circuits and 
abstract disciplines of capitalist social relations, is not overly surprising that many of 
the tendencies inherent to the latter have increasingly begun to reassert themselves. 
Before examining elements of income polarisation and the relative effectiveness of 
social policies in mediating these tendencies, it is important to address what champions 
of Chilean neoliberalism have heralded as one of its most marked successes: namely. 
the reduction of poverty.72 With the re-integration of the massively expanded reserve 
71 Financial Times, "Chile Prepares for General Strike", 12 August 2003, London. 
72 e.g. Aninat 2000. 
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labour army into the relationship of capitalist work , offi cial poverty level s have 
declined from the 1990 level of 38.6 percent to just over 20.3 percent in 2000, wi th 
extreme poverty declining from 12.9 percent to 5.7 percent over the same period (refer 
to figure 8:4). This seemingly dramatic reduction , however, represents a return to 
levels consistent with the longer trend of absolute poverty reduction in Chile over the 
second half of the twentieth century. 73 In this respect poverty reduction during the 
1990s represents a success only in respect to the drastically increased level s of poverty 
induced by the brutal capitalist restructuring process implemented between 1975 and 
1985 . 
Figure 8:4 - Evolution of the Incidences of Poverty and Indigence, 1990-2000.74 
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Moreover, the status of the population immediately above the poverty line is markedl y 
tenuous. As Guillermo Wormald and Jaime Rufz-Tagle indicate, even in 1996 at the 
height of the economic boom, 43 percent of the working population earned fewer than 
two minimum wages , which meant that in addition to the twenty three percent li ving 
under the povel1y line, a further twenty percent were only tentativel y on the ' ri ght ' side 
of the line.75 This represents the dependence of the Chilean workin g class on low ly 
remunerated employment in the context of a jUlidical system th at structures power 
relations strongl y in the favour of capital. Finall y, given th at the sharp trend toward ~ 
) 1 t' R c, aczynski 1999. 
) 4 MIDEPLAN 2001 b: 4. 
)\ Wormallid and RlIlz-Tagle 1999 : 35 -6. 
--------------~ 
poverty reduction occurred only within the boom years of 1990 to 1996, the prevalence 
of wage poverty of this nature has not improved. By the end of the 1990s, poverty 
reduction had reached a plateau, indicating the structurally ingrained nature of poverty 
within Chilean capitalist development. 76 
A further primary element of the Chilean social geography has been the continued and 
growing polarisation of income distribution. The latter has occurred alongside the 
positive effects of the Chilean boom in terms of rising aggregate real wages and the re-
incorporation of the unemployed masses into the Chilean workforce. It is common for 
advocates of the Chilean model to present the figures for rising real wages as proof of 
the virtues of the development strategy (refer to table 8:2).77 However, presenting 
merely the aggregated trends of real wage changes in an undifferentiated fashion clouds 
the asymmetrical composition of changing wage levels amongst the working class. 
Over the boom period, the highest wage rises went to professionals and technicians, 
with the majority unskilled elements of the working class receiving below average 
wage increases. 78 This served to increase the stratification of the working class, with 
considerable divergence in wages related to both the branch of production and position 
within the vertical division of labour. Such factors led to a consolidation and slight 
deepening of income inequality within Chile, which remains highly polarised even by 
the unenviable standards of Latin America. As such, and notwithstanding the 
Concertaci6n's repeated motif of 'growth with equity', the outcome of the export-led 
boom was growth coupled with growing income inequality (refer to table 8:4). The 
76 Also see Fazio 2001 for an analysis of wage poverty and struggles over the value of the minimum 
wage. 
77 
cf. ChaCl)1l 1999: 222. 
7R 
Escobar 1999b: '+3,44. 
latter is testament to the pervasiveness of the new degree of social polari sati on forged 
within the medi um-tenn restructuring project. 
T bl 8 4 DO t °b f f ° b d 0. 1990 2000 79 a e . - IS n u Ion 0 Income 'Y eCI e, -. . 
Decile 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
I 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 
II 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 
III 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 
IV 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 
V 5.4 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.7 
VI 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.5 
VII 7.8 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 7.9 
VIII 10.3 10.4 10.6 11.1 11.0 10.5 
IX 15.2 14.8 15.4 15.5 16.0 15.2 
X 42.2 41.9 41 .9 41.6 41.3 42.3 
Unsurprisingly, in view of its pledge to fashion a more equitable Chile, the accentuated 
degree of social polarisation has resulted in political problems for the Concertaci6n. As 
is discussed in the previous chapter, one of the primary challenges facing the 
Concertaci6n within its 'Growth with Equity' strategy was to try and mediate the 
implications of social stratification and the persistence of poverty through social policy 
initiatives. The targeting of social expenditure within this process has certainly been to 
the benefit of the bottom four deciles of income eamers. As MIDEPLAN (Mi ni stry of 
Social Planning) vigorously specifies, if the distlibution of social expenditure IS 
quantified in pesos and added to household 's autonomous incomes according to 
quinti les of wage eamers, average household in the bottom quinti Ie of wage earners 
receives a social service value equivalent to almost 85 percent of its conventional 
income (refer to figure 8:5). 
Figure 8:5 _ Distribution of Autonomous and 'Total' Income by Quintile, 1998080 
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Even leaving aside the issues rai sed in the previous chapter, which indicated how the 
poorest sections of society benefited most from government health and educat ion 
spending by default owing to their inability to join the vas tl y superior systems of 
private provision, there is an immediate problem with the rosy picture of targeted social 
spending th at MIDEPLAN presents. This is related to the preci se expenditures th at the 
Concertaci6n has chosen to include and exclude from the exercise. Specifically. the 
figures are fundamentally prejudiced by the removal of pension ex pendi ture. Whi Ie the 
provided statistics include the state assistance pension , which predominantl y benefits 
the bottom two quintiles owing to their systematic exclusion from the privati sed 
system, the state's expenditure in topping up private pensions that fall below the 
subsistence minimum and its still substantial provi sion of public pensions is not 
included. Given that pension provision still accounts for forty percent of state social 
spending, including these more regressive forms of expenditure that res ult from the 
irrati onalities of the privatised pension system would have radicall y altered the 
progressive description of expenditure presented above. 
To end , one further just ifi cation and projection of the Concertaci6n's greater soc ial 
ex penditure was that new producti ve ac ti vi ties shou ld be encouraged that promoted 
labour processes with greater va lue added and. hence. necess itating a more s ~ill ed and 
------------~.-
able workforce. The result of such transformation could be a structural change in 
Chilean employment to a more productive and highly remunerated position within the 
international division of labour. In this way, investments in basic services were 
heralded as a positive step in fomenting a better skilled labour force with increased 
human and social capital that in tum would enable the shifting of the productive 
structure of the economy, hence mediating the dependence of the majority of the 
working class on low-skilled, low paying employment. 8 ! As detailed above, however, 
whilst the Concertaci6n has consistently endorsed a switch to a second phase export 
strategy that would have less dependence on unmodified primary materials, capital -
domestic and foreign - has been far less willing to follow suit. The long-term 
implications of this failure to create new competitive advantages within the global 
division of labour are considerable given the trends towards deteriorating terms of trade 
for Chilean products, not to mention the potentially devastating environmental impacts 
and non-sustainable nature of primary product reliance. 82 Whilst during the period of 
productive boom, between 1990 and 1997, such gloomy prognoses were easily ignored; 
the emergence of sustained crisis and relative stagnation since 1998, however, has 
made them of paramount political import. 
6. The 'Chilean Model' and Future of Capitalist Development in Chile 
Within the context of a dramatic expansion in the mass of capital, until the mid-1990s 
the Concertaci6n was relatively successful in its political strategy of leaving production 
relations to follow the trajectory forged in the Pinochet period whilst championing its 
activities in the sphere of distribution. This involved a struggle-driven consolidation of 
R I 
Raczynski 2000: 13l. 
~: . 
ct. Claude 1999. 
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the institutional forms of regulating the capital-labour relation into a heavily 
'flexibilised' form that closely approximate the World Bank's best-practise model and 
which the Financial Times labels as Latin America's "most modern labour code".83 
Common to both the Concertaci6n and the World Bank, therefore, is the priority to 
fashion the institutional parameters of capital-labour relations in a form that facilitates 
the flexibility of capital to exploit on national and global scales. Although this facet of 
reform is often obscured in the discourse of both institutions that prefer to place 
attention upon the active mediation of the state through social policies, it is nonetheless 
a fundamental aspect of these strategies in an era of overaccumulation on both national 
and global scales. However, whereas the ideological strength of neoclassical theories 
of labour flexibilisation rest upon the notion of the harmonious interaction of 
individuals with different factors of production, the direct experience of deepened 
exploitation within Chilean production relations has sharpened conflicts between 
workers and employers within firms and also between the organised working class and 
the state. 
Concurrently, the emphasis placed upon the Concertaci6n's expanSIOn of social 
expenditures masks deep-rooted structural problems within service provision that and 
calls into question the World Bank's enthusiastic promotion of partial privatisation 
linked to decentralisation, targeting and anti-poverty policy. These factors emerge with 
respect to both anti-poverty policy and wider forms of social provision. As returned to 
in the following chapter, the form of anti-poverty policy encompasses a complex 
interaction between the imposition of social disciplines and the amelioration of the 
conditions of social reproduction. The FOSIS anti-poverty programme ultimately seeks 
8.1 Financial Times. "Chile Prepares for General Strike", 12 August 2003, London. 
to consolidate the material conditions of the extreme poor in order that they can become 
part of the working poor involved in a hyper-flexibilised labour relation with capital. 
Secondly, the dualization of service provision in health and education has served to 
reinforce the role of the cash nexus in social reproduction, therein reinforcing the 
polarisation of Chilean society. Whilst the increased expenditures made available by 
the Concertaci6n have provided distinct improvements in the quality of certain services 
as compared to the Pinochet era, the resources for this limited distributive strategy have 
become increasingly tight with the Chilean boom of the early and mid-1990s giving 
way to a recession and relative stagnation at the tum of the millennium. This has been 
reflected in growing pressure upon the Concertaci6n regime to shirk its commitment to 
fiscal responsibility and to continue expanding social programmes despite budgetary 
constraints. It has also been reflected, however, in a rising popular awareness of the 
limits to distributive mediation within the confines of the present development 
trajectory and a strong movement aimed at a more fundamental reform of production 
relations. Such awareness manifested itself, as detailed above, in increasing political 
pressure upon the Concertaci6n to initiate further reforms to the Labour Code, 
alongside an increasingly active and vocal labour movement. The motion to establish a 
form of "politics within limits" that lay at the heart of Growth with Equity is 
increasingly being faced with a populace that is less willing to accept the limits of the 
current form of social relations. 
In reaction to these tensions, in 2002 the Concertaci6n government - despite internal 
fissures within the constituent parties - declared itself to be firmly on the side of fiscal 
responsibility, with President Ricardo Lagos recently rebuffing the calls for greater 
social expenditure and announcing the fallacy of such proposed increases as a recipe 
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for "bread today, hunger tomorrow".84 Nonetheless, the prospect of continued 
economic stagnation, shrinking electoral support, the growth of the populist right, 
disjunctures within the Concertacion coalition, and increasing social discontent all 
promise a stem test for the Concertacion's attempt to sustain their particular brand of 
neoliberalism. One possible scenario is a leftwards movement within the coalition 
towards an attempted deepening of the "growth with equity" strategy, perhaps 
consolidating around a pre-election attempt at a more thorough labour reform. A 
second real possibility, however, is the breakdown of the coalition and the election of a 
government from the political right for the first time since the downfall of the Pinochet 
dictatorship. 
Within the World Bank, however, escalating contradictions at a global level have 
prompted, amongst other responses, a deepening of its engagement with the notions of 
participation and empowerment explicit in, for example, the FOSIS programme. This 
transformation is the subject of the following, and final, chapter. 
8~ EI Mostrador, "Reformas Sociales", Santiago de Chile, 15th April 2002. 
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CHAPTER 9: IN CONCLUSION - THE CRISIS OF RESTRUCTURI~G 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF "COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOP~IENT" 
1. The Rise of 'Comprehensive Development' 
The results of rapid and widespread social restructuring across the South disappointed 
the expectations of World Bank staff and client governments alike, many of which had 
imposed reforms through political authoritarianism and widespread repression of 
adversely affected interests. The destructive side of the experiment was apparent 
enough in the "lost decade" of development and the enormous human costs of 
d· I a Justment. Less evident in this period, however, was any stable or sustained 
improvement in economic or social indicators in most of the global South, a factor 
reluctantly conceded by the World Bank.2 
Moreover, with the emergence of ever-more sophisticated financial infrastructures in 
the 1980s and 1990s that facilitate the rent-seeking activities of money-capital to 
operate at a distance far-removed from productive capital (the apparent de-linking of 
the productive and financial realms) the power of money, as alienated labour in its most 
fetishised and dominating form, has been ever deepened. During the 1980s an 
expansive infrastructure for the global movement of finance capital was forged, therein 
heightening the ease of global capital mobility and the pressures upon national states 
inherent in the threat of the escape of capital in its money form from unsatisfactory 
conditions.3 The institutionally facilitated global movement of money capital tightens 
the pressures upon states to subordinate various forms of intervention to the logic of 
: e.g. Chossudovsky 1996; Altimir 1998 . 
. World Bank 2001 a: 64 . 
.1 Hotloway 1995b; Soederberg 2002a. 
investment profitability whilst concurrently developing new forms of intervention to 
actively promote the conditions for accumulation. Moreover, the requirements to 
establish "international" standards for business are given tangible form by the lists of 
directives for realising good corporate governance offered by the World Bank, IMF, 
World Trade Organisation and other international organisations.4 As the Bank 
elaborates: 
Private capital flows now dominate official flows in the world, but 
they reinforce positive economic developments, either neglecting 
or punishing countries with weak economic conditions.s 
However, despite the belief that global monetary disciplines would secure an era of 
hannonious prosperity, the 1990s were instead marked by the spectre of intense 
financial volatility that brought drastic economic and social devastation to many of the 
Bank's most acclaimed success stories (e.g. Mexico 1995, S.E. Asia 1997, Argentina 
2001). Elsewhere in the global South, the promised rewards of structural adjustment 
largely failed to materialise. In contrast to the world of prosperity under the tutelage of 
liberated market forces, as predicted by the ideologues of the Washington Consensus, 
two decades of neoliberal restructuring were widely recognised as being characterised 
by profoundly uneven development, including increased poverty and inequality at the 
global leve1.6 This included the stagnation of Latin America and regression of sub-
Saharan Africa, two regions that most dramatically implemented neoliberal forms of 
4 Soederberg 2003c. 
5 World Bank 2001b. 
6 Moreover, the number of people in the world living in conditions of extreme poverty rose considerably 
in the 1980s and continued a more moderate upward trend in the 1990s. The relati ve proportion of the 
population in extreme poverty also rose during the 1980s, but fell moderately in the 1990s, largely due to 
the influence of China and India; World Bank 2001a; Milankovic ~003. 
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restructuring, on a wide spectrum of development indicators.7 Unsurprisingly, the 
failure of structural adjustment to realise generalised and sustained growth, alongside 
successive and devastating financial crises in the 1990s, severely dented the legitimacy 
of the Washington based institutions and the neoliberal paradigm of structural 
adjustment, with the former increasingly denigrated by a range of social actors. The 
latter include former insiders and emergent global social movements, but also the 
forces of the political right in the US, including the constant propositions to downscale, 
disband or pri vatise the Bank. 8 
Under these circumstances, the latter half of the 1990s was one of pronounced change 
in the discourse and policy prescription of the World Bank. In a series of speeches and 
publications the Bank began to outline a new development philosophy that, in contrast 
to the previous focus on freeing markets to achieve rapid and sustained economic 
growth, posits a "holistic approach" to development that balances macroeconomic with 
structural, human and physical development needs.9 In order to realise this vision, the 
World Bank claimed, not only would the aims of development practise have to be 
revised, but a substantial overhaul of the relationships between international 
development agencies, client governments, civil societies, and the development 
community at large would also be necessary. In short, the existing form of the 
7 Pender 200l. Inequality both between North and South and within Southern countries has escalated 
dramatically, thereby undermining the neoclassical prediction of a general convergence of wages and 
wealth amongst national states in conditions of open trade. cf. Sutcliffe 2001; Nederveen Pieterse 2002; 
Weeks 2001. 
8 Such discussions were given tangible form by the Meltzer Commission at the close of the 1990s. For 
an excellent examination of different notions to reform the Bank, cf. Pincus and Winters 2003. In this 
respect, the Bush administrations creation of the 'Millennium Challenge Account' and its reformulation 
of lending to heavily indebted poor countries is of significant importance; cf. Soederberg 2003b. 
9 Wolfensohn (1999) contains the initial proposal for the Comprehensive Development Framework. The 
World Development Reports of 1999/2000, 2000/2001 and 2002 (World Bank 2000a, 200 la, 2(02) 
elaborate in greater detail the substantive content of development practises that are to occur wlthm thIS 
framework. 
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international governance of capitalist development in the global South would have to be 
refashioned. 
To this end, in 1999 Bank President James Wolfensohn unveiled a new and holistic 
development agenda known as the "Comprehensive Development Framework" (CDF). 
Three immediate transformations from previous Bank practice were made explicit. 
Firstly, the basis of the CDF's holistic approach is a broadening of the Bank's 
development agenda to ensure that all country-level borrowing agreements cover a 
wide and systematically elaborated range of concerns. Consistent with the ontological 
foundations of the new paradigm, a whole range of social and institutional reforms need 
to be realised in order to complement existing macroeconomic adjustments. Secondly, 
the CDP envisages a series of procedural changes to Bank operations. These include 
national government ownership of programmes alongside participatory forms of 
producing development strategies at the national and subnational levels. Under the 
provisions of the CDF, the involvement of all relevant stakeholders is required in the 
deliberation and creation of World Bank sponsored development policies and 
programmes. IO Third and finally, the implementation of programmes must involve the 
active participation of the recipients. 1 1 Provocatively, the World Bank now professes a 
development mandate to empower poor people in order that they are able to lift 
themselves out of poverty. In the words of James Wolfensohn, development is no 
I 12 onger to be done to poor people but by them. 
In this respect, the emergence in the late 1990s of "Comprehensive Development" and 
associated policy changes is best understood as driven by a combination of lost 
10 IMF / IDA 1999. 
II 
World Bank 2001a. 
12 Wolfensohn 2001: 4. 
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legitimacy and the tangible need to address the failure of development programmes in 
the South. Without doubt, the cnp rests on a heavy degree of popUlist rhetoric, 
including the invocation of catchwords such as "empowerment", "partnership" and 
"ownership", which are aimed to disarm critique from antagonistic global social 
movements and internal dissenters. Likewise, the shift in emphasis to poverty-
reduction is clearly a central axis in the global legitimation of the IMP and World Bank 
at the tum of the millennium. 13 At one level, the promise of ridding the world of 
poverty is endowed with greater legitimising potential than the mission of promulgating 
an increasingly questioned array of neoliberal economic fundamentals, even if the 
prescription to achieve the former still involves a heavy dose of the latter. At another, 
the pledge to do so through participatory and country-owned procedures also seems to 
address a second primary criticism of combative international social movements that 
emphasised the externally imposed nature of structural adjustment programmes. 
Comprehensive development, however, represents far more than an instrumentally 
designed ideological gambit. That the Bank is actively attempting to find ways to 
reinvent its practices is an indication of the degree to which alternative policy packages 
need to be developed in face of growing contradictions in the global South and the 
political repercussions that these instil. 14 Market-driven restructuring brought a 
heightening of the conflictual tendencies inherent to capitalist social relations and, in 
contrast to the projected death of conscious development strategy in face of abstract 
market forces, has induced strong pressures upon national states to actively intervene in 
the relations of social reproduction. In this manner, from the late 1980s governments 
13 The degree to which the discourse of poverty reduction has pervaded the day-to-day operations of the 
leading international financial institutions is aptly captured by one World Bank researcher who suggested 
that: "The poverty issue is so red-hot that IMF and World Bank staff began to feel that every actIOn 
inside these organizations, from reviewing public expenditure to vacuuming the office carpet, should be 
justified by its effect on poverty reduction", Easterly 2001: 4. . 
14 Petras et al. 1997 presents a range of struggles raised by structural adjustment in Latin .-\menca. 
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across the global South have faced the recurrent necessity of reinventing structural 
adjustment policies in order to address issues of govemability in a period of escalating 
social polarisation. A major trend in Latin America, for example, has been to introduce 
various forms of "neoliberalism with a human face", many of which foreshadow the 
World Bank's current discourse by almost a decade, including the Chilean "Growth 
with Equity" strategy. IS Such strategies have involved increasingly innovative attempts 
at modifying social policy and institutional forms in order to mediate the social 
struggles engendered in the conflict-ridden project of societal restructuring. 
In short, it is precisely the failure of restructuring to achieve the cohesion necessary for 
the sustained reproduction of capital by dissolving the basis of struggle that has 
prompted states in the South to readdress their forms of intervention. Concurrently, it 
is in no small measure as a response to the struggle-driven course of policy change in 
the South that the Bank, alongside the IMF, has been hurried into a prudent strategic 
realignment. To a great extent, therefore, the World Bank is seeking to reinvent its role 
in the governance of global capitalist development in accordance with contemporary 
changes in the global development of class relations. This has involved a change in the 
operating practises of the Bank in order to project a renewed relevance of Bank 
doctrines to the concrete problems faced by governments in the South, a process that 
has culminated in the adoption of the principals of comprehensive development, the 
renewed emphasis on poverty reduction as the central aim of all Bank activities, and the 
production of guidelines on the restructuring and regulation of an ever-wider array of 
social relations. 
15 Social policy restructuring in Mexico (PRONASOL, PROGRESA) and Chile (FOSIS) ar~ prime 
examples of innovative social programmes designed to disarm social struggle and more ettecttvely 
manage social polarisation initiated alongside retrenchment of traditional welfare programmes. 
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2. Comprehensive Development within the Aegis of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers 
The introduction of the Comprehensive Development Framework as a model of 
development practice has been achieved through remodelling of structural adjustment 
lending by the IMF and World Bank under the new motif of "Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers" (PRSPs). According to the IMP, these new policy documents have 
replaced the older Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) as the primary means of 
organising borrowing agreements to low-income countries in order to promote broad-
based growth and reduce poverty.16 They envision a clear yet complementary division 
of labour between the IMP and World Bank, a relationship that World Bank President 
James Wolfensohn referred to as "breathing in and breathing out".17 For its part, the 
IMP has proclaimed its need to "focus conditionality on those policies that are critical 
to achieving the macroeconomic objectives of the programs supported by the Fund" 
whilst engaging with a "clearer division of labor with other international institutions, 
especially the World Bank".18 This new formulation of conditionality and task-division 
is a reaction to criticism of the ineffectiveness of conditionality that had been growing 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 19 Within this division of labour, therefore, the practice of 
cross-conditionality that emerged in the debt crisis period has been given a tangible and 
more clearly formulated existence. Whilst the IMP will concentrate on a familiar range 
of macroeconomic policies and objectives, albeit with each reform rationalised in terms 
of its projected effect on poverty reduction, the World Bank is now responsible for 
overseeing the "social and structural" policies of participating countries. It is for 
16 IMP 2002b. 
17 Wolfensohn 1999: 2. 
18 IMF 2001. 
19 cf. Killick 1995. 
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perfonning these functions within the formation of national PRSPs that the World Bank 
has unveiled the CDF. 
The CDP represents an operational guide, or management tool, for this purpose. On the 
one hand, it offers four guiding principals for all development practice. On the other, it 
stipulates fourteen areas of "social and structural" policy that must be addressed in all 
national development programmes. The four stated operational pillars are: 1) an 
emphasis on long-term vision and strategy, 2) enhanced country ownership of 
development goals and actions, 3) more strategic partnership amongst stakeholders, 
and, 4) accountability for development results. 20 Substantively, "social and structural" 
policies are to be formed with respect to the World Bank's new development 'matrix' 
that identifies and delineates all the policy areas that must be addressed. To this end, 
the matrix specifies fourteen areas that the Bank suggests comprise the hitherto 
undervalued institutional, human and physical dimensions of development strategy. 
These areas range from "good governance" and the rule of law, through to social safety 
nets, education, health, rural and urban strategies, and environmental and cultural 
d· . 21 1menslOns. Together, they form an ambitious policy agenda covering a holistic 
range of issues that broadens the scope of policy and institutional refonn well beyond 
the original locus of state fiscality, interest and exchange rates, and trade liberalisation. 
As such, the CDP reflects a comprehensive delineation of World Bank priorities 
regarding the course of social development strategy. The frontrunners in this new Bank 
strategy were thirteen diverse but heavily indebted countries that produced PRSPs 
along CDP guidelines in 1999 in order to receive debt relief from the Bank. By 
January 2002, however, at least forty-two countries were either implementing or 
20 cf. World Bank 2000b. 
21 Wolfensohn 1999: 5-10. 
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formulating PRSPs and it is the stated objective of the IMP and World Bank to make all 
lending agreements follow the PRSP/CDF template.22 
3. Empowerment and Country Ownership: Conditionality Reformed? 
As noted above, one of the principal pillars of the CDF is the concept of enhanced 
country ownership. According to Bank president James Wolfensohn, in contrast to 
former development programmes that were crafted by international agencies such as 
the Bank and IMF, ownership entails that: 
Countries must be in the driving seat and set the course. They 
must determine the goals and the phasing, timing and sequencing 
of programmes. 23 
Furthermore, ownership is suggested to mean that the policies formed within the 
framework of the PRSP must find their initiative in the country itself, through a 
partnership between elements of the government, civil society, private sector and 
international development community, and not solely in the World Bank. For this 
second generation of reforms to be truly effective, the Bank argues, reforms must not 
be centrally imposed but require the support of all affected social groups. Hence, 
although the World Bank has taken the lead in forming the Comprehensive 
Development Framework, it insists that the design and ownership of the policies 
formed within its matrix by the participating country is essential for success. 
22 Craig and Porter 2003: 54. 
23 Wolfensohn 1999: 5. 
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However, given the emergence of the CDFIPRSPs as part of an effort to readdress the 
effectiveness of conditionality agreements, the bold assertion that each participant 
country needs to 'own' its programme, and the implications of autonomy that this 
connotes, appears as a particularly incongruous aspect of the Comprehensive 
Development Framework. The notion of "ownership" is taken directly from business-
management science where it has been developed to improve the commitment of 
employees to firm projects.24 In short, the practises associated with "ownership" are 
constituted within complex power relationships, in this case between international 
finance provider and national governments. On the one hand, ownership explicitly 
aims at improving the efficiency of programme designs through a specialisation of 
functions. As noted above, the elaboration of a PRSP necessarily involves acceptance 
of the larger framework of economic liberalisation established by the Washington 
institutions. Beyond this, however, ownership provides the grounds for national 
governments to take the lead in establishing social and structural programmes with 
respect to local conditions and idiosyncrasies that they would be in a privileged 
position to understand. 
On the other hand, the concept of ownership also belies a transformation and, feasibly, 
an extension of conditionality. Since both the IMF and World Bank directorships must 
vet all development programmes before funding is approved, it is highly improbable 
that the broad trends of the development strategy will be allowed to di verge far from 
Bank and Fund orthodoxy. On the contrary, given the wide propagation of what the 
Bank considers to be "best development practise", national governments are expected 
'4 
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to internalise these lessons in order to receive funding. 25 In this manner, ownership 
could be considered as a kind of "Trojan horse" through which Bank inspired doctrines 
are adopted by countries without need of direct tutelage and with a greater room for 
their creati ve adaptation to local circumstances. 
Behind the World Bank's emphatic pronouncements of ownership, participation and 
shared responsibilities, however, there is an essential and very real manner in which 
country ownership is genuine. This is the manner by which governments are to 
proceed with implementation at a pace in accordance with the generation of compliance 
and participation from civil society and private sector groups. In effect, the national 
government has to ensure that the political conditions for implementation exist, and, as 
such, the onus of ownership falls upon the leadership role of the national government. 
In the terminology of the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department, national 
governments must seize the "locus of initiative" to ensure that key policy makers are 
intellectually convinced and that there is evident public support. 26 Specifically, the 
World Bank suggests that policies formed within the ambit of the Comprehensive 
Development Framework must be subjected to a process of national dialogue between 
all relevant stakeholders. These not only include the World Bank, IMF and national 
government, but private sector and civil society organisations as well. 27 This "hands 
off' approach to the implementation of programmes by the Bank presents national 
governments with the obligation to discipline both themselves and various component 
interest groups in order to receive development finance. Whilst the Bank remains at 
25 Consider, for example, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative to attract G8 
financing. Although ostensibly an autonomous product of African nations, it was nonetheless 
systematically couched in World Bank buzzwords and best-practise models, and pledged a. full 
commitment to continue the forms of macroeconomic restructuring that have delivered no repneve from 
stagnation for the continent in twentv years; cf. Sender 2002. 
26 World Bank 2003c. . 
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arms length, able to provide specific guidelines to best practise and the funds to carry 
out operations, this new division of labour places the functions of consensus generating 
in the hands of the domestic government. As the Bank affirms: 
The whole framework rests on the premise that the Bank need not 
lead - or even be involved - as long as the process produces the 
desired results. 28 
In the World Bank's vision of the PRSP formation process, the private sector, civil 
society, national and regional governments and the international agencies would all 
have an equal opportunity to put forward their particular views on different aspects of 
the system. The projected raison d' etre for this participatory form of deliberation is one 
of efficiency, which relates to the division of expertise that, as noted above, frames the 
concept of ownership. A shift towards more participatory development projects had 
begun in the 1980s as a response to recognition that externally imposed and technocrat-
orientated forms of research and implementation showed serious shortcomings.29 
Participatory development, therefore, is based on the principle that recipient groups and 
poor communities are in a privileged position to know their own needs, allowing 
accurate information regarding the kind of micro-projects necessary to promote 
capitalist development to float upwards through the deliberation process. This is 
intended to lead to better-targeted projects that will have greater chances for success. 
Moreover, given their common role as equal participants in the programme design 
process, the Bank intends that recipient groups will view projects as having greater 
legitimacy and will also act in order to facilitate programme realisation. 
'8 
. World Bank 2000b: 1. 
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Like many Bank conceptualisations, however, this vision is shrouded in a model of 
harmony that, as noted by Else 0yen, is "seducing in all its good will and buzzwords of 
partnership, sharing of social capital, equality and acceptance". 30 The latter masks the 
problematic nature of power relations that permeate the process. On the one hand, the 
assumed equality of voices ignores the vast inequalities in material and political power 
that enable privileged groups to exercise a profound influence over deliberations and 
implementation. Alongside its own power vis-a-vis client countries, the World Bank's 
discourse conveniently ignores deeply imbedded national power structures that 
profoundly condition the process of political decision-making. Secondly, even within 
these curtailed possibilities for political pluralism, as in all good management practises 
derived from business studies, the realm of influence of subordinate groups is clearly 
and precisely delineated to particular micro levels. The modes in which subordinate 
groups can participate are all shaped at the level of the World Bank and national policy 
elites and they enter the "national dialogues" that are intended to precede PRSP 
formation on these terms. Within the framework of the PRSPs, which separate the 
IMF's focus on macro-economic policy from the World Bank's social and structural 
policies undertaken within the CDF, fundamental issues such as trade liberalisation, 
privatisation and other macro and structural policies are partitioned off from pluralist 
deliberation at a prior level. This follows the trend witnessed throughout the neoliberal 
period of removing key decisions (monetary policy aimed at price-stability is in 
example par excellence) from the ambit of politics and placing them in the realm of 
technocratic decision making, such as an independent central bank. At issue is the 
containment of inherently political issues behind a fa~ade of rationally-grounded 
neutrality. 
30 Oyen 2001: 3. 
30..+ 
Emerging empirical case studies provide support for an interpretation of ownership and 
partnership as a contradictory attempt at incorporating diverse social groups into a 
tightly constrained realm of decision making in order to promote both efficiency and 
legitimacy. One report made at the request of the IMP and World Bank in Bolivia - an 
initial test case for the PRSPs and CDP - suggests that in the political process of 
debating the CDP programmes, the poor were represented through proxy by 
sympathetic figures from the established political system, rather than by democratically 
selected community groups or figures. Moreover, the latter were not permitted to 
address the issues of economic and political reforms, but were merely invited to express 
opinions on technical aspects of social programme form and implementation. Many 
participants, however, expected that they would not just have a voice in the process, but 
a vote too. As one official put it, "the public could become frustrated and highl y 
sceptical of this type of consultation".31 Similarly, the "Partnership for Governance 
Reform in Indonesia", initiated through the World Bank, United Nations Development 
Program, and the Asian Development Bank in October 2000, was also meant to operate 
according to the principals of partnership between all stakeholders. However, civil 
society groups were marginalized within the reform process, with strong governmental 
and private sector representation concretising existing power structures within the 
deliberations. Of particular note is the systematic exclusion of any trade union voices 
despite the latter's recognised role in the democratisation struggles of the late 1990s.
32 
Such accounts reinforce the critique of the Bank's usage of participation offered by M. 
Aycrigg, who states that: 
11 
. Cavero et al. 2002. 
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Many project examples could be cited in which priman 
stakeholders were consulted as to project components or 
implementation strategy, but did not participate Tn the 
identification / selection ofproject components. Yet these projects 
are still referred to as participatory?3 
The extremely constrained nature of pluralism in the operational form of the 
CDFIPRSPS is indicative of a wider political unwillingness and theoretical inability to 
conceive of power relations in the framework of the Bank's worldview. Presently, 
however, the chapter moves away from analysing the form of World Bank relations 
with client countries to examine the substantive content of the new development 
philosophy and some of its practical policy implications. 
4. Freeing the Global Market 
A critical assertion of the World Bank is that the range and breadth of the areas for 
reform in their CDFIPRSP approach to development represent a marked improvement 
on the prior "Washington Consensus" mode1. 34 According to the Bank's interpretation 
of its own history, the former focused too stringently upon macroeconomic issues and 
neglected other institutional and policy areas that are key for the achievement of 
sustained growth and poverty reduction. In this respect, the World Bank is tacitly 
acknowledging that its previous approach, resting upon an overriding concern for 
neoIiberal macroeconomic management, has proved inadequate. In contrast, the new 
.1.1 A . ycngg 1998: 19. 
34 cf. Gilbert and Vines 2000. 
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approach rests heavily on the theoretical basis of the "institutional turn" in neoclassical 
economics, as typified by Joe Stiglitz (chief economist at the Bank between 1997 and 
2000) and others such as Douglas North.35 From this perspective, property rights, 
sound money, fiscal solvency, market-oriented incentives remain necessary aspects of a 
growth strategy, but their sustained achievement involves a high degree of institutional 
development appropriate to local circumstance. In the words of Joe Stiglitz: 
Trying to get government better focused on fundamentals ... is a 
vital step. But focusing on the fundamentals is not a recipe for a 
minimalist government. The state has an important role to play in 
appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social protection and 
welfare.36 
The theoretical basis for this reassessment of neoclassical principals is located in a 
modified interpretation of the underlying assumptions of the former. Recalling the 
quote from Milton Friedman in chapter one, all consensual exchanges under conditions 
of adequate information are mutually beneficial. Unlike the neoclassical tradition, 
however, Stiglitz and associated economists emphasize the imperfect nature of 
information as being a pervasive feature of market transactions: 
Incomplete information, incomplete markets, incomplete contracts 
are all inevitable features of the economy in general and the 
financial system in particular. 37 
35 t' A 
' c, nkarloo 2002. 
36 Stiglitz 1998: 125. 
37 Stiglitz 1998: 14. 
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In practise, therefore, Stiglitz's reformulation of the Washington Consensus into the 
post-Washington Consensus that is savvy to the insights of information-theoretic 
economics involves a fuller role for the state in promoting efficient regulatory 
institutions that can prevent informational failures?8 It is precisely the existence of 
imperfect information that necessitates state action - not to undertake the functions of 
markets, but to provide a sound regulatory environment that can mitigate informational 
imperfections. In this manner, as the World Bank echoes: 
The efficiency of markets, which are themselves institutions, 
depends on the strength of supporting institutions that help align 
the expectations of agents regarding the procedures that govem 
h . . 39 t ezr transactlOns. 
Nonetheless, despite these reVISIOns, the pnmary ontological assumptions of 
neoclassical economICS remain. First and foremost, as Ben Fine has demonstrated, 
methodological individualism remams the assumption of the post-Washington 
Consensus formulation. Consequently, the new framework retains the basis of a 
perfectly competitive market composed of rational self-maximising individuals, yet 
charts how information imperfections impose deviations from this state. As such, the 
post-Washington Consensus model understands the capitalist economy as a "construct 
of imperfectly informed individuals, imperfectly co-ordinated through the market 
place", a neat reduction which enables all other analytical principles to be ignored'-~o 
Even questions concerning explicit power relations, never mind the abstract forms of 
38 The most explicit statement of this influence in the Bank is the World Development Report 2002: 
"Building Institutions for Markets" (World Bank 2002). 
39 World Bank 2000a: 22. 
40 F' me 200lb: 7. 
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domination that structure capitalist society, remain absent. This leads to an overriding 
fundamental assumption - that if measures are taken to mitigate information 
imperfections, the heart of the liberal ideal of a world composed of rational utility-
maximising indi viduals engaged in harmonious exchange relations can be retained. 
To the extent that the Bank has embraced them, the post-Washington Consensus 
arguments provide not only a modified theoretical basis for policy formation, one that 
attempts to chart new ground in the state versus markets dichotomy integral to debates 
over neoliberalism, they can also serve as an rationalization of the dismal historical 
record of the Washington Consensus in achieving its projected aims. As Dani Rodrik 
quips, "sound economics has too often been delivered in an unsound form".41 Indeed, 
if all "developing countries" were ordered according to economic performance and 
poverty reduction, then those countries with the strongest adherence to the major tenets 
of the Washington Consensus (many Latin American countries and some in Africa) 
would be placed far down the list. In contrast, those countries heading the list (East and 
South-East Asia, China and India) have, in different ways, deviated widely from the 
Washington approach.42 This divergence, however, can now be explained on the basis 
of information-theoretic economics as the failure of the former to provide an adequate 
institutional framework that would have allowed neoliberal-style reforms to succeed. 
Consequently, the large discrepancy between theoretical projections of neoclassical 
economics and ugly reality of crisis and stagnation in the structurally adjusted South 
does not entail that Bank fundamentals or their ontological presuppositions are 
Incorrect. On the contrary, as James Wolfensohn stipulates, neoliberal macroeconomic 
.1 Rodrik 2003: 12. 
42 Rodrik 2003. 
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management still constitutes "one side of the development coin".43 In this way, the 
macro-economic fundamentals espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s, predicated on the imposition of the discipline of fiscal 
prudence onto the practises of the national state whilst removing political constraints to 
the external movement of capital and commodities ("free markets, sound money"), 
remain at the heart of the new development corpus. Hence, the Bank proclaims that its 
economic fundamentals remain correct: 
Some economic policies - such as openness to international trade, 
sound monetary and fiscal policies (reflected in moderate budget 
deficits and the absence of high inflation), a well-developed 
financial system, and a moderately sized government - are 
I d · . h44 strong y con UClve to economlC growt . 
This remains the lynchpin of the Bank's strategy as they stipulate that economic growth 
to be stimulated through market liberalisation is "systematically associated" with 
development and poverty reduction. To return to the basis of the Washington 
Consensus policy prescription, it is based on the neoclassical fable that all freely 
conducted economic exchanges, assuming full knowledge of all relevant infonnation 
on both sides, will necessarily be mutually beneficial. By definition, therefore, any 
action that enlarges the realm of possible market exchanges is one that serves to 
promote the common good by expanding the mass of positive sum games. Hence, in 
the World Bank's view, the effects of globalliberalisation, in the fonn of globalisation, 
4} Wolfensohn 1999: 1. 
44 World Bank 200la: 49. One of the key elements of this macroeconomic framework is the resolute 
adherence to capital account liberalisation, as laid down in detail in World Bank 2001b and critiqued In 
Soederberg 2002a. 
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offer unprecedented opportunities for both the South and the North.-+s Firstly, 
integration of Southern economies with the world market offers far wider range of 
potential exchange relationships. Secondly, it also holds the possibility of increased 
investment in the form of foreign capital. Both of the former are assumed to result in 
the development of productive capacity and, therein, material wealth, development and 
poverty reduction. Finally, integration also imposes further discipline upon 
governments to make correct policy choices. Insufficiently liberalised economies face 
neglect by international capital owing to the negative effects of restraints on economic 
activity. Good policy therefore involves the furnishing of 'sound investment 
environments' in order to attract capital for productive investment, and hence continue 
along the path of capitalist development. 
For the World Bank, to facilitate the establishment of the full range of institutional 
prerequisites necessary for a sound investment environment, it is necessary to broaden 
the development agenda by way of the CDF. What is required is to proceed beyond 
liberalisation to ensure that the correct institutional forms facilitate the benign operation 
of market forces. In contrast to the former doctrine of the minimalist state, the new 
doctrine professes that states need to actively intervene to facilitate and regulate the 
conditions for free economic exchange, and to correct potential market failures caused 
by asymmetries of information. The latter are particularly prevalent within the 
developing world owing to the underdeveloped nature of capitalist relations, and 
therefore necessitate a much fuller role of the state in establishing institutions that 
channel information about market conditions, goods and participants than the anti-state 
bias of initial restructuring models suggested.46 
41 t' W 
. c. orld Bank 2000a. 
46 World Bank 2002: 8. 
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As such, the substantive emphasis of comprehensive development is the refashioning of 
national and sub-national institutional forms in order to compliment and optimise the 
basic fundamentals of market relations. Subsequently, "good governance", which in 
the World Bank's presentation entails the creation of transparent and accountable 
institutional forms leading to market-enabling policy content, has become the primary 
goal of development initiatives in the twenty-first century. In this vein, the "social and 
structural" reforms that constitute the objective of comprehensive development are 
necessary in order to allow individuals, and particularly the impoverished sections of 
society, to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the first generation of 
macroeconomic reforms. Indeed, with respect to the overarching aim of poverty-
reduction, the new strategy rests upon the hypothesis that numerous social and 
institutional factors obstruct poor people from effectively exchanging assets in markets. 
It is not, therefore, market failures that induce poverty, but the failure of poor people to 
adequately access markets owing to institutional and social impediments such as 
corruption, discrimination, and political voicelessness. These market imperfections are 
the result of cumulative human, social and political failures. Consistent with the 
theoretical impetus of the CDF, any development strategy centred on poverty reduction 
must aim not only to expand economic opportunities through sound macroeconomic 
management, but also to refashion institutions and social practises in order to remove 
the imperfections that impair market exchanges.47 In the words of the Bank: 
47 d. World Bank 2001a: Chapter..f. 
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Societies have to help poor people overcome the obstacles that 
prevent them from freely and fairly participating in markets.48 
Hence, the World Bank's role through the CDP is to foster changes in the social and 
political frameworks that at current are preventing poor people from freely integrating 
themselves with markets. The prime factor that the Bank identifies as restraining 
market access is the relative lack of accountability and responsiveness of state 
institutions in the global South. Thus the state is to be made more responsive to the 
needs of the poor, which, as presupposed by the Bank, is free market access and, 
controversially, the poor are to be "empowered" to make this happen.49 
5. Good Governance and Empowerment 
As a result, within the rubric of 'good governance', public administrations must 
become efficient, accountable and responsive to users, including the curtailment of 
corruption and 'harassment'. In this manner, the good governance agenda focuses on 
creating streamlined and decentralised public sectors that are efficient, accountable and 
focused on addressing social needs through market-promoting strategies, rather than 
acting as devices for elite rent creation.5o The prominent buzzwords are 'performance 
incentives', 'rationalisation' and 'modernization'. It is suggested that in nearly every 
country the public sector often pursues activities that are not socially justified or that 
create rents for elites, a phenomenon that occurs in two manners. Firstly, the state 
bureaucracy has tendencies to inefficiency and corruption, features that not only 
48 World Bank 2001a: 61. 
49 The issue of empowerment has provoked serious conflicts within the Bank, and between the Bank and 
the United States; cf. Wade 2002. 
so cf. World Bank 2001a, 2002. 
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undermine the common good but also disproportionately prejudice the poor. Secondly, 
within governance frameworks that do not provide transparency and pluralist fonn of 
participation, social elites are better able to mobilize the distributional functions of the 
state to reflect their interests, again primarily at the expense of the poor. 
The solution within the CDF is a four-pronged good governance strategy that seeks to 
actively remove all institutional constraints upon market activity and to refashion 
institutions to facilitate more actively market exchanges. Firstly, liberal-democratic 
fonus of selecting governments through free elections are to be promoted. Where 
public servants are un-elected, ensuring the existence of incentives to withhold 
tendencies towards corruption are necessary: 
Key incentives include merit-based recruitment, clear 
specification of tasks, rewards for good performance, and 
insulation from excessive political pressure. Together with skilled 
technocrats and close collaboration with the business community, 
these make up what has been termed 'the developmental state' .51 
Secondly, decentralisation is championed as bringing mechanisms for broad 
participation into the delivery of public services, and hence minimising the scope for 
capture by elites. As discussed in chapter five, the World Bank's idea that 
decentralisation removes service provision from established webs of patronage, 
however, is based more on hope than any substantial evidence as it ignores the multiple 
51 World Bank 2001a: 100. It is interesting to note how the Bank seizes upon the conc~pt of the 
··developmental state" but refashions it to remove the original emphasis on active interventIOn In key 
economic sectors and reduce it to an idealised vision of "good governance" in which public servants are 
provided incentives in order to act in a neutral and technocratic manner. 
manners by which localised power relations permeate project implementation and 
service delivery. Given that decentralised and "owned" programmes commonly require 
local communities to draft their own projects and contribute labour and monetary 
resources, issues of community power relations are necessarily prominent within this 
52 process. 
Thirdly, enforcing the rule of law is paramount within good governance. At first 
impression, the formal equality of all citizens before the law is clearly a progressive 
aspect of liberal doctrine, especially considering that poor people have often been 
victims of a lack of access to legal rights. Nevertheless, enforcing the rule of law -
particularly the sanctity of private property - is concurrently a means to ensure the 
status quo of class relations constitutive of capitalism. This is not formulated as a 
problem within the World Bank's theoretical construct of capitalist society, as the latter 
is premised upon a harmonious model of individual asset owners looking to maximise 
the benefits of their freely chosen economic exchanges with other individuals. 
Methodological individualism, however, serves as a convenient abstraction away from 
the class nature of capitalist social relations in which the 'free' labourer meets the 
owner of capital, with the latter enjoying privileged control over the means of 
production through juridically sanctified ownership. The rule of law codifies the 
contractual relations that constitute the basis of social reproduction in capitalist society 
- the free and consensual exchange of labour power for wages. Whilst these exchange 
relations are legally constituted as relations of equivalence, their substance is one of 
substantive inequality through the extraction of surplus value in production and the 
appropriation of the material form of this surplus by the capitalist as a quantity of use-
)2 For example, refer to the discussion in Tendler 2000. 
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values. In this way, through the defence of private property the rule of law protects 
both the rights of labour and capital to contract free from coercion, as emphasised by 
the World Bank. Simultaneously, and ignored by the Bank, however, it protects the 
claim of the capitalist to the yield of the production process.53 
In conjunction with the 'good governance' doctrine, comes "empowerment". 
According to the World Bank, empowerment is a process whereby the poor are 
politically mobilised to aid the process of state and social institution reform in order to 
reduce the bureaucratic and social constraints on economic activity and upward 
b'l' 54 mo 1 tty. Pro-poor "coalitions" are to be encouraged, which involves the state 
providing the conditions under which the interests of the poor and non-poor can be 
linked in the form of political associations (or, in the World Bank's formulation 
"enhancing the perception of common interests between the poor and the nonpoor,,).55 
The manner by which this is to be achieved is threefold: first, through promoting 
democracy and the rule of law; second, through reducing informational asymmetries 
via education and ensuring the transparency of government actions and decision 
making; third, through technical assistance to civil society groups that can help form 
"pro-poor coalitions". 
Integrally entwined into the Bank's empowerment, however, are a range of disciplines. 
In the Bank's vision, poor people are encouraged to form pressure groups that can act 
as a countervailing power against corruption and elite rent seeking through state 
manipulation. Corruption is seen as a particular problem as it can serve to restrain the 
development of capitalist social relations as special interests either siphon off money or 
53 d. Blanke, JUrgens and Kastendiek 1976. 
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block social change that would enable the proliferation of free market exchanges. 56 
Collective action by the poor, therefore, is to be used for applying political pressure in 
order to guarantee the quality of state services and peer monitoring of their delivery, 
thereby mitigating the possibilities of development resource capture by elites. 
Collective action beyond ensuring accountability and a superior quality of service 
delivery, however, is not welcome. Political movements that might threaten the status 
quo as enshrined by property rights and the primacy of free markets are symptomatic of 
poor people who do not recognise their own best interests. In the words of the Genoa 
report produced by officials from the eight richest countries in the world yet speaking 
on behalf of the global poor: 
From the perspective of the poor, there are risks that justified 
concerns about their interests are manipulated to support a return 
. . 57 to protectlOnlSm. 
A second example serves to illustrate the manner in which empowerment within the 
Comprehensive Development cannon is constituted within the limits of capital. Given 
the dependence of poor people upon wage labour - as noted by the World Bank who 
label the ability to work as poor people's "most abundant asset,,58 - the realm of labour 
and production could be considered a primary area for poor people's empowerment. 
However, as systematically elaborated in the 1995 World Development Report, this 
empowerment is circumscribed within the limits of market conforming behaviour. 
Building from the theoretical postulate that trade liberalization may not reallocate 
resources appropriately if the labour markets are insufficiently 'flexible', the World 
56 However, see Kahn 2002 for the limits of this perspective. 
57 G8 2001: 12. 
58 World Bank 1990: 15. 
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Bank suggests it is a policy priority to ensure that worker empowerment in no way 
interferes with the optimal mechanisms of the market. Hence, unionisation _ 
historically a vitally important form of empowerment for those seeking to improve their 
life conditions - must be constrained within strict limits.59 
As examined in chapter five, the World Bank suggests that a tight correlation between 
the needs of the firm and its workforce must be forged by restricting any forms of 
collective negotiation above the level of the firm. Concurrently, free market reforms 
must create a framework of full competition between firms. By enforcing the discipline 
of the market upon each individual capital through the pressures of competition, it is 
intended that a symbiosis will form between workers and firm, as the former would 
restrict any demands to within the limits of market competitiveness for fear of 
enterprise collapse and job loss. In short, for the World Bank, market pressures levied 
upon the individual firm are to be internalised by the workforce, and unionisation must 
restrict itself to cooperative arrangements to improve efficiency and equity rather than 
challenge market outcomes. Worker empowerment, therefore, is to be achieved 
through the medium of the economic success of the firm at which they work, and 
therefore "empowerment" must be subordinate to the turbulent yet abstract domination 
of market forces. 60 
Once again, we see that the World Bank wishes that the working class reconcile itself 
to - and even promote - its status as a commodity. If one of the reasons that labour 
markets do not operate according to the neoclassical models for other commodity 
59 In this respect, the Chilean experience is extremely pertinent. . 
60 World Bank 1995: 83-6. As discussed previously, no antagonism between employer and worker IS 
conceivable as wages are assumed to coalesce at an optimum level set by the invisible hand of the 
market. 
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markets (the market for frozen fish, for example), then it is necessary for workers to 
behave less like human beings with strong sentiments concerning the terms and 
conditions of the sale of labour-power and its subsequent expenditure, and to behave 
more like frozen fish. The latter, of course, undertakes no agency to alter its conditions 
of use once the sale has been made. The distinctiveness of labour-power as a 
commodity, however, is precisely the distinction that Marx made between labour and 
labour-power; that labour-power represents the capacity to work and the capitalist 
production process relies on the ability of the capitalist to ensure that the value 
produced by exertion of labour is more than that represented by the wage. It is this 
fundamental antagonism that underscores the volatility of labour markets and the 
production process. 
development. 
It also represents the fundamental tension of capitalist 
World Bank empowerment, therefore, places responsibilities on the poor to act in 
accordance with the liberal designs of the Bank and to confine social aspirations within 
the limits of capital as manifested in the fetishised form of the market. In this way, 
empowerment is only permissible to the degree that it is market conforming and market 
facilitating. It is a euphemism for development practise that attempts, first, a fuller 
incorporation of poor people into market relations - or, to be more specific, to offer 
their labour-power on suitably flexibilised labour markets; and, second, to make those 
relations more efficiently owing to the removal of particular interests that impinge upon 
the abstract forms of capitalist domination. Empowerment is therefore the new means 
towards the familiar end of market exchanges. The latter, in turn, present themselves 
and are subsequently represented as a world of freedom, equilibrium and opportunity, 
not of asymmetrical power relationships, social imposition and exploitation. 
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6. Comprehensive Development and the Future of Restructuring? 
In essence, the much-heralded novelty of Comprehensive Development, despite claims 
to the contrary, is not one of aims but rather one of means. At core, Comprehensive 
Development presents a vision of the extension of social engineering through policy 
and institutional reforms in order to achieve a projected market utopia in the global 
South. The Bank's conceptualisation of empowerment, therefore, rests on the notion 
that empowerment is the removal of obstructions to participation in market relations. 
More specifically, this means harnessing the agency of the poor to remove restraints 
upon the reproduction and sale of their labour-power. The telos of empowerment, 
therefore, is an unmediated relationship between global capital and global labour. 
Consideration of markets as constituted within and constitutive of asymmetrical power 
relations that belie the appearance of free exchange, however, is entirely absent from 
the Bank's conceptual apparatus. When attention is focused upon exchange being not a 
neutral encounter between rational individuals but, rather, as one moment of the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations - and therefore of a process characterised by 
asymmetrical relations of domination mediated through the social power of money and 
sanctified by the rule of law - it becomes possible to perceive why the real world of 
capitalist development does not conform to the harmonious social relations predicted 
by neoclassical thought. 
The major contradictions that surface within comprehensive development. therefore, 
are not in essence those of the World Bank's programme, which consistently advocates 
extending and deepening the discipline of market relations upon all social actors in 
order to maximise the expanded reproduction of capital, but those of capitalist social 
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relations. The latter, it has been suggested do not operate in the general equilibrium 
mould of neoclassical economics, as is the Bank's presupposition, but are predicated 
upon exploitation and have inherent tendencies towards unequal development and 
crisis. In short, market relations are not harmonious but antagonistic, and this is why 
the Bank needs to integrate its calls for pluralism and empowerment within structures 
of discipline and compulsion. 
These tensions are likely to be the object of sustained social struggles between groups 
and classes within national social formations, and also at a global level, between the 
Bank, core states and emergent global social movements. In this respect, the new 
emphasis upon participation and empowerment should not be understood merely as an 
instrumental strategy to co-opt struggles over the course of capitalist development,61 
but rather a sign of the continuing crisis of capitalist development at a global level that 
has manifested itself within the Bank. As with the discussion of "growth with equity" 
in Chile, the precise form and content of the category of empowerment as realised in 
development practise will be determined by struggle. With the World Bank and IMP 
keen to structure all forms of development lending into the Comprehensive 
Development template, its immanent contradictions are likely to be propagated at a 
wider level with unclear consequences. 
Clearly, the World Bank and its national level clients enjoy considerable resources 
through which to attempt to impose strict limits upon the forms that empowerment can 
take. However, it is also clear that harnessing subordinate populations to facilitate their 
increased exploitation by global capital is a decisively paradoxical utopia. The task of 
progressive struggle will be to attempt to push empowerment beyond the limits 
61 Cammack 2001, 2003. 
prescribed by the Bank, both in terms of the substance of empowerment and the social 
realms in which empowerment can be articulated. Whilst the difficulties of such 
strategies cannot be understated, they do offer an opportunity to take advantage of how 
the World Bank has embedded this expression of the contradictions of capitalist 
restructuring within its policy prescription. 
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